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As if to debunk the conventional wisdom, the 101st Congress busied itself
with efforts to override numerous Supreme Court decisions construing federal
statutes.1 Successful legislation overrode eight recent opinions interpreting
federal statutes.2 Overturning an older decision, another law for the first time
rejected a Supreme Court interpretation discriminating against bisexuals, gay
men, and lesbians.3 Even abortive override efforts in the 101st Congress
1. This Article will use the term "override" to mean any time Congress reacts consciously to, and
modifies a statutory interpretation decision. A congressional "override" includes a statute that: (I) completely
overrules the holding of a statutory interpretation decision, just as a subsequent Court would overrule an
unsatisfactory precedent; (2) modifies the result of a decision in some material way, such that the same case
would have been decided differently; or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision, such that the same
case would have been decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided differently. With
only a few exceptions, this Article will not use the term "override" to include statutes for which the
legislative history-mainly committee reports and hearings-does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial
decisions.
2. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Public Employees
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. & Loan, 489 U.S. 561 (1989); United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49 (1987); Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984). Appendix I lists the statutes
overriding these decisions.
3. The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990), rewrote
the exclusion provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in part to override Boutilier v. INS, 387
U.S. 118 (1967), which had interpreted the Act to exclude bisexuals, gay men, and lesbians from the United
States.
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illustrated Congress' attention to the Court's statutory interpretation cases. Most
prominent among the unsuccessful override efforts was the vetoed Civil Rights
Act of 1990, which would have overturned nine recent decisions narrowly con-
struing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and related statutes. A similar
Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, was enacted into law by the 102d Con-
gress.4
Congress' attention to the Court's statutory decisions raises issues that are
critically important to statutory interpretation scholarship. Specifically, Con-
gress' recent override activity presents scholars with an opportunity to revisit
longstanding academic debates about (1) congressional awareness of, and
responsiveness to, Supreme Court decisions in general; (2) political theories that
realistically describe both the legislative process and the interaction between
the Court and Congress; and (3) the ramifications of the first two debates for
the theory and practice of statutory interpretation.
Three obstacles thus far have hindered academic debate on these topics.
First, and most important, existing scholarship has not yielded much reliable
data about when and how often Congress overrides the Court. Even the leading
empirical studies by political scientists are, on the whole, disappointingly
incomplete. Second, theoretical literature on the legislative process is divided
into opposing viewpoints that fail to recognize alternative approaches. One side
views the political process as dominated by rent-seeking interest groups, while
the other sees politics as deliberation about the common good. Without a
4. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 would have overturned Independent Fed'n of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 754 (1989); Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986);
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). Identical bills were introduced in both chambers to override these
cases. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), and H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Congress passed
the override bill as amended. The President vetoed the bill, and his veto was sustained by a 66-34 vote in
the Senate. 136 CONO. REc. S 16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which passed
Congress in November 1991 and was signed by President Bush on November 21, see Andrew Rosenthal,
Reaffirming Commitment, Bush Signs Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22. 1991, at Al, overrides these nine
decisions, as well as EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 1227 (1991): West Virginia Univ.
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, Ill S. Ct. 1138 (1991) and Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
Also in 1990, the House Judiciary Committee reported a crime control bill that would have overridden
at least nine interpretations of the federal habeas corpus statute: Sawyer v. Smith. 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990);
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990): Butler v. McKellan, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion): Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982): Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); and Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963). See H.R. REP. No. 681(l), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 123-35 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6528-41. The habeas corpus title of the bill was amended on the floor of the House
and, as amended, was dropped in conference with the Senate. Title Xl of the proposed Crime Control Act
of 1991, H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), which passed the House in October 1991. would override
some of these decisions.
Also in 1990, the Senate passed a bill that would have overridden the celebrated case of Chevron,
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (interpreting Clean Air Act
to permit companies to balance out pollution levels within large "bubble"). See S. REP. No. 228, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3410. This provision was dropped in
conference with the House.
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.consensus, or even dialogue between the competing camps, political science
scholarship is not as helpful to legal scholarship as it might be. Third, legal
theories touching on the political process do not represent the most up-to-date
political science data and theory, Hence, even if reliable empirical data and
useful theoretical consensus existed, they would not necessarily inform legal
discourse.
Based on more comprehensive empirical evidence documenting congress-
ional responses to the Court's statutory interpretation decisions, this Article
presents a revised view of the legislative process and the interaction between
the Court, Congress, and the President. It further discusses the implications that
this revised discourse has for the theory and practice of statutory interpretation.
Part I and the appendices to this Article report the results of an empirical
survey of congressional overrides of Supreme Court-as well as lower
court-interpretations of federal statutes. It concludes that Congress and its
committees are aware of the Court's statutory decisions, devote significant
efforts toward analyzing their policy implications, and override those decisions
with a frequency heretofore unreported. Congressional overrides are most likely
when a Supreme Court interpretation reveals an ideologically fragmented Court,
relies on the text's plain meaning and ignores legislative signals, and/or rejects
positions taken by federal, state, or local governments.
The Article then uses the empirical data and case studies to develop a
theoretical model that deepens our understanding of the interaction between the
Court, Congress, and the President. Part II develops the model by drawing
insights from competing distributive and deliberative theories of legislation. The
model posits that a dynamic game exists between the Court, the relevant
congressional committees, Congress, and the President. In this game, ultimate
statutory policy is set through a sequential process by which each player-in-
cluding the Court-tries to impose its policy preferences. The game is a
dynamic one because each player is responsive to the preferences of other
players and because the preferences of the players change as information is
generated and distributed in the game.
Part III applies the data and the sequential game model to rethink legal
issues of statutory interpretation. Descriptively, a central theme is that the
Court's statutory interpretation decisions are more responsive to the expecta-
tions of the current Congress than to those of the enacting Congress. But the
Court is also responsive to its own institutional and personal prefer-
ences-especially its preference for coherence and predictability in the law.
This descriptive analysis provides new insights into several otherwise puzzling
doctrines of statutory interpretation, including the Court's invocation of special
stare decisis for statutory precedents, its willingness to find meaning in legisla-
tive inaction, and its reliance on subsequent legislative history.
Normatively, this Article analyzes the Court's traditional role as an impor-
tant player contributing to the operation of the pluralist political process. The
[Vol. 101: 331
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Court facilitates the operation of pluralism over time by updating statutes to
reach new situations, to reflect new values, and to accommodate the current
preferences of governing political forces. Current critics, however, believe that
the Court should not pay attention to current legislative preferences in statutory
interpretation and instead should attend only to statutory text or original intent.
This Article argues that the Court's traditional practice survives this objection
but is more vulnerable to another objection: that the Court's practice fails to
give sufficient attention to interests and perspectives that are unrepresented in
our pluralist political system.
I. CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION DECISIONS, 1967-90
A number of empirical studies have focused on congressional responses
to the Supreme Court's statutory decisions.5 They conclude that the Court's
decisions sometimes generate override bills but that these are few in number.
For several reasons, these studies are not as useful as they might be. They take
an unsystematic or fragmented approach to statutory overrides and, as a result,
do not generate a complete sample. They also either ignore unsuccessful
overrides or fail to analyze them systematically. Finally, because of the first
two problems, these studies have failed to generate reliable conclusions about
the conditions that will provoke an override.
These prior studies have only reinforced assumptions that Congress is
generally ignorant of and unresponsive to the Court's statutory decisions.6
However, since 1975, each Congress has overridden (on average) about a dozen
5. The main studies are Beth M. Henschen, Statutory interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressio-
nal Response, II AM. POL. Q. 441 (1983) (legislative responses, including codifications, to Court's labor
and antitrust decisions, 1950-72); Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the
CongressionalAgenda-Setting Process, 5 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989) (same); Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking
and the Modern Court: When Do Supreme Court Rulings Prevail?, 42 W. POL. Q. 493 (1989); Harvey P.
Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law and Politics, 14 J. PUB.
L. 377 (1965); Note, Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1324 (1958) (21 instances of congressional reversal of Supreme Courtdecisions, 1945-57) [hereinafter Note,
Congressional Reversals]; Note, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme Court,
8 J.L. & POL (forthcoming 1992) (122 statutes that have overturned or modified Supreme Court constitution-
al, common law, and statutory decisions, 1804-1990) Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next
Word: Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions (1991) (unpublished paper on file
with the author) (51 congressional responses to Supreme Court's decisions, 1970-88).
This list does not include articles and books that are more casually empirical, anecdotal, or episodic
than the standard citations provided above. Some of these articles are most useful, however. See, e.g., Carol
F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on
State and Local Liability, 20 URB. L. 301 (1988) (legislative response to decisions impairing state and local
interests); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, Mhen Congress Overrles the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (199 1)
(comparing congressional overrides of the Court during New Deal and during Reagan Administration).
6. Judge Abner J. Mikva of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a former member of the House of
Representatives, claims in Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?,
61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609 (1983), that "most Supreme Court decisions never come to the attention of
Congress." See also HARRY WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 11 (1990).
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of the Court's statutory decisions.7 The current study also shows that Congress
monitors the Court's statutory decisions with great care, reflected in the fact
that after 1975 almost half of the Court's statutory interpretation decisions per
year have been or will be the specific focus of congressional hearings.
This part presents the methodology and results of my empirical study.' It
provides a more complete listing of congressional overrides, explores the failure
stories more systematically, and suggests conditions for successful overrides.
It provides the empirical context for a richer and more reliable academic discus-
sion of the interaction between the Court, Congress, and the President in
statutory interpretation.
A. Congressional Override Legislation, 1967-90
Previous studies have been faced with what might be an intractable prob-
lem. Given the enormous amount of material (thousands of pages of statutes
and millions of pages of recorded legislative history) and the failure of the
written record to reflect the complete legislative process, we may never have
a complete list of all statutes overriding Supreme Court decisions. We can do
better than existing lists, however, which for the most part have been compiled
through a very casually empirical process. 9
The United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
(U.S.C.CA.N.) collects the main committee reports and other materials for most
of the public laws enacted by Congress in any given year. Committee reports,
including conference committee reports, routinely discuss judicial decisions
affected by proposed statutory provisions. 0 My research assistants and I
searched the reports printed in the U.S.C.C.A.N. for the period 1967 to 1990,
noting every time a report said a proposed statutory provision "overruled,"
"modified," or (in some cases) "clarified" a federal judicial interpretation of
a federal statute. I then correlated these references to provisions in the enacted
public law, weeding out references to provisions that ultimately were not
7. This study does not include statutes codifying or accepting the Court's statutory interpretation
decisions, statutes responding to the Court's common law or constitutional decisions, or statutes overriding
the Court's decisions without evidence that Congress was specifically responding to the Court. Each
Congress responded to several Supreme Court decisions in these categories, and including these responses
would generate 15-20 override statutes per Congress.
8. The three appendices and the methodological statement at the end of this Article explain this in more
detail.
9. See, e.g.. Note, Congressional Reversals, supra note 5, at 1324 n.3 (researcher compiled congressio-
nal overrides through "[i]nterviews with members of the Harvard Law School community and a search of
written materials" such as the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and law review articles); cf. Solimine &
Walker, supra note 5 (relying mainly on the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and anecdotal evidence).
The best methodology is found in Henschen & Sidlow, supra note 5, at 692 n.30 (examining legislative
hearings to pinpoint override bills), although that study is limited to labor and antitrust overrides and to the
period 1950-72.
10. For elaborate and detailed bills, such as omnibus tax bills, budget reconciliation bills, and
recodifications (such as for bankruptcy and criminal codes), the committee report usually contains, for each
section, a statement of existing law, reasons for changing the existing law, and the proposed changes.
[Vol. 101: 331
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enacted or that did not substantially override a decision.11 I supplemented this
method with a more selective search of committee reports reproduced in
microfiche by the Congressional Information Service, with an examination of
hearings conducted by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees (for part
of this period), and with the consultation of secondary sources.
Appendix I lists the Supreme Court and other federal court statutory
interpretations that have been the subject of overrides during this period.12
Table 1 records the number of statutes in each Congress that contained override
provisions; the number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions
overridden in each Congress, also broken down into recent (ten years or less
between decision and override) and older decisions; and the number of lower
federal court decisions overridden in each Congress. t3 Appendix I lists these
decisions by name. 4
11. This method has some gaps. Not all public laws generate committee reports, not all committee
reports are reproduced in U.S.C.C.A.N. (which also edits the reports), and not all overrides of judicial
decisions are reported in committee reports.
12. This study incorporates overrides of lower federal court decisions to add perspective. A broader
sample should provide a more reliable picture of changes in congressional responsiveness over time. Further,
including lower court decisions gives a better idea of the great variety of subject areas covered by override
bills. Finally, the broader sample will be a corrective for the conclusion, discussed in text accompanying
infra notes 14-15, that Congress is aware of-and overrides many-Supreme Court decisions. The same
cannot be said for lower court decisions; Congress tends not to be aware of them and overrides a much
smaller percentage of them.
13. Lower federal court decisions include decisions by federal district courts, circuit courts of appeals,
magistrates, military tribunals, and specialized federal courts (such as the Tax Court).
14. Table 1 raises an important "counting" problem. A statute overriding a leading Supreme Court or
lower court decision also overrides cases following that leading decision. Counting each of the later or
collateral decisions, in addition to the leading decision, would inflate artificially the number of overrides.
Also, those later cases would prove too difficult to track down. This study seeks to avoid double counting.
Therefore, Table I treats a series of Supreme Court or lower court decisions standing for the same statutory
interpretation as one "Supreme Court Decision Overridden" or one "Lower Court Decision Overridden."
On the other hand, Table I counts each of two Supreme Court interpretations overridden by a statute when
the cases stand for two different propositions or when the cases interpret different statutes or provisions.
In borderline cases, the study relied on the treatment in the committee reports: were the two decisions treated
as independent, or was one considered a derivative of the other?
1991]
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TABLE 1. Congressional Overrides of Federal Statutory Decisions (1967-90)
SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS OVERRIDDEN LOWER COURT
OVERRIDE TOTAL DECISIONS DECISIONSCONGRESS STATTrrEs OVERRIDDEN TOTAL <10 YRS. >10 YRS. OVERRIDDEN
101st (1989-90) 15 27 9 8 1 18
100th (1987-88) 24 39 12 9 3 27
99th (1985-86) 25 45 18 14 4 27
98th (1983-84) 16 44 15 11 4 29
97th (1981-82) 17 24 8 6 2 16
96th (1979-80) 20 31 8 5 3 23
95th (1977-78) 14 43 19 11 8 24
94th (1975-76) 17 34 12 10 2 22
93d (1973-74) 10 14 7 6 1 7
92d (1971-72) 7 12 8 4 4 4
91st (1969-70) 8 15 2 2 0 13
90th (1967-68) 14 16 6 6 0 10
TOTAL 187 344 124 •  92•  32 220
• The 124 Supreme Court decisions overridden include three decisions overridden in more than one
Congress. Altogether, only 121 different decisions were overridden during this period, and only 89 recent (less
than or equal to 10 years old) decisions were overridden.
As Table 1 suggests, Congress frequently overrides or modifies statutory
decisions by lower federal courts as well as those by the Supreme Court. Where
earlier studies have found only three or four Supreme Court decisions overrid-
den by each Congress, this study finds an average of ten per Congress. While
some of the difference results from the more thorough count in this study, most
of it is explained by a change in Congress' responsiveness over time. The 94th
Congress was a turning point. The four Congresses from 1967-74 generated an
average of six Supreme Court overrides per Congress, not many more than the
numbers uncovered in prior studies. In contrast, the eight Congresses from
1975-90, beginning with the 94th, generated an average of twelve Supreme
Court overrides per Congress. When we consider the overrides involving the
decisions of all federal courts, the difference is even more dramatic. The 90th
through 93d Congresses (1967-74) generated an average of fourteen lower court
overrides per Congress, while the 94th through 101st Congresses (1975-90)
generated an average of thirty-five lower court overrides per Congress, two-and-
one-half times the number for the previous period.
The substantial increase in congressional overrides for lower court decisions
reflects a number of obvious developments. First, those years have seen a
geometric increase in the number of lower federal court opinions to which
Congress might respond. Second, Congress has passed more omnibus statutes,
such as reconciliation statutes, statutory reform efforts, and recodifications.
Finally, organized interest groups have proliferated, producing more monitoring
ofjudicial decisions that are then brought to Congress' attention. The latter two
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reasons also probably play a role in the increase in congressional overrides of
the Supreme Court's statutory decisions. 15
Perhaps the most interesting (and heretofore unappreciated) variable
associated with the increased override activity is the growth of congressional
committee staff. As part of the legislative reform process in the early 1970's,
the staffs of the House and Senate standing committees doubled between 1970
and 1975. Between 1973 and 1975 alone, the House committee staffs increased
by two-thirds, and the Senate committee staffs increased by one-third. 6 The
numbers are almost as explosive for the judiciary and labor committees, the
main committees generating congressional overrides. 7 Staff size in House and
Senate committees continued to rise through 1979 and then stabilized (for the
House) or declined (for the Senate) in the 1980's. A similarly dramatic increase
in the sizes of Members' personal staffs and of the staffs of congressional
support agencies also occurred in the first half of the 1970's.' s
Because staffs are essential to monitoring judicial decisions (often through
interest group communications), organizing congressional hearings (a virtual
prerequisite for an override), and drafting committee reports and statutes, the
dramatic increases in staff levels enable Congress to respond to statutory
decisions by the federal judiciary more often. Therefore, it should not be
surprising that the leaps in committee staff numbers closely match the burst in
congressional override activity. The explosion in staff in the period 1973-75
coincides with the increase in congressional override activity in the period
1975-76. The peak of override activity in the period 1977-78 roughly parallels
the peak in committee staff increases at that time. Moreover, the plateau in
override activity in the 1980's tracks the leveling off of committee staff.
Although the increased size of committee staffs (especially in the judiciary
and labor committees) correlates well with the increased override activity, it
is not clear that staff size is the cause-and not the effect-of override activity.
The traditional explanation for the surge in congressional staff numbers during
15. The first reason (increased number of decisions) does not apply to the Supreme Court. For purposes
of comparison, during the entire period of this study, the Supreme Court issued about 80 statutory interpreta-
tion decisions each year.
16. NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VrrAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1989-90, at 136 tbl. 5-5 (1990).
17. The House Judiciary Committee staff went from 27 in 1960, to 35 in 1970, to 69 in 1975, to 80
in 1979, and then stabilized at between 75 and 81 in the 1980's. The House Education and Labor Committee
staff went from 25 in 1960, to 77 in 1970, to 114 in 1975, and then stabilized at between 119 and 127 in
the period since 1975. Id. at 137 tbl. 5-6.
The Senate Judiciary Committee staff went from 137 in 1960, to 190 in 1970, to 251 in 1975, to 223
in 1979, and then fell back to between 134 and 141 during the 1980's. The Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee staff grew from 28 in 1960, to 69 in 1970, to 150 in 1975, to 155 in 1979, and then
fell back to between 119 and 127 in the 1980's. Id. at 138 tbl. 5-7.
18. House Members' personal staffs jumped from 4055 in 1967 to 6939 in 1976, and then increased
only incrementally in the 1980's. Senators' personal staffs jumped from 1749 in 1967 to 3251 in 1976, with
slow increases after that. Id. at 132 tbl. 5-2; see also id. at 133 fig. 5-1 (graphic display of dramatic leaps
in member and committee staff sizes).
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the 1970's emphasizes internal congressional changes. 9 New Democratic
Members of Congress in the early 1970's demanded a greater diffusion of
power, which placed more authority in subcommittees. The proliferation of
subcommittees, and thus of independent power centers, required more staff in
the House. The Senate experienced some committee staff increase, but also
greatly expanded Members' personal staffs in 1975.1° This traditional explana-
tion suggests that the increased override activity stemmed from changes internal
to Congress.
Another explanation, however, is that congressional staff size-and override
activity-increased as a response to divided government.2 ' A Democratic
Congress has strong incentives to monitor statutory implementation by a
Republican Presidency, and increased monitoring requires an augmented staff.
Confronted with a Republican Supreme Court after 1971 (four Nixon appointees
and later one Ford appointee in place) and an increasingly Republican judiciary
in general, the Democratic Congress in the 1970's had an incentive to monitor
judicial decisions more carefully than it had in the 1960's. This partisan
incentive might have rendered the Democratic leadership in Congress more
receptive to demands by Democrats for more power, more subcommittees, and
more staff.
This divided-government explanation correlates with some of the data. The
boom in congressional overrides started in 1975-78, when enlarged Democratic
majorities in Congress (and, after 1976, a Democratic President) became more
aggressive in scrutinizing the work of Republican judges. Override activity fell
off from 1979-82, as the lower courts were operating with more Democratic
appointees.' This evidence would support the suggestion that both the staff
increases in key committees and the increased override activity resulted from
a Democratic Congress' distrust of a Republican judiciary.
This suggestion is not supported by data from the 1980's, however. For
example, between 1983 and 1987, override activity sharply increased from the
1979-82 dip, even though the Senate was in Republican hands and a Republican
President could exercise a viable veto threat. And congressional override
activity has not increased noticeably since 1987, even though the federal
judiciary has received even larger numbers of Republican appointees and the
Senate has returned to Democratic hands. The evidence from the 1980's
correlates very well with the suggestion that staff size has exercised an indepen-
19. See LEROY N. RIESELBACK, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES (1977); STEVENS. SMITH
& CHRISTOPHER DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 194-98 (1984); Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L
Oppenheimer, The House in Transition, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 27-32 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce
I. Oppenheimer eds., 1st ed. 1977).
20. See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 126.
21. This point was suggested to me by Matt Spitzer.
22. In 1979-82, override activity fell significantly from its 1977-78 "high." By then President Carter
had appointed more than half of the federal judiciary (albeit no Supreme Court Justices).
[Vol. 101: 331
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dent influence on the level of congressional overrides. Just as staff size reached
a plateau in the 1980's, so did override activity.
B. Congressional Monitoring of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions (Judiciary
Committees), 1979-87
A second difficulty with previous surveys is their inattention to proposed
overrides.23 This is an important feature of the overall picture, in part because
an examination of the proposed, but unsuccessful, overrides yields a richer
vision of congressional monitoring of the Court's statutory decisions. Is Con-
gress actively aware of the Court's decisions? How does it become aware? For
what decisions are serious but unsuccessful override efforts mounted? Why do
some efforts fail, while others succeed? The failure stories provide a data base
with which the success stories may be compared, giving us clues about the
types of overrides likely to pass and the ones more likely to fail.
My study of failed overrides is based on a sampling, rather than a compre-
hensive search, methodology.' About half of the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation decisions in any given Term deal with issues within the jurisdic-
tion of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.' I examined the hearings
of these committees during the 96th through 100th Coigresses (1979-88),
searching for analysis and criticism of specific Supreme Court statutory deci-
sions. Appendix II lists those Supreme Court cases examined in either House
or Senate Judiciary Committee hearing during this period. Where applicable,
Appendix II also lists the override bill(s) associated with each decision and
indicates the fate of each bill. Table 2 presents the data as collected in Ap-
pendix II, but correlated with the five Congresses studied.
23. The only study that attempts to consider proposed overrides is Henschen & Sidlow, supra note
5, which is dated (1950-72) and limited to labor and antitrust issues.
24. The approach is dictated by limited human resources. The best way to learn about failed override
efforts would probably involve examination of all of the committee hearings for this period. These hearings
are collected in the Library of Congress' legislative section in the Jefferson Building. But there are literally
thousands of volumes of such hearings for the period in question. Although I found committee hearings
fascinating literature, reading them all would take years to do. Life is short, and so I made the decision to
limit my research to all the House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings from 1979 to 1988.
25. Specifically, these issues include general administrative process and freedom of information,
immigration, bankruptcy, the antitrust laws, substantive criminal law, federal jurisdiction, federal tort and
contract liability, habeas corpus, patent law, copyright and trademark law, and civil rights law. These areas
usually constitute the main areas at issue in 40 or more of the Court's statutory decisions each year (see
Table 3), about half of the 80 or so statutory decisions the Court hands down annually. Note that there is
significant overlap with the jurisdiction of at least one other committee: The labor committees in both the
House and Senate share jurisdiction with the judiciary committees for issues of job discrimination under
Title VII.
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TABLE 2. Judiciary Committee Scrutiny of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions
(1979-88)
DECISIONS CRUTINIZED DECISIONS OVERRID-
DEN AS A PERCENTAGE
WITHIN WTHIN OVER OF ALL CONGRES-











As Table 2 suggests, more than half of the congressional overrides involved
statutory subjects within the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. The overrides that have received the most popular and legal atten-
tion very often involve statutory policy within these committees' jurisdiction.26
Appendix II and the data underlying Table 2 show that a substantial number
of Supreme Court decisions, especially recent ones, were the focus of one or
more House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in each Congress.27
Table 3 takes a seven-year period of the Court's decisions (1977 through 1983
Terms), records how many decisions were the focus of House and Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings, and determines what percentage of each Terms's
decisions within the committees' jurisdiction were scrutinized. This seven-year
period was used because it begins the ten-year period covered by the study of
House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings (see Table 2).












26. This is especially true of the 101st Congress. About half of the enacted overrides originated with
the House or Senate Judiciary Committees, as did the two spectacular failures-the proposed Civil Rights
Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), and the habeas provisions of the Crime Control Act
of 1990, H.R. REP. NO. 681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 122-36 (1990) (deleted in conference), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6527-41.
27. Note that Table 2 counts several decisions more than once, because they were the focus of hearings
in more than one Congress. Hence, the total number of different decisions scrutinized in this period is not
the sum of the decisions scrutinized in each Congress.
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Table 3 shows that the Judiciary Committees actively hold hearings to evaluate
Supreme Court statutory decisions within their jurisdiction. Although as of 1988
the committees had scrutinized only a third of the decisions from the 1980
through 1983 Terms, in a few years the percentage of decisions from that
period will probably approach the forty percent or higher figures of earlier
Terms.8 This finding itself is striking.
Additionally, House and Senate Judiciary Committee members and staff
seem to be aware of decisions besides those for which hearings are held. The
House and Senate Judiciary Committees' knowledge of judicial developments
is not unusual when compared with that of other committees, especially the
labor committees (Education and Labor in the House, Human Services in the
Senate) and the tax committees (Ways and Means in the House, Finance in the
Senate). Contrast this data, which shows significant legislative interest in
Supreme Court statutory decisions, with Dr. Robert Katzmann's empirical work,
which suggests that committee member and staff awareness of lower court
statutory interpretations is much more selective than their awareness of Supreme
Court interpretations.2 9
Tables 1 through 3 and this Article's underlying research suggest that the
Supreme Court's statutory decisions are accessible to Congress. Moreover, this
research indicates that key staff members become aware of any significant
Supreme Court decision affecting issues within their committee's jurisdiction,
but not necessarily every significant lower court decision. Almost half of the
Court's decisions are examined over time in "oversight" hearings-committee
members, other relevant officials, and representatives of private groups discuss
the policies adopted in those decisions. But less than a fifth of the decisions
seriously examined by the relevant committees are actually overridden by Con-
gress.
C. Supreme Court Decisions Most Likely To Be Overridden by Congress
A final difficulty with previous studies is their failure to explain convinc-
ingly the circumstances under which Congress will override Supreme Court
statutory decisions. The rest of this part will make empirical and comparative
28. This is because the "Decisions Scrutinized" column is cumulative. As the committees examine more
decisions each year, they add to the total from prior years.
29. Dr. Robert Katzmann conducted a survey of congressional staff awareness of 15 significant statutory
opinions of the D.C. Circuit in 1989. He found the staff unaware of 12 of the 15 decisions, including the
four cases within the jurisdiction of the well informed House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice. Dr. Katzmann found that "staffs tend to be aware of cases when those cases
are so-called major cases, that is, those cases in which the Supreme Court has resolved the matters, or cases
in which the losing party, for example, an interest group or trade organization, seeks some sort of relief
through the legislative process. Otherwise, the staff member is dependent upon what he or she might glean
from the summaries offered by a reporting service if he or she has the time or inclination to peruse them."
Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241,
323-24 (1988) (remarks of Robert Katzmann).
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observations about the characteristics of Supreme Court decisions that render
them most likely to be overridden. Part II will then utilize political science
theory to develop a model of congressional overrides.
Appendix III compiles some simple information about the 121 Supreme
Court statutory decisions overridden in the last twelve Congresses. From the
list in Appendix III, Table 4 characterizes the areas of law with the most
override activity.3 0
TABLE 4. Subject Matter of Statutes Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation Decisions (1967-90)
SUBJECr 1AATrER NUMBER OF OVERRIDES PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Criminal Law 18 15%
Antitrust 11 9%
Civil Rights 11 9%
Bankruptcy 10 8%
Federal Jurisdiction & Procedure 9 7%
Environmental Law 9 7%
Income Tax 8 7%
Copyright, Trademark & Patent Law 8 7%
Intergov'tl Relations & Federalism 6 5%
Longshoremen & Shipping 6 5%
Federal Torts/Contracts 4 3%
Armed Services & Veterans Affairs 4 3%
Immigration 4 3%
Gov't Employment 3 3%
Freedom of Information 2 2%
Admiralty (Ports) 2 2%
Common Carriers 1 1%
Traditional Labor Law 1 1%
ERISA 1 1%
Banking Regulation I 1%
Stockyards 1 1%
Social Welfare I %
TOTAL 121 101%
Table 4 demonstrates that the House and Senate Judiciary Committees have
jurisdiction over most override efforts. The judiciary committees have primary
or exclusive jurisdiction over 54% of the total overrides in this period (criminal
law; federal jurisdiction and procedure; antitrust; bankruptcy; copyright, trade-
mark, and patent law; federal torts/contracts; immigration; and freedom of
information) and secondary or shared jurisdiction over another 17% of the
30. My methodology for characterizing decisions usually follows the United States Code: civil rights
decisions were overridden by changes to title 42; criminal law, title 18; federal jurisdiction and procedure,
title 28; bankruptcy, title 11; income tax, title 26; antitrust, title 15; copyright, trademark, and patent law,
titles 17, 15, and 35, respectively; armed services and veterans affairs, title 38; longshoremen and admiralty,
title 33; immigration law, title 8; environmental law, titles 7, 16 & 42; United States government workers,
selected parts of title 5; federal torts and contracts, selected parts of titles 28 and 41, respectively; freedom
of information, title 5; labor law and ERISA, title 29; banking regulation, title 12; and stockyards, title 7.
The main departure from this methodology is the category of intergovernmental (federal/state) relations,
where the statutory overrides occurred in various parts of the United States Code. See generally Lee, supra
note 5 (in-depth analysis of congressional overrides of decisions affecting state and local governments).
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overrides (civil rights in education and the workplace, intergovernmental
relations, government employment). The labor committees have primary or
exclusive jurisdiction over 13% of the overrides (civil rights in education and
the workplace, government employment, traditional labor law, and ERISA). The
public works committees and tax committees are also important sources of
overrides, with primary jurisdiction over 7% (environmental law) and 7%
(income tax) of total overrides, respectively. Altogether, almost nine out of ten
overrides are generated from these four committees.
Table 4 also suggests the relative subject matter of override activity.
Although statutory overrides of Supreme Court civil rights decisions have
received the most publicity, there has been much more override activity for
criminal law in this period, and just about as much activity for bankruptcy,
federal jurisdiction and procedure, and antitrust law.3t Given their low visibili-
ty in the political system, it may be surprising that cases involving criminal law,
bankruptcy, and federal jurisdiction and procedure have generated so many
overrides. The significant activity is the result of ambitious codification and
reform efforts by judiciary subcommittees responsible for each of those areas
of law. In contrast, there has been a surprising lack of overrides in securities
law, given the intense public interest and litigation in this area.32
When Congress chose to override the Court, it usually did so with relative
speed. Almost half of the Supreme Court cases in the study were overridden
within two years of their decision (ten were overridden the year they were
decided), two-thirds were overridden within five years, and three-fourths within
ten years (see Appendix III). 33 To explore more fully the interaction between
the Court and Congress, the remainder of this section will focus on the eighty-
nine cases overridden within ten years of their decision (see Table 1).3 4 Tables
5 through 7 present data describing the division of the Court in these eighty-
nine overridden cases, the political characterization, if any, of the Court's
division, the mode of reasoning underlying the Court's interpretation, and the
nature of the losers in overridden cases (the parties who are likely to petition
Congress for an override).
31. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overrides 12 Supreme Court decisions (most
of which interpret civil rights statutes), make the civil rights category the leading override area for the period
1967-92.
32. Labor law also produced fewer overrides than expected, but this is probably due to the current limits
of "traditional labor law" (mainly, the National Labor Relations Act). If"labor law" included discrimination
in the workplace, federal employee and civil service issues, federal regulation of state employees, and
pension (ERISA) issues, then Table 4 would list more than ten overrides.
33. Most of the cases that were overridden after a relatively long delay involved recodification statutes
(especially the Bankruptcy Act of 1978), reconciliation statutes (often overturning old tax decisions), and
other omnibus acts covering a number of related issues in one statute.
34. Although 10 years is an arbitrary figure, it is a useful cutoff point for analyzing short-term
congressional responses to the Court. Most of the decisions overridden more than 10 years after they were
decided were the subject of omnibus reconciliation or recodification bills (see Appendix I) in which the
override was not the main focus of the legislation.
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Table 5 reports the voting splits among the Justices, to provide information
on the divisions within the Court for decisions overridden soon after they were
handed down.35 Table 5 also indicates whether the Court split along identifi-
able ideological lines in these decisions.36
TABLE 5. Voting and Political Divisions in Supreme Court Decisions Overridden
by Congress Within Ten Years of the Court's Decision (1967-90)
VOTING SPLITS NUMBER OF OVERRIDES PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
4-4 or Memorandum Decisions 6 7%
5-4 Decisions 14 16%
6-3 Decisions 30 34%
7-2 Decisions 15 17%
8-1 Decisions 12 13%
9-0 Decisions 12 13%
TOTAL 89 100%
POLITICAL SPLITS NUMBER OF OVERRIDES PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
Conservative/Liberal 34 38%
Liberal/Conservative 18 20%
No Clean Division 37 42%
TOTAL 89 100%
Table 5 suggests that overridden statutory decisions usually involved issues
producing a fragmented, ideologically divided Court. A majority of the overrid-
den decisions involved a 4-4, 5-4, or 6-3 division on the Court, and three-fifths
of the decisions reflected an ideological split (usually with Justices Brennan
and Marshall opposing Justice (or later Chief Justice) Rehnquist). The tendency
for Congress to override identifiably "conservative" Supreme Court decisions
significantly more often than identifiably "liberal" opinions is a very recent
35. In determining splits, the study counts concurring Justices as part of the majority even when they
did not join the majority opinion. The study counts Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part based
on how they voted on the issue for which Congress overrode the Court. Finally, as Table 5 reflects, the study
attempts to place decisions with fewer than nine total votes in the most similar category used for full Court
decisions. For example, the study places 8-0 decisions (where only eight Justices voted) in the 9-0 decision
category.
36. The study follows the standard liberal/conservative characterizations. The usual clue to an
ideological split is that consistently liberal Justices were on one side and consistently conservative Justices
on the other. The consistently liberal Justices for this study include Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall, and (for the 1980's) Blackmun and Stevens. The consistently conserva-
tive Justices include Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, and Justices Rehnquist, Powell (for the 1970's),
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. I considered Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White to be moderates. Thus,
if a Supreme Court opinion in the 1980's finds Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in the majority
with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting, I would identify the opinion as "conservative," while I would
categorize a decision with Justice Rehnquist joining Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent as "no split."
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phenomenon, attributable entirely to events of the 1980's.37 In the last five
years covered by the study (1986-90), congressional overrides of identifiably
"liberal" Supreme Court statutory decisions all but vanished (three of thirty-
eight). Almost half of the overrides (sixteen of thirty-eight) reversed identifiably
"conservative" decisions, although a similar number (nineteen of thirty-eight)
of the overridden decisions could not be characterized ideologically (see
Appendix HI).
Table 6 reports the various modes of reasoning underlying the Court's
holdings in the overridden decisions, in an attempt to identify those most likely
to produce an interpretation that Congress would later reject."
TABLE 6. The Primary Reasoning in Supreme Court Decisions Overridden by
Congress within Ten Years of the Court's Decision (1967-90)
PRIMARY REASONING NUMBER OF DECISIONS PERCENT OF TOTAL
Plain Meaning 23.5 26%
Legislative History 19.0 21%
Canons 16.0 18%
Statutory Precedents 13.5 15%
Purpose & Policy 6.5 7%
Common Law & Constitutional Law 3.5 4%
No Opinion 7.0 8%
TOTAL 89.0 99%
37. Of the 39 Supreme Court decisions of the 1980's that Congress overrode (as of January 1991),
17 were conservative decisions, 16 reflected no clean division, and only 6 were liberal decisions (see
Appendix I.
38. The main methodological difficulty involved identifying the Court's primary reasoning, for the
Court almost never relies on just one reason. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (demonstrating lack of one identifiable
reason behind various Court decisions). To determine the Court's primary reasoning, I considered three
factors: (1) explicit statements by the Court (for example, if the Court declared that the text was clear and
not trumped by the loser's legislative history arguments, the study identified the primary reasoning as plain
meaning); (2) the placement and length of the Court's analysis (for example, if the Court began its analysis
with a canon of statutory construction and then demonstrated that no other argument offset it, the study
identified the primary reasoning as reliance on canons of construction); and (3) the persuasiveness of the
Court's analysis and the Court's own apparent confidence in its opinion (if the Court's legislative history
argument was subordinate to, but more convincing than, what appeared to be a makeweight textual
argument, the study identified the primary reasoning as legislative history). For about a fourth of the Court's
decisions, I felt that there was no "primary" reasoning, and in these cases I identified the two main
candidates, considering each as one-half of the Court's reasoning for counting purposes.
As set forth in greater detail in the methodological statement preceding the appendices, infra text
accompanying notes 304-10, the modes of reasoning included: (1) "plain meaning," where the Court relies
on the probable meaning of the "plain" text, construed according to standard dictionaries, rules of grammar
and syntax, and the overall statutory structure; (2) "legislative history," where the Court relies on the history
of the statute before Congress enacted it; (3) "statutory precedents," where the court relies on prior Supreme
Court decisions construing the statute or related statutes; (4) "canons," where the Court relies on canons
of construction, usually expressed as presumptions or clear statement rules; (5) "purpose and policy," where
the Court relies on purpose of the statute and other policy arguments; and (6) "common law and constitution-
al law," where the Court relies on common lav or constitutional decisions to fill gaps in statutory policy.
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The most interesting feature revealed by Table 6 is that Congress is much more
likely to override "plain meaning" decisions than any other type of Supreme
Court statutory decision. When decisions dominated by canons of statutory
construction are added to the total of plain meaning decisions, about half of the
overrides fall within this category. In contrast, Congress rarely appears to
override those interpretations grounded on statutory "purpose."
In an effort to identify the groups that are likely to petition Congress for
an override, Table 7 characterizes the groups who "lost" in decisions that later
were overridden by Congress. 39
TABLE 7. "Losing" Groups in Supreme Court Decisions Overridden by Con-
gress within Ten Years of the Court's Decisions (1967-90)
"LOSINO" GROUPS NUMBER OF DECIsIONS PERCENT OF TOTAL
United States & U.S. Departments 22 25%
Organized Business 16 18%
Diffuse Citizenry 10 11%
State & Local Governments 9 10%




Criminal Defendants & Suspects 2 2%
Racial Minorities 2 2%
Noncitizens 2 2%
Veterans Groups 1 1%
The Poor 1 1%
Religious Groups 1 1%
Unclear 2 2%
TOTAL 89 99%
Table 7 suggests that the big "winners" among the "losers"--the groups most
likely to persuade Congress to override an adverse Supreme Court decis-
ion-are federal, state, and local governments, which together have procured
more than one-third (35%) of the overrides of recent decisions. Another 26%
were obtained by organized business and labor groups. Less than one-eighth
(11%) of the overrides reversed losses for groups that include most Ameri-
cans-litigants, appellants, consumers, government tort victims, Freedom of
Information Act petitioners, and antitrust plaintiffs. These groups are identified
as "diffuse citizenry," that is, groups that include, or potentially include, most
or all Americans.
39. See methodological statement preceding the appendices, infra text accompanying notes 304-12,
for an explanation of what or whom I am including in each group listing.
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The data presented in Tables 5 through 7 suggest that the typical congres-
sional override will focus on Supreme Court decisions that adjudicate issues
producing an ideologically divided vote on the Court and that harm the interests
of federal, state, or local governments, or of well-organized interest groups.
This is useful information, but does not answer the question: How does the
typical overridden Supreme Court decision compare with the typical Supreme
Court decision that is not overridden? In other words, Tables 5 through 7,
standing alone, are of limited utility because they do not compare overriden
decisions with decisions that Congress allowed to stand. To facilitate such
comparisons, Tables 8 and 9 draw upon the sample (profiled in Table 3 above)
of Supreme Court statutory decisions from the 1977 through 1983 Terms.
Table 8 compares the voting splits, ideological divisions, and primary
reasoning of three sets of decisions from those Terms: (1) decisions never
examined by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, (2) decisions exam-
ined but not overridden, and (3) decisions from those Terms that were within
the Judiciary Committees' jurisdiction and were overridden. 0
40. Although the third group (decisions overridden from the 1977 through 1983 Terms) is small (18
decisions), its overall percentages roughly match those for all of the overrides in Tables 5 and 6. This
finding provides some confidence that the sample is representative.
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TABLE 8. Comparison of Overridden Supreme Court Decisions with Supreme
Court Decisions within Judiciary Committee Jurisdiction But Not Overridden
(1978-84)
DEcSIONS SCRUTINIED
TOTAL DECISIONS NOT NoT
VOTING SPLIT DECISIONS SCRUINIZED TOTAL OVERRIDDEN OVERRIDDEN
9-0 Decisions 85 61(72%) 24 (28%) 1 (1%) 23 (27%)
8-1 Decisions 33 22(67%) 11 (33%) 3 (9%) 8 (24%)
7-2 Decisions 36 20 (56%) 16 (45%) 1 (3%) 15 (42%)
6-3 Decisions 65 38 (58%) 27 (41%) 6 (9%) 21(32%)
5-4 Decisions 56 29 (52%) 27 (48%) 7 (12%) 20 (36%)
TOTAL 275 170 (62%) 105 (38%) 18 (7%) 87 (32%)
POLITICAL DIVISIONS
Conservative/Liberal 83 49 (59%) 34 (41%) 8 (10%) 26 (31%)
Liberal/Conservative 58 31 (55%) 27 (46%) 7 (12%) 20 (35%)
No Clear Division 134 90 (67%) 44 (33%) 3 (2%) 41 (31%)












































Table 8 generates several interesting observations. First, decisions subject to
judiciary committee scrutiny were much more likely to have a dissenting
opinion and to reflect a close division on the Court; this was particularly true
of decisions that were ultimately overridden.41 Not surprisingly, issues that
generate division in the Court are the ones most likely to generate serious
congressional scrutiny.
Second, decisions that were overridden were much more likely to have had
an ideologically identifiable split on the Court than either decisions not scruti-
nized or decisions scrutinized but not overridden.42 For the period in question
41. Specifically, 72% of the 9-0 decisions were not examined by the judiciary committees, but only
52% of the 5-4 decisions were not examined. Putting it another way, 72% of the overridden decisions (13
of 18) reflected 6-3 or 5-4 votes, while only 47% of the examined-but-not-overridden decisions (41 of 87)
reflected such votes, and only 39% of the unscrutinized decisions (67 of 170) reflected such votes.
42. Specifically, overridden decisions make up only 2% of the "No Clear Division" decisions, in
contrast to the 10% and 12% these decisions constitute in the other two categories. Putting it another way,
only 15% (3 of 18) of the overridden decisions reflected "No Clear Division," while 47% (41 of 87) and
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(1977-84), the Court as a whole was moderately conservative, and all three
groups of decisions reflect that (hence, more identifiably conservative decisions
in each category). If Table 8 included data from the late 1980's, when overrides
of identifiably liberal decisions all but dried up,43 the overridden decisions
category would probably overrepresent "conservative" decisions, when com-
pared to the other categories.
Third, decisions that were overridden were more likely to have relied on
a statute's plain meaning or the canons of construction than either decisions
not scrutinized or decision scrutinized but not .overridden.4 Interestingly,
decisions scrutinized but not overridden tended to have more legislative history
reasoning than the other two categories, while purpose and policy reasoning
was greatly overrepresented in the unscrutinized decisions category.
The most dramatic and instructive contrast between the different categories
of decisions is revealed in Table 9, which identifies the "losing" groups by
category (only for decisions in the 1977 through 1983 Terms).45
TABLE 9. Comparison of "Losing" Groups in Overridden Decisions with "Los-
ing" Groups in Decisions Within Judiciary Committee Jurisdiction, but Not
Overridden (1978-84)
DECISIONS SCRUTINIED
TOTAL DECISIONS NOT NOT
"LOSING GROUP" DECIsIONs SCRUTNIZED TOTAL OVERRIDDEN OVERRIDDEN
Diffuse Citizenry 77 53 (68%) 24 (32%) 1 (1%) 23 (31%)
Organized Business 54 30 (55%) 24 (45%) 1 (2%) 23 (43%)
Criminal Defendants & Suspects 34 24 (71%) 10 (29%) 1 (3%) 9 (27%)
State & Local Gov'ts 34 16 (48%) 18 (53%) 3 (9%) 15 (44%)
United States & U.S. Dep'ts 24 15 (62%) 9 (38%) 5 (20%) 4 (18%)
Racial Minorities 20 17 (85%) 3 (15%) 1 (5%) 2 (10%)
The Poor 7 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%) 2 (29%)
Organized Workers 6 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 2 (33%) 1 (17%)
Noncitizens 5 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%)
Environmentalists 4 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%)
Women 2 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 0 (0%)
Foreign States 1 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Disabled 1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%)
Not Clear 6 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 3 (50%)
TOTAL 275 170 (62%) 105 (38%) 18 (7%) 87 (32%)
53% (90 of 170) of the scrutinized-but-not-overridden and unscrutinized decisions, respectively, reflected
"No Clear Division."
43. See supra text accompanying note 37.
44. Specifically, these are the highest percentages for the "Decisions Overridden" column, next to the
lowest for the "Decisions Scrutinized but Not Overridden" column, and middling for the "Decisions Not
Scrutinized" column. Justice Stevens recently made this observation in West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v.
Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1153-58 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. See methodological statement preceding the appendices, infra text accompanying notes 304-12,
for an explanation of what or whom I am including in each group listing.
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Table 9 strongly supports the suggestion from Table 7 that federal, state, and
local governments are unusually successful in having their Supreme Court
losses reversed by Congress.46 Table 9 also contributes an additional insight:
State and local governments are more likely than the United States to have their
losses scrutinized by Congress, but then much less likely to have the losses
actually overridden.
Although the numbers are too small to draw strong conclusions, Table 9
suggests that big business (like state and local governments) fares much better
at obtaining judiciary committee scrutiny of decisions it loses than it is at
obtaining actual overrides. In contrast, organized worker groups (not only
unions, but retired persons and federal employees) fare particularly well in
overturning adverse decisions. Conversely, diffuse random groups (such as
victims of state constitutional violations or federal torts) fare poorly; and
criminal defendants and suspects, as well as the poor, have had virtually no
success in obtaining overrides. Further, middle class women fare comparatively
well when their collective interests are harmed by a statutory decision.
This data provides some basis for generalizing about which Supreme Court
statutory decisions stand the best chance of being overridden in the 1990's.47
(1) They will likely be split decisions in which political ideology provides a
basis for the split. (2) For now, conservative Court decisions relying on plain
meaning of the statutory text and/or the canons of statutory construction are
most likely to be overturned, subject to qualifications to be introduced in the
next part of the Article. (3) The most important variables seem to be the
identity of the party who lost the case and the identity of the party whose
interests the Court's interpretation harms in the long run (often the same). If
the ruling harms the federal government's interests, an override is particularly
likely. Women, the disabled, state and local governments, environmentalists,
and organized workers are also relatively able to command Congress' support
for an override, while consumers, litigants, nonbusiness and less wealthy
taxpayers, and the poor are much less likely to muster such support.
To illustrate the importance of "who loses the case," consider the following
contrast. The Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,4S
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit employment
discrimination based upon pregnancy, presented a classic case for an override.
46. Specifically, 21% of the United States' losses and 9% of the losses for state and local governments
were overridden by Congress-much higher figures than those for organized private groups, including big
business (2%) and minorities (5%). Putting it another way, 44% (8 of 18) of the "Decisions Overridden"
category were ones where federal, state, and local governments lost Supreme Court cases, compared with
22% in the "Decisions Scrutinized But Not Overridden" category (19 or 87) and 17% in the "Decisions
Not Scrutinized" category (31 of 170).
47. Caveat: Prediction about the Court/Congress interaction in the 1990's based upon data from the
1980's is risky, so the following conclusions should be discounted appropriately. Also, while each of the
three generalizations is true for a majority of the overrides studied (Tables 5-9), a majority of the overrides
will not necessarily fit the overall picture painted by all three generalizations together.
48. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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The Court was split (6-3); the split was along ideological lines (conservative
over liberal) for which neither Congress nor the President had much sympathy;
the decision relied on plain meaning and constitutional precedent; and the deci-
sion represented a public defeat for organized women's groups, unions, and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Although employer and insurance
groups supported the decision, Congress promptly overrode it. A few years
later, in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,49 the Court interpreted Title VII
to protect post-1964 seniority systems that had a discriminatory impact upon
African Americans. Although the Court was even more closely divided (5-4)
along ideological lines than it was in Gilbert, the American Tobacco issue did
not even generate override hearings." The critical difference between Gilbert
and American Tobacco lies in the relative clout of the losing groups. The
combined efforts of women's groups, unions, and the federal government
effected a prompt reversal of Gilbert over employer group objections, while
African Americans standing alone could not muster sufficient interest to
generate hearings on the issues decided in American Tobacco.
II. MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COURT, CONGRESS,
AND THE PRESIDENT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Even the best empirical data is of only limited use without a theoretical
framework. Despite the multiplicity of theoretical works analyzing the legisla-
tive process, most prior studies of congressional overrides have failed to draw
on this literature to help explain and predict overrides. In an effort to remedy
this shortcoming, this part will survey the political theories of the legislative
process, including the role of interest groups and committees. The section will
attempt to synthesize political science and legal scholarship to produce a model
that reflects the complexity of the process yet remains capable of generating
some useful predictions. It will conclude with a dynamic model of the interac-
tion between the Court, Congress, and the President in statutory interpretation
cases. One of the contributions of this Article will be to highlight, through
formal and historical analysis, the important (but often unappreciated) role of
the President in the override process, especially during periods of divided
government.
49. 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
50. Even though the labor committees of the next Congress held extensive oversight hearings on Title
VII, it appears that American Tobacco was never even mentioned. See Oversight Hearings on the Federal
Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); Oversight of the
EEOC, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1983); see also Civil Rights Act of 1984: Joint Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on Education,
Arts and Humanities and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 353 1991-1992
354 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 101: 331
Oversimplifying somewhat, one might identify two theoretical traditions
for describing the legislative process.5 1 The first, the deliberative tradition,52
conceives of the legislature as deliberating to improve the general welfare or
common good. This tradition assumes that legislators are public-regarding-they
"desire to participate in formulation of good public policy. '53 Thus, they fairly
arbitrate interest group conflicts, correct market failures, and promote worthy
public values in the political community. According to this view, the legislature
itself is organized to facilitate the discovery and implementation of good public
policy, through the creation of specialized committees. The relationship between
the legislature and the other branches of government, including the judiciary,
is one of cooperation. Congress sets public-seeking national policy, and the
judiciary and the executive implement it.
The cogency of such an optimistic view of the legislative process has
steadily eroded, as scholars have shown the process to be frequently private
regarding and "rent seeking" (distributing benefits to a group without normative
justification).54 A different "distributive" tradition (often characterized as
"public choice" theory) has emerged in political science over the last twenty-
five years.5 This tradition has replaced "a romantic and illusory set of notions
about the workings of governments"56 with more "realistic"--or, perhaps,
51. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1-93 (1988).
52. The classics in this tradition are ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNIENT (1908);
WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1949); ROBERT A. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). These works set forth a vision of pluralist legislative process
in which most viewpoints are represented and legislators solve collective action problems. See also ARTHUR
C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962). This "optimistic pluralism" has been the dominant
legal theory for most of the century and was canonized in HENRY H. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
More recent deliberative theories of the legislative process are RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN
IN COMMITTEES (1973); STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOV-
ERNMENT (1987); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984); ARTHUR
MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1980).
53. KELMAN, supra note 52, at 261.
54. See ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE
PRIvATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930 REVISION OF THE TARIFF (1935).
55. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); ANTIONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
(1957); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); DAVID
R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL 3 (1971).
More recent works of significance include BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987); MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A
THEORY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1981); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982);
TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); see also DENNIS
C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 307-47 (1989) (survey).
56. James M. Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and
Its Normative Implications, il THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 11 (James M. Buchanan & Robert
D. Tollison eds., 1984).
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cynical-views. The distributive tradition views legislation as the distribution
of benefits to well-organized interest groups, typically at the expense of (and
not in pursuit of) the general welfare.57 Legislation is, in this view, an eco-
nomic transaction, in which groups "purchase" governmental benefits from
legislators. On the demand side, wealthy established interests are best represent-
ed, while the interests of broad categories of the citizenry (consumers, the poor,
etc.) are underrepresented.55 On the supply side, distributive theory assumes
that legislators "are single-minded seekers of reelection,' 59 a goal furthered
by pandering to well-organized groups (who may provide money and support)
at the expense of the general public (which is often ignorant of the costs it
bears).6" The bottom line, some distributive theorists declare, is too much
legislation for the benefit of small, established groups, and too little legislation
pursuing the more diffuse goal of the general welfare. 1
Because it lends itself to an analysis that claims some predictive value,
distributive theory has attracted the attention of many law professors. 2 But
just as distributive theory has attracted increased attention, both political
scientists and their counterparts in law have come to realize its limitations.'
57. In addition to the sources in supra note 55, see Gary S. Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups,
and Dead Weight Costs, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 329 (1985) [hereinafter, Becker, Pubic Policies]; Gary S. Becker,
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).
58. See OLSON, supra note 55, as elaborated in MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 54,
as elaborated in ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960) ("The flaw in the
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent ...."); see also John
Ferejohn, Congress and Redistribution, in MAKING ECONOMIC POLICY IN CONGRESS 131 (Allen Schick,
ed., 1983). The best empirical study of interest groups is more restrained in its pessimism. See KAY L.
SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
59. FIORINA, supra note 55, agrees that legislators' motivations are more complicated but makes this
simplifying assumption in order to work out his powerful analytical model; see also MAYHEW, supra note
55, at 5, 16-17 ("focus on the reelection goal" as most realistic perspective on legislative process).
60. See generally FIORINA, supra note 55; MAYHEW, supra note 55.
61. See HAYES, supra note 55; OLSON, supra note 55.
62. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Richard L.
Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate & Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71
MINN. L. REV. 913 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights
Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Fred S.
MeChesney, Regulation, Taxes, and Political Extortion, in REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS,
BUREAUCRACY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 223 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989); Richard
A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263
(1982); Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regulation,
70 B.U. L. REV. 339 (1990).
63. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1990); ROBERTA. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION
POLICY FOR THE DISABLED (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being. and Public Choice, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical
& "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989); Daniel
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by
Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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Empirical studies of the legislative process do not bear out many of the predic-
tions of distributive theory. For instance, a raw distributive theory does not
explain such important statutes as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the deregula-
tion movement of the 1970's and 1980's,65 the evolution of environmental
statutes, 66 and even such public choice chestnuts as tariff and tax legisla-
tion.67
There is some truth in both the deliberative and the distributive theories.
Distributive theories highlight the role that self-interested groups outside
Congress play in affecting the legislative process, while deliberative theories
remind us of the importance of the internal processes and the public account-
ability of legislators. Distributive and deliberative theories might be viewed as
complementary, rather than competing. They also share a common problem.
Both theories, as traditionally articulated, view "interest"--whether private
(distributive) or public (deliberative)-as predefined and exogenous to the
political process.6 A more realistic view of the political process views inter-
ests (both of groups and of legislators) as endogenous to the political process,
that is, as shaped by that process.69
To conceptualize the lawmaking process, this part draws upon this idea of
endogenous interests and expands upon recent work on information theory.7
Because information theory emphasizes the internal dynamics of Congress in
the production of public policy, it is linked to the deliberative tradition. Infor-
mation theorists argue that Congress is structured to deal with uncertainty about
the effect of various policy choices on shared goals and objectives. Congress
tries to resolve this uncertainty by delegating information-gathering and deliber-
ating activities to subgroups. Once it is better informed about the consequences
of various choices, Congress is better able to set policy. A particularly signifi-
64., See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
65. See KINGDON, supra note 52.
66. See BRUCE ACKERMAN& WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1979); E. Donald Elliott
et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 313 (1985).
67. See RAYMOND A. BAUER ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1963) (discussing
trade legislation); JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
68. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation
as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 747-50 (1991).
69. "Interest" here has three different meanings: (1) interest as a group's or legislator's ultimate goals
and objectives; (2) interest as a group's or legislator's belief that a certain measure will contribute to those
goals and objectives; and (3) interest as a group's or legislator's willingness to trade off some goals and
objectives for others. All of these meanings are endogenous to the political process, although the first
meaning is usually more stable over time than are the other two.
70. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); Thomas
W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Choice Without Procedural
Commitment, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS 295 (Peter L. Ordeshook ed., 1989). For an
interesting twist on the role of information in politics, see Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?
Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917 (1990).
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cant intellectual contribution of information theory is its fluid definition of the
public interest as the consensus that emerges at the end of the information-
gathering and deliberating process.
This contribution of information theory provides a lesson for the distributive
tradition. Heretofore, the distributive viewpoint has suggested that information
is merely an expression of an interest group's position and has no independent
role in the political process beyond posturing and manipulation. While informa-
tion is manipulated in the political process, it does place limits on political
discourse and contributes to a political dynamic that tangibly affects interest
group activity. Like Congress, groups are uncertain about their interests and
about how best to achieve them. Groups seek to reduce uncertainty by obtaining
relevant information about the consequences of various policies. This informa-
tion not only helps them to define their preferences, but also allows them to
judge whether they can persuade others, perhaps because a particular policy is
good for all, or many, sides. In turn, groups respond to, and are often trans-
formed by, information generated by other groups and legislators.
The present study of congressional overrides offers an excellent opportunity
to attempt to synthesize the distributive and deliberative traditions, using the
insights suggested by information theory. The opportunity is possible because
an override story is often a story over time, in which the power of information
to influence the behavior of both groups and Congress is most readily apparent.
Consider the following example, drawn from this study's collection of over-
rides.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provided that "[a]liens
afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect" were to
be excluded from entry into the United States.71 The exclusion was originally
urged upon Congress by the Public Health Service (PHS) to prevent at least
some gay men and lesbians from entering the United States. Reflecting then
"modern" views within the medical community, the PHS considered homosexu-
ality a disease, and urged that it be included as a medical basis for exclusion.
Congress acquiesced to the PHS's "psychopathic personality" euphemism. No
one objected to the provision, in part because the victims-gay men and lesbi-
ans-were afraid even to identify themselves, much less to organize politically
to oppose such legislation. In Boutilier v. INS,72 the Supreme Court interpreted
"psychopathic personality" to mean "homosexuality," even though the medical
consensus on this issue had significantly eroded and the excluded alien in the
case was actually bisexual, not homosexual.73 No effort was made to override
Boutilier because no interest groups opposed the decision.
71. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (repealed 1990).
72. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
73. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., GadamerlStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 654
(1990) (providing fuller analysis of this decision).
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Much changed in the next decade. New circumstances transformed views
on these issues. Especially after the Stonewall Riot in 1969, gay men and
lesbians became politically active and sought to dismantle legal disabilities
based upon sexual orientation. Through activism and the spread of information
about the actual lives of homosexuals and the irrelevance of their sexual
preference to their abilities and capacities, gay and lesbian groups in the 1970's
persuaded the leading medical organizations to remove homosexuality from the
category of disease.74 This shift was the result of a major struggle within the
psychiatric community, recognizing the cogency of long-neglected studies
showing sexual preference to be unrelated to mental illness and rejecting the
earlier medical consensus that homosexuality is an illness. Reflecting the
outcome of this debate within the profession and an emerging literature rebut-
ting earlier medical stereotypes about homosexuality, the PHS (an agency
staffed by medical personnel) in 1979 abandoned its original position and
announced that it no longer considered homosexuality a medically excludable
condition and that homosexuality should no longer operate to exclude gay men
and lesbians." Unmoved, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
publicly disagreed with the PHS in the early 1980's but carried on its own
internal debate, which resulted in its substantial failure to enforce the exclu-
sion.76
In the 1980's, liberal Democrats in Congress repeatedly introduced legisla-
tion to override Boutilier.77 Abandoned by the medical community, the PHS,
and even the INS (which must have found the exclusion ridiculous to adminis-
ter), and under sharp attack from the then-organized gay and lesbian communi-
ty, Boutilier no longer enjoyed much support. Efforts to override it gathered
momentum in Congress in the late 1980's, as two Members of the House
declared themselves to be openly gay, and public sympathy for gay men and
lesbians was further spurred by the AIDS epidemic. Boutilier was finally
overridden in 1990 by bipartisan agreement and without much fuss.7"
This override story allows information theory to identify interconnections
between the distributive and deliberative perspectives on legislation. As the
distributive perspective suggests, Congress will generally not override Supreme
Court statutory decisions unless a politically salient group presses for an
override and unless other relevant groups, especially government officials and
74. RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 101-
78 (1981).
75. Memorandum from Julius B. Richmond, Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Health, to
Dr. William H. Foege, Director of the Center for Disease Control, and Dr. George I. Lythcott, Administrator
of the HSA (Aug. 2, 1979) (on file with author).
76. The INS announced that it would exclude gay men and lesbians only if they made unsolicited
declarations of sexual preference to an INS agent. 62 Interpreter Releases 166-67 (INS 1985).
77. See, e.g., S. 2210, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (sponsored by Sen. Cranston); H.R. 6303, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (Rep. Beilenson and 28 cosponsors by May 20); H.R. 3524, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1981) (Rep. Dixon and 29 cosponsors by Oct. 28); S. 1086, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Sen. Cranston).
78. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067.
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political party leaders, acquiesce in the override.79 But, contrary to distributive
theory as traditionally articulated, interests of relevant groups change over time
in response to new information, new arguments, and new frameworks of
thought.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the configuration of interests made an override
of Boutilier inconceivable, but the later outpouring of pro-gay and lesbian
information and theory after the Stonewall Riot transformed the relevant private
interests. First, gay men and lesbians "came out" in greater numbers and made
their interests politically salient. Second, leading professional groups revised
their views about homosexuality in response to demands by the gay and lesbian
community and to accumulated evidence inconsistent with the old views. Third,
government officials changed their positions in response both to new informa-
tion and to pressure brought upon them by the first two changes.
As the deliberative perspective suggests, Congress will generally not
override a Supreme Court decision without painstaking deliberation over
whether the decision undermines its policies and whether alternative approaches
are desirable. This deliberation usually generates both House and Senate
committee hearings. Hearings and informal contacts provide Congress with
more information about the consequences of the Supreme Court's decisions and
about the alternatives from which Congress might choose. The Boutilier issue
was the subject of hearings throughout the 1980's, and the hearings reflected
the waning appeal of the statutory precedent and the increasingly undesirable
policy it represented. Deliberation over time transformed legislative views about
what the "public interest" demanded.
Starting with this information-based synthesis of the distributive and
deliberative features of politics, the remainder of this part will develop a model
of congressional overrides, using Boutilier and other case examples from the
study. The model is developed in three stages: first, an exploration of the
importance of interest groups (broadly defined to include ideological and
governmental groups); then, a discussion of the critical role of congressional
committees; and, finally, the development of a formal model describing the dy-
namic interaction between the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President in
statutory interpretation cases.
A. The Importance of Interest Groups
The central importance of interest groups best illustrates the distributive
features of the legislative override process.8 0 Interest groups are important
79. Recall the contrast at the end of Part I between Congress' reaction to Gilbert (a prompt override
in response to pressure) and its nonreaction to American Tobacco (acquiescence because of interest group
opposition).
80. The main sources for the discussion that follows are HAYES, supra note 55; OLSON, supra note
55; SCHATrSCHNEIDER, supra note 54; SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 58; Becker, Public Policies,
supra note 57; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 63, at 21-37, for an excellent critical synthesis of
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because they bring issues to the attention of Congress, and because they are
capable of maintaining issues on the national agenda and blocking legislative
initiatives. The distributive possibilities arise in part because interest groups
form selectively. Not all potential "interests" form organized groups, and groups
have varying arrays of resources and influence. Generally, groups are most
likely to be politically salient (i.e., "organized") if they have: (1) a small,
cohesive set of members; (2) significant resources or power-, and/or (3) a
preexisting organizational apparatus to unite them for purposes beyond lobbying
and legislation.81 If some interests are well organized and others are not, there
is a risk that organized interests will reap a disproportionate share of govern-
ment benefits.
Recent political science scholarship suggests that this account has some
validity, but contains caveats reflecting the informational features of interest
groups.82 An important caveat is that "interest" needs to be understood as a
complex phenomenon-not simply as wealth maximization. Instead, "interest"
inevitably reflects an ideological component, an appeal to a group's concept
of a good society. Many politically salient interest groups are primarily driven
by ideology, including civil rights groups such as the ACLU and NAACP,
environmental organizations, free enterprise study institutes, consumer welfare
watchdogs, and even political parties. 83 Indeed, in the modern administrative
state, the state and groups within the state (such as agencies) are interest
groups, and the way in which they define their interests (literally, the "public
interest") is intrinsically ideological." Even traditional private economic
interest groups go through ideological processes as they decide which issues
to stress, allies to seek, and arguments to make. One reason for this process is
that an interest group cannot obtain what it wants without persuading other
actors-political parties, experts, and legislators and their staff-that it has good
reasons supporting the desired legislation.
this literature.
81. See OLSON, supra note 55.
82. This discussion is based upon FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 63, at 21-37; INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS 1-69, 162-82 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986); SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY,
supra note 58; Elliott et al., supra note 66, at 313; Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology
in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984); William H. Panning, Formal Models
of Legislative Processes, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH 669 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al. eds.,
1985).
83. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS (1977); ANDREW S. MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES (1976); SCHLOZMAN &
TIERNEY, supra note 58, at 28-35; Jeffrey M. Berry, On the Origins of Public Interest Groups, 10 J. POL.
392 (1978); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms
of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988); John M. Hansen, The Political Economy of
Group Membership, 79 AM. POL. SC. REV. 79 (1985); V. Kerry Smith, A Theoretical Analysis of the
"Green Lobby," 79 AM. POL. Scr. REV. 132 (1985); David Vogel, The Public Interest Movement and the
American Reform Tradition, 95 POL. So. Q. 607 (1980).
84. See W.M. Crain & Robert E. McCormick, Regulators as an Interest Group, in THE THEORY OF
PUBLIC CHOICE II, supra note 56, at 287.
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The case studies and data in my survey of congressional overrides provide
evidence supporting the following synthetic view of interest groups in the
legislative process. First, interest groups form around shared perspectives, based
upon both economic and ideological considerations, in different mixes for
different groups. Groups are most likely to organize when they are small,
cohesive, and sociopolitically privileged. Diffusion, heterogeneity, and political
marginalization render groups less likely to become organized, but sometimes
potentially more powerful if organized. Second, interest groups have goals,
proposals, and priorities that are determined by both internal and external politi-
cal processes. Hence, those goals, proposals, and priorities are subject to change
as groups acquire new information and feedback from the political process.
Third, interest groups cannot secure their distributive goals (benefits for them-
selves) without providing reliable information to other actors in the legislative
process. On any given issue, several groups are potential competitors; to prevail,
a group usually must persuade other groups to acquiesce, since intense interest
group opposition is fatal to most initiatives. Thus, even an economically driven
(traditional) interest group must provide persuasive information and arguments
to more ideologically driven groups-including relevant agencies, political
parties, the media, and experts-to assure either their neutrality or support.
1. The Agenda-Setting Role of Interest Groups
Interest groups regularly bring judicial decisions to the attention of Con-
gress and are usually the impetus behind congressional focus on Supreme Court
statutory decisions. If no organized interest is (or perceives itself to be) harmed
by a recent Supreme Court decision, the decision will probably not provoke a
congressional hearing, much less an override. It is for this reason that there
were no congressional hearings on the Boutilier issue until gay men and
lesbians became an organized political force, with important legislative allies,
in the 1980's. While many observers criticized Boutilier,5 the decision's
validity did not command legislative deliberation until a newly salient group
pressed its significance. Contrast the long congressional inattention to Boutilier
with Congress' immediate attention to controversial civil rights decisions of the
1988 Term.86 Those statutory cases moved immediately onto the legislative
agenda because a rainbow of middle class civil rights groups, as well as the
Democratic Party, considered them important.
This phenomenon helps explain why there are relatively few hearings and
overrides to protect the interests of criminal defendants and suspects (see Tables
85. See, e.g., Maurice Roberts, Sex and the Immigration Laws, 14 SAN DIEGO L. RaV. 9 (1976-77);
Thomas R. Byrne, Jr. & Francis M. Mulligan, Note, "Psychopathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation":
Theoretical Terms or Legal Catch-Als-Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Alien, 40 TEMPLE L.Q.
328 (1967).
86. See supra note 4.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 361 1991-1992
The Yale Law Journal
7 and 9). The Supreme Court on average decides between three and seven
statutory cases per Term involving the rules of habeas corpus for state and
federal prisoners, substantive federal criminal law, and rules of federal criminal
procedure. The cases won by state and federal governments, which leave
criminal convictions intact, rarely generate even a judiciary committee hear-
ing. 7 In contrast, cases lost by state and federal governments, which overturn
convictions, readily command judiciary committee hearings and often lead to
overrides. 88 In the period of this study, Congress overrode eighteen Supreme
Court interpretations of federal criminal statutes;8 9 fifteen of the eighteen
overrode interpretations adverse to state and federal law enforcement. 90 The
reason for this asymmetry is that state and federal law enforcement officials
are powerful interests that can command congressional attention, while criminal
defendants and suspects are more diffuse, marginalized, and less sympathetic
groups.
Much the same story could be told for other relatively diffuse or margin-
alized groups. Supreme Court decisions hurting the economic interests of
consumers, welfare and medicaid beneficiaries, alcoholics, migrant workers,
inner-city youth, and the working poor rarely generate legislative interest. These
groups are not well organized, and advocacy groups that might represent them
tend to reflect an upper-middle-class bias and often lack sufficient resources
to pursue many initiatives. In contrast, as suggested in Tables 7 and 9, orga-
nized groups are very effective in getting their statutory issues before Congress.
The most successful groups are federal, state, and local governments; big
87. Exceptions to this generalization are issues that tend to affect businesses, such as civil RICO
liability, see Hearings, infra note 103; well-to-do citizens, such as wiretapping; and organized groups, such
as the gun lobby.
88. For example, the judiciary committee hearings on habeas corpus in my study (1979-88) focused
in large part on cutting back the remedy. See Habeas Corpus Reform: Hearings on S. 238 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearings
or S. 829 and H.R. 2151 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Habeas Corpus Procedures Amendments Act
of 1981: Hearings on S. 653 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
89. See infra Appendix I for the overrides of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987);
United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983); United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983);
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983); Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982);
Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980); United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977);
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754-55 (1966) (adverse dictum); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 715 (1946)
(dictum); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
90. The three overrides protecting the rights of criminal defendants and suspects all involved issues
of interest to mainstream, middle class America. See the overrides of United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977), where the ACLU and allied groups procured legislation to protect against wiretap
abuse, Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983), in which the gun lobby prevailed, and
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), in which Congress updated the Mann Act's prohibition
to permit greater sexual liberties between consenting adults.
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business (routinely represented by the Business Roundtable and the Chamber
of Commerce); specific industries (represented by trade associations); unions
(the AFL-CIO and individual unions); women (NOW and other groups); the
disabled; and environmentalists (Sierra Club and others).
A group's ability to place an issue on the legislative agenda does not ensure
that the group will do so. There are many reasons endogenous to the political
process why a group might not press a statutory issue that it lost in court. For
example, a group may not believe it can prevail on the issue and does not want
to deplete valuable political capital or credibility by pressing frivolous positions.
After losing an important issue of Title VII interpretation in American Tobacco
v. Patterson in 1982, civil rights groups did not press for an override,91 proba-
bly because they did not have the votes for an override that benefitted only
African-American workers and/or because they did not want to expend political
capital to seek relief for an issue that pitted their interests against those of labor
unions, which were often political allies in civil rights battles in Congress. In
contrast, civil rights groups did press for an override of Wards Cove Baking
Co. v. Atonio92 and other 1989 decisions cutting back on Title VII, for several
reasons: the cumulative effect of those decisions was felt to be devastating to
the overall enforcement of Title VII; the decisions hurt middle class women
and minorities as well as working class minorities (the only victims of Ameri-
can Tobacco), hence offering opportunities for coalition-building; and there
were excellent arguments that the Court was "setting back the clock" in civil
rights by retreating from twenty years of more liberal interpretations of Title
VII.
2. Persistence of Issues on the Legislative Agenda
Interest groups also provide the "push" to keep issues on the legislative
agenda. This has both distributive and deliberative features. On the one hand,
a determined interest group can press Congress to "stick with" an issue, and
organized group activity is essential to keeping an issue on the legislative
agenda over time. In the present study, there is not a single congressional
override that did not have strong support outside of Congress. Moreover, almost
all of the overrides had support from both private interest groups and govern-
ment groups.
On the other hand, legislative deliberation over time gives the interest group
an opportunity to build up a coalition supporting its policy proposal, to educate
Congress about the issue and its proposal, and to persuade legislators that its
position is justified. Thus, the persistence of the Boutilier issue in hearings
throughout the 1980's reflected both the gay and lesbian community's com-
91. There were several Title VII oversight hearings during the year after American Tobacco, see supra
note 50, yet no civil rights group even mentioned the case.
92. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 363 1991-1992
The Yale Law Journal
mitment to obtaining a benefit for its members and its effort to demonstrate the
irrationality of the antihomosexual policy. Similarly, the persistence of civil
rights issues on the national agenda, culminating in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, was due in part to a coalition of African-American, women's, and labor
groups.
Consider another example. The Supreme Court in StencelAero Engineering
Corp. v. United States93 held the United States immune from indemnity claims
by government contractors sued in tort for defects in products they sold to the
United States. Although this statutory decision is hardly one of the more
important ones (in either doctrinal or policy terms) of the last several decades,
it stimulated more House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings than any
other Suprvme Court decision in the period studied. Indeed, there were hearings
on the indemnity issue in every Congress from 1979 to 1988. The hearing
record suggests the evolution of this issue: Stencel was a big employer in the
district of a Member of Congress who introduced the first override bill, presum-
ably as a favor to an important business in his community.95 That alone would
have generated enough hearings for one or two Congresses, but probably not
many more. The issue persisted on the legislative agenda, however, not only
because it was being "pushed" by the industry trade group and the ABA's
Public Contracts Section, but also because it raised an important policy prob-
lem: The proliferation of products liability lawsuits against government suppli-
ers, who were prevented from impleading the United States due to the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, financially threatened many such companies and raised
doubts about their willingness to continue selling to the government. The
contractors won the support of allied groups and legislators but met powerful
93. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
94. For hearings on bills to override Stencel and the later, related case of Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 460 U.S. 190 (1983), see Federal Procurement Liability Reform Act of 1987: Hearing on
H.R. 2378 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Fair Allocation of Governmental Fault Act: Hearing on
H.R. 1623 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Operations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Indemnification of Government Contractors: Hearing on
S. 1254 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Government Contractors'
Liability and Indemnification Act: Hearings on H.R. 4083 and HR. 4199 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 House Stencel Hearings]; Indemnification of Government Contractors: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For exploratory hearings which occurred before a bill was proposed, see Indemnifi.
cation of Government Contractors: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administration of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). For older hearings on bills merely to override Stencel,
see Government Contractors Product Liability Act: Hearing on HR. 1504 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., I st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter 1981 House Stencel Hearings]; Government Contractors Product Liability Act. Hearings
on H.R. 5351 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter 1980 House Stencel Hearings].
95. Representative Gudger of North Carolina introduced H.R. 5351, 96th Cong., 1stSess. (1979), soon
after the Stencel decision in 1977. He also introduced H.R. 5358, a private bill for relief to Stencel. See
1980 House Stencel Hearings, supra note 94 (reproducing both bills).
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economic counterarguments from the Departments of Justice and Defense.96
After ten years of deliberation on the issue, it was the Supreme Court, and not
Congress, that bailed out the government contractors by giving them a federal
"defense" that could be invoked in state law products liability actions. 97
3. Critical Nature of Interest Group Opposition
Appendix II suggests that the vast majority of override issues that reach
the legislative agenda do not result in legislation. Most Supreme Court decisions
scrutinized by congressional hearings are in no danger of being overridden. Just
as some interest groups bring issues onto the legislative agenda, other interest
groups simultaneously try to ensure that no proposal is actually enacted.
Congress is unlikely to pass legislation on an issue that produces a "conflictual"
demand pattern, where important interest groups differ sharply over what should
be done. Legislation is more likely, however, when a "consensual" demand
pattern exists, that is, all the main groups acquiesce in the legislation.9" Infor-
mation theory, of course, suggests that demand patterns can change over time.
If an originally conflictual demand pattern changes to a more consensual one
(through compromise and/or new information), an override is much more likely.
Contrast the override efforts for Boutilier and Stencel. Bills to override the
former had the support of groups with relatively little monetary or voting clout,
but Boutilier was ultimately overridden in 1990 because no salient group
supported the decision. This process required two decades of public education
on the nature of homosexuality and on the numbers of individuals in our society
who are homosexual. The demand pattern shifted on this issue. Conversely,
despite impressive interest group support, Stencel was never overridden by
Congress because the conflictual demand pattern persisted. The Departments
of Defense and Justice and consumer groups opposed the legislation intensely
and were never persuaded to support it.
Another example of this latter phenomenon is the legislative reaction to
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,9 9 in which the Supreme Court held that "indirect
purchasers" of a product had no standing to sue under the antitrust laws.
Because it was perceived as retreating from vigorous enforcement of the
antitrust laws and as denying important groups (such as the states) access to
treble damage recoveries, Illinois Brick yielded a firestorm of protest and
96. For the best articulation of the suppliers' arguments, see 1981 House Stencel Hearings, supra note
94. For the government's counter-arguments, see 1984 House Stencel Hearings, supra note 94.
97. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). The dissent noted that Congress
had been debating that very issue for a decade and had afforded the contractors no relief. Id. at 515-16 &
n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. The above analysis is taken from HAYEs, supra note 55, at 93-126. See also Michael T. Hayes,
The Semi-Sovereign Pressure Groups: A Critique of Current Theory and an Alternative Typology, 40 J. POL.
134 (1978).
99. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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generated a decade of congressional hearings."' Although the override effort
had strong support from the Department of Justice, the states, consumers'
groups, unions, and women's groups, it failed in large part due to the intense
opposition of the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce, and other
business groups. This opposition was effective, not because these interest
groups were invincible (they were routed in the 1978 override of Gilbert, for
example), but because their support for the Illinois Brick decision was backed
by powerful data and economic analysis. 10 1
The most important statutory interpretation issues of the last thirty years
have produced the most conflict, with important interests and cogent arguments
supporting both sides of the case. The Court's most dramatic policymaking
decisions have remained untouched by Congress because interested groups are
often intensely opposed and proffer powerful but contradictory analytical
arguments on how to resolve such issues. This phenomenon is evident on issues
such as affirmative action in employment, the home video and audio recording
of copyrighted works,1°2 the application of criminal racketeering laws to
garden variety commercial disputes, 3 and contribution in antitrust cases.104
100. See The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1986 (Illinois Brick): Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Senate Illinois Brick Hearing]; Antitrust
Fairness Amendments of 1983 and Oversight of Corporate Interlocks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 House Illinois Brick Hearings]; Taxpayer Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1983 (Illinois
Brick): Hearings on S. 915 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1983-
84); Restoring Effective Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2050 Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 House Illinois Brick Hearings]; Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings On
S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Illinois Brick Hearings].
101. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Illinois BrickHearings, supra note 100, at 174-89 (statement of Professors
Richard Posner and William Landes, arguing that override would retard vigorous antitrust enforcement).
102. Dozens of bills were introduced in anticipation of and in response to Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), in which the Court called upon Congress to enact
responsive legislation, but the motion picture industry and other groups were able to head off override bills.
See, e.g., Home Video Recording: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Home Audio Recording Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
of The Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985-86); Video and Audio Home
Taping: Hearing on S. 31 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); Copyright OfficelCopyright Royalty Tribunal: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearings on S. 1758
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1981-82).
103. The Department of Justice and the National Association of Attorneys General, for example,
opposed the business community's efforts to override Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479
(1985). See, e.g., RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1987-88); Proposed RICO Reform Legislation: Hearings
on S. 1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); RICO Reform:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist
& 2d Sess. (1985-86); Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). Indeed, in the 99th Congress, overwhelming business support propelled the
Sedima override through the House, 132 CONG. REC. H9377 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986), but the Department
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In the last twenty-four years, there have been only a handful of overrides in
which Congress acted against the strong opposition of an important interest
group, and the overrides in those cases required a herculean effort t°5
This same difficulty confronted the civil rights community's effort to over-
ride Wards Cove. Notwithstanding support from the Democratic Party, all of
the leading civil rights groups, many unions, and consumer groups, the pro-
posed Civil Rights Act of 1990 failed in the 101st Congress primarily because
big business and the Republican Party were able to raise opposing policy con-
cerns, such as the possibility of excessive damages and litigation and of em-
ployers' setting quotas for minority hiring. Essentially the same legislation
became law in the 102d Congress because both big business (in early 1991)
and the Republican White House (in October 1991) signaled their willingness
to acquiesce in a massive override in return for damage caps and anti-quota
reassurances in the legislation.
B. The Critical Role of Committees
The deliberative features of the legislative override process are at first blush
most apparent in the critical role played by committees. 10 6 A difficulty inher-
ent to the legislative process is that policy must be made under conditions of
uncertainty. Is the "problem" identified by the groups petitioning Congress
really an important social or economic problem not adequately handled by
of Justice stopped the bill on the floor of the Senate. 132 CONG. REC. S16,704 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986).
104. Although the leading business groups and the Department of Justice strongly favored overriding
the Court's decision in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), and the
Court's opinion itself called for a legislative response, the opposition of consumer groups and antitrust
attorneys killed override efforts. See, e.g., The Antitrust Remedies Improvement Act and the Intellectual
Property Reform Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1407 and S. 63S Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopo-
lies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1987-88);
Individual Treble Damage Liability: Hearing on S. 1300 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1981-82); The Antitrust
Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1981-82).
105. See. e.g., the overrides reported in Appendix I for Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)
(override intensely opposed by Department of Justice and unsuccessfully vetoed by President); NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (override intensely opposed by Business Roundtable and other
business groups); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (override opposed by Department of
Justice).
106. See JOSEPH COOPER, CONGRESS AND ITS COMMITTEES: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE ROLE
OF COMMITTEES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1988); see also JOSEPH COOPER, THE ORIGINS OF THE
STANDING COMMIrEES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN HOUSE (1970); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR.,
CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); KREHBIEL, supra note 70; DAVID E. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE
LAWS? CREATIVITY AND POWER IN SENATE COMMITrEES (1972); STEVEN SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J.
DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (1984); Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra note 70: Thomas V. Gilligan &
Keith Krehbiel, Asymmetric Information & Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, 33 AM. J.
POL. SCl. 459 (1989); Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?,
84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 149 (1990); Keith Krehbiel, Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?, 81 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 929 (1987); David E. Price, Congressional Committees il the Policy Process, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED (Laurence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 3d ed. 1985).
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existing laws and institutions? If so, what policy alternatives exist? What are
the costs and benefits of each? Congressional practice had been to deal with
this uncertainty through deliberation and information gathering. Congress early
on realized that it could not make informed decisions on the many issues it
faced if it confronted and debated all the issues on the floor. Hence, Congress
established specialized committees to gather information about problems
brought to the legislature, to identify alternative policies, and to make recom-
mendations based upon deliberation of the different perspectives.
This traditional, deliberative understanding of the role of committees has
been questioned from a distributive perspective. 107 These scholars argue that
the committee selection process is skewed in favor of "preference outliers," that
is, Members of Congress whose preferences do not reflect the chamber norm.
Thus, if farm state legislators want to sit on the House Agriculture Committee,
union supporters choose the House Education and Labor CL nmittee, and
military boosters opt for the House Armed Services Committee, all of those
committees may consist of legislators whose preferences are much more pro-
farmer, pro-union, and pro-military than the preferences of the chamber as a
whole. Under this view, committees become means by which government
benefits are distributed to interest groups. If the committee is stacked in favor
of client groups, the chamber as a whole defers to the committee, and if the
committee uses its "gatekeeping" power to set the legislative agenda on issues
within its jurisdiction, then interest groups can use their influence to obtain
more benefits than the chamber as a whole would desire. This leads to an
effective "capture" of the legislative process, as well as of the committees, by
the relevant groups.108
The distributive perspective reveals a fascinating feature of the committee
process, one supported by anecdotal evidence. It is subject to both analytical
and empirical doubt, however.10 9 Why would a majoritarian chamber tolerate
a committee selection process that yielded outlier committees? Why would the
chamber defer to such a committee? Distributive theorists respond by emphasiz-
ing intensity of preferences. Each legislator is willing to tolerate nonmajoritarian
decisions on issues not of great concern for her constituents (and her reelection)
in return for satisfaction of her own outlier preferences on issues of great and
107. See SHIEPSLE, supra note 55; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Veingast, The Institutional
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 85 (1987); see also Gilligan & Krehbiel, supra
note 106; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983); Barry R.
Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
108. This is related to the "cozy triangle" literature on the capture of both relevant committees and
agencies by regulated interests. See generally RANDALL B. RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE
BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 9-12, 55-66 (3d ed. 1984) (occasions and techniques for interaction
between Congress and the bureaucracy).
109. The main skeptic is Keith Krehbiel, whose recent book criticizes the evidence developed in
SHEPSLE, supra note 55, and presents an informational perspective on the committee process. KREHBIEL,
supra note 70.
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intense concern to her constituents. 10 Information theory suggests that this
is not in fact what happens: Committees are not populated by preference
outliers, and to the extent that outliers do gravitate to certain committees, they
are typically met by outliers in precisely the opposite direction."' Information
theory also suggests that committees do not tend to be "captured" by one set
of interests, for otherwise Congress would have insufficient reason to rely on
their judgments.
The data and case studies generated by this survey suggest a synthetic view
of congressional committees. First, most committees are not dominated by
preference outliers. Among the committees most relevant to statutory interpreta-
tion issues, the tax committees, banking committees, environmental policy
committees, and committees in charge of admiralty law are not now, and
probably have not traditionally been, dominated by preference outliers.' On
some issues at some points in time, the judiciary committees have been prefer-
ence outliers (left of the chamber median),' and the labor committees have
been preference outliers for the entire period of this study (left of the chamber
median)." 4 Second, even if a committee consists of preference outliers on at
least some issues, the committee is usually constrained by the preferences of
the full chamber, which are not easily evaded. This constraint means that the
committee will not normally report a bill that it believes will be defeated on
110. Weingast & Moran, supra note 107, at 771-72.
111. See KREHBIEL, supra note 70. For example, just as Democrats who strongly favor civil rights
might desire to be on the Judiciary Committees to press the interests of an important constituency,
Republicans who favor business interests might want to be on the same committees, for precisely the same
reason. Both may be preference outliers, but they will tend to cancel out one another.
112. See id. at 129 tbl. 4.6 (deviations of various House committees from House median).
113. Krehbiel argues that for the period 1985-86, the House Judiciary Committee was not much of
a preference outlier, though it was to the left of the House median. Id. His observation seems borne out
by the Committee's performance on the Civil Rights Act of 1990. The Judiciary Committee voted for a
favorable report on the bill by a 25 to 12 vote, see Transcript of Judiciary Committee Mark-Up (on file with
author), which resembles the favorable vote of 272 to 154 in the House as a whole. See 136 CoNG. REC.
H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). At the beginning of this study, however, the House Judiciary Committee
was a preference outlier (to the left of the chamber median) on civil rights issues. The Committee in 1969
was chairea by the liberal Emanuel Celler and consisted of 15 liberal Democrats, 5 liberal, Eastern Republi-
cans, and 4 Midwestern Republicans who were liberal on civil rights, a total of 24 pro-civil rights votes,
against five Southern Democrats (opposed to civil rights) and six conservative Republicans (neutral or
reluctant). See 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 66 (listing committee members); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note
64. This was much more liberal than the House as a whole.
The Senate Judiciary Committee today may be at or near the chamber median. By my count, the 1990
Senate Judiciary Committee had average 1988 ADA scores (ratings given by Americans for Democratic
Action for "liberal" decisions, with the most liberal rating equaling 100%) of 74% for its Democratic
majority and 15% for its Republican minority, about the same as the chamber medians of 72% (Democrats)
and 19% (Republicans). See ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLrICS 1990. At the beginning of this study, the
Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by the conservative Senator Eastland and populated with a number
of other Southern Democrats, was probably to the right of the Senate median.
114. KREHBIEL, supra note 70, at 128-29 tbl. 4.6 (finding 1985-86 House Education and Labor
Committee significantly left of chamber median). By my count, the 1990 Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee had cumulative ADA scores of 88% support for its Democratic members and 26%
for its Republican members, significantly to the left of the chamber medians of 72% (Democrats) and 19%
(Republicans). See ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1990 (listing committee members and ADA scores).
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the chamber floor. Hence, it will either report bills that it believes meet the
chamber's preferences, or it will try to change those preferences through
information and persuasion. Third, an outlying committee has some power to
delay or kill proposals that the chamber would adopt. To be sure, committees
occasionally report bills that they oppose in response to demand by the cham-
ber, and the chamber can and will bypass a committee that is bottling up
legislation. But most measures are not salient enough for the chamber even to
know what its preferences are. Committees can delay or raise the costs of
enacting legislation on salient issues and hence discourage legislation at the
margin, while in some instances committees can exercise their strategic power
(particularly during conference committee) to kill or dilute legislation they do
not like.
This theory emphasizes three committee roles in congressional overrides:
screening out most override proposals; providing a forum for developing
override proposals that will satisfy the chamber median and avoid most interest
group conflict; and serving as a policy center that generates arguments and
information for shaping, and perhaps changing, the chamber's own initial
preferences.
The primary role of congressional committees is to serve as devices to
screen out the vast majority of policy proposals submitted to Congress. Com-
mittees will kill override legislation for three reasons. First, the committee can
discourage an override proposal that the chamber might prefer (the outlier
phenomenon). Although this is not nearly as regular an occurrence as distribu-
tive theory would suggest, it occasionally affects the prospects of override
proposals. For example, the outlier phenomenon was probably the reason there
was never a serious legislative effort to override Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,"5 in which the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act to permit disparate impact lawsuits. Griggs harmed big business, which saw
itself faced with Title VII lawsuits simply for having "bad numbers," and in
1971-72 a majority in Congress probably did not agree with the sweeping
reconceptualization of Title VII in Griggs."6 However, the Labor Committees
in both chambers were significantly to the left of their chamber medians and
probably preferred Griggs to any bill their chambers would have passed. Hence,
no committee-generated bill contained a Griggs provision, and both committees
115. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
116. See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
PoLIcY, 1960-1972 at 388-91 (1990). Note also that the House in 1971 voted to override judicial interpreta-
tions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) which hurt the interests of private employers, and a majority of Senators
on the floor were prepared to do the same in 1972. See infra text accompanying note 188. Essentially the
same coalition would have opposed Griggs, which, if anything, was a more serious threat to employer
interests.
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inserted language in their reports for the 1972 amendments to Title VII that
strongly approved of Griggs.n17
Second, a much more common phenomenon is a committee's refusal to
report an override that it likes but that it believes the chamber will reject. This
was probably the case with the efforts to override Illinois Brick. Both the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees favored an override of the decision
in 1979-80, and the Senate Committee reported a bill, which died on the Senate
Calendar. Although the Judiciary Committees in both chambers continued to
hold hearings on Illinois Brick after 1980, the House Judiciary Committee,
which strongly favored overriding the decision, never reported an override bill.
The probable reason was that it saw virtually no chance for enactment, especial-
ly after the pro-business Republicans gained control of the Senate in 1981.118
Conversely, the Senate Judiciary Committee during the period of Republican
control (1981-87) often failed to report override bills that it believed would fail
on the floor of the Senate or be killed in the Democratic-controlled House
Judiciary Committee."19
A final reason a committee will kill an override proposal, especially one
that it likes, is its judgment that the proposal is not "ripe" for the chamber's
consideration. Committees and subcommittees see their role as building a record
for the chamber's consideration of proposed legislation, informing the chamber
of the various arguments and interest alignments, and working out a compro-
mise or consensus on the issue. This explains the reluctance of a sympathetic
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee to report a Boutilier override
in the early- and mid-1980's. The subcommittee contented itself with building
a record against the case without pressing for legislation favoring a controver-
sial group (gay men and lesbians). Finally, the subcommittee acted in the 100th
Congress and included the Boutilier override in a bill which generally rewrote
the bases for exclusion. That bill got through Committee to the full House,
which was unable (for agenda and time pressure reasons) to consider it.120
117. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2156-67; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).
118. Rep. Rodino (D-N.J.), Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, poignantly noted in the 1984
House hearings that he and his staff had worked on overriding Illinois Brick for eight years. 1984 House
Illinois Brick Hearings, supra note 100, at 27. The hearings carry with them a sense of "just going through
the motions," given the disinclination of Senator Hatch (R-Utah), the Chair of the Senate subcommittee,
to permit a bill to get to the Senate. See 1986 Senate Illinois Brick Hearings, supra note 100, at 1.
119. See, e.g., The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2216 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (habeas corpus reform bill, overriding Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963) and other cases); Affirmative Action and Equal Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (override bill for United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), approving voluntary affirmative action under Title VII);
Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. 1983: Hearings on S. 584, S. 585. and S. 990 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (override bill for
various decisions imposing "excessive" § 1983 liability on municipalities).
120. The subcommittee held hearings on H.R. 1119 on June 23, 1987. See Exclusion and Deportation
of Aliens: Hearing on HR. 1119 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration. Refugees and International Law
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). It reported a clean bill, H.R. 4427,
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The Boutilier override was then included, without much fuss, in the immigra-
tion reform law passed in the 101st Congress.
C. A Model of the CourtlCongress/President Interaction in Statutory Interpre-
tation
This Article's discussion of general theories of the legislative process,
interest groups, and committees lays the foundation for a realistic and theoreti-
cally robust model of the interaction between the Supreme Court, Congress,
and the President in statutory interpretation. The goal is to construct a model
that has some predictive value but that also captures much of the complexity
of the legislative process. Specifically, the model must incorporate the dynamic
and interactive features of that process, such as the way in which different
actors generate information to persuade other actors, while at the same time
remaining sensitive to the different preferences of those actors.
For a number of years, positive political theory has been developing
equilibrium models of the legislative process' response to agency and executive
decisions,121 but has only recently begun to model the interaction between
the Court and Congress.122 The latter is an area in which law professors may
have something to add, because we have done more research in the areas of
judicial incentives, preferences, and work product. This Article provides a
convenient sample from which to build the outlines of a theory. It shall do so
in three sections.
The first section outlines a theory of judicial preferences in statutory
interpretation and uses the data from my empirical survey to suggest general
relationships between those preferences and committee and legislative prefer-
ences in the 1980's and (probably) 1990's. The next section models the interac-
tion between the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President as a sequential
game, in which a Court interested in not being overridden can achieve that
objective and usually still read its preferences into federal statutes. The last
section relaxes that assumption and suggests situations in which the Supreme
Court would rationally risk or even prefer statutory overrides of its decisions.
to the full Judiciary Committee, which reported the bill favorably to the House on August 12, 1988. H.R.
REP. No. 882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
121. See John A. Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 1 (1991) (Special Issue); Steven Mathew, Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game,
104 Q.J. EcoN. 347 (1989); Terry Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Domi-
nance" of Bureaucracy, 12 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 475 (1987); Weingast & Moran, supra note 107.
122. See John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: A Strategic Theory of Interpreta-
tion (paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional Law & Economics, Stanford University) (Oct.
25-27, 1990) (on file with author); Brian A. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policy-
making: Grove City College v. Bell (1984) (1989 unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University)
(on file with author).
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1. Supreme Court Preferences in Statutory Interpretation
What the Supreme Court is trying to do in statutory interpretation has long
been a subject of intense controversy, but an emerging academic consensus
indicates that statutory interpretation is not dominated by any single ap-
proach.l"s The existing literature strongly suggests, for example, that the
Court rarely just implements some preexisting "original legislative intent" when
it interprets statutes. On the other hand, there is little current academic support
for the proposition that the Court simply interprets statutes to implement the
Court's own view of what is the best policy. In other words, when interpreting
statutes, the Court behaves neither like the traditional vision of a court, nor like
the traditional vision of a legislature.
These academic insights are borne out by the Supreme Court's statutory
decisions surveyed in this Article, especially those in the survey of decisions
from the 1977 through 1983 Terms (Tables 3, 8, and 9). The more than 200
statutory decisions analyzed from that period followed different interpretive
methods from case to case. While the Justices emphasized textual plain meaning
in some cases, they emphasized legislative history or statutory precedents in
others (see Table 5). Indeed, it is often difficult to characterize the approach
emphasized in individual decisions, because the Court usually analyzes and
relies upon a variety of factors before arriving at a decision."2
Notwithstanding the Court's eclectic approach, it is still possible to make
some generalizations. This survey, informed by prior scholarship, found that
the Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes reflects three different preferenc-
es. The first is a preference for implementing the plain meaning of the statutory
text (if there is one)."z Applying the apparent meaning of the text furthers
important rule of law values, such as predictability, certainty, and objectivity.
The preference for plain meaning is most important for recent and detailed
statutes, since they are most likely to have a plain meaning that reflects the
preferences of the legislature and sound policy.
The second judicial preference is coherence. The Supreme Court sees itself
as preserving, to the extent possible, law's coherence. A reading of the text that
123. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 38; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 543 (1988); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV.
827 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405 (1989);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
124. For a detailed elaboration of this point, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 38, at 345-62.
125. "Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in
reasonably plain terms, 'that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). For other leading, and influential, expressions of this preference, see Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173, 195 (1978) (holding that plain
language of Endangered Species Act requires court to enjoin completion of a federal dam); United States
v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490
(1917). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
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is coherent with other legal authorities is better than an equally plausible textual
reading that is incoherent.126 It is useful to distinguish between horizontal and
vertical coherence, both of which are valued by the Court, but which are often
in tension.127 A reading of the text is horizontally coherent if it makes the
best sense of the statute as a whole, is consistent with interpretations of similar
statutory provisions, and fits with current judicial and legislative policy pre-
sumptions. A reading of the text is vertically coherent if it is consistent with
the statute's legislative history, its original design and purpose, and prior
judicial interpretations of the text. The Court desires horizontal coherence
because it makes current statutory law fit together into a seamless web of law
and because it believes citizens will understand and accept such law better than
checkerboard law.'2 The Court desires vertical coherence because it suggests
a rooted tradition from which the Court declares law and because citizens rely
on the prior authorities in making decisions.129
The third judicial preference is policy based. The Justices bring to the
interpretive task ideological frameworks and policy preferences that inevitably
influence the choices made. 130 For example, the Court has strong institutional
preferences to avoid decisions and rules that it believes itself incompetent to
make or believes will overburden the courts operating under scarce resources.
Additionally, the Court will implement canons of statutory interpretation that
reflect traditional policy preferences. Canons such as the rule of lenity in crimi-
nal cases, presumptions against exemption from antitrust and tax laws, and clear
statement rules protecting against unannounced waivers of sovereign immunity
are particularly important in statutory interpretation. 13' Finally, in difficult
cases (ambiguous statutory text, unhelpful legislative history), the political
ideology of the particular Justices makes a difference in their statutory interpre-
tations. Ideology seems to have the most influence in cases dealing with
politically charged topics, such as discrimination and military and foreign
affairs.
It is instructive to compare the Court's apparent preferences with those of
Congress and its committees through analysis of the main areas of override
activity in the last twelve Congresses. The Supreme Court in this period has
126. For an extended discussion of this point, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
127. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 116 (1988).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) (inferring congressional abrogation of
policy in a related statute, over dissent's reliance on continuity with past policy).
129. This is the policy behind the super-strong presumption against overruling statutory precedents.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment). It also underlies the Court's various legislative inaction doctrines. See, e.g., Monessen Southwest-
ern Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988).
130. See HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel veinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans.,
2d rev. ed. 1989), analyzed in GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMIENEUTIcs, TRADITION AND REASON
(1987). See generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERmENEUTiC READER (Sanford Levinson
& Scott Mailloux eds., 1989); Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
131. These and other canons are discussed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989), and Sunstein, supra note 123.
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preferred plain textual meanings, has followed statutory precedents and legisla-
tive history unless strongly contradicted, and has been influenced by its concern
with a constantly rising caseload, the policies embodied in the canons, and its
own conservative ideology. The analysis in this part suggests that Congress and
its committees would prefer interpretations that reflected their own political
preferences, which are strongly influenced by the Members' own ideological
frameworks, their perceptions of constituent preferences, and the pressure and
information provided by salient groups, including government groups.
This analysis and the data in Appendix I and Table 4, provides a basis for
comparing the preferences of the Court and Congress (during 1967-90) for
some of the main policy areas subject to legislative overrides. On the conven-
tional liberal/conservative scale, the Court for most of the period of this study
has been more conservative than Congress and its committees on issues involv-
ing civil rights, environmental law, federal jurisdiction and procedure, and
intergovernmental relations. The Court's relative conservatism in civil rights
cases can be attributed to the difficulty of applying old statutes and legislative
history to unanticipated problems and to the Court's own strongly conservative
preferences about civil rights policy.32 In contrast, Congress' Democratic
majorities have been committed to liberal civil rights enforcement and have
been responsive to leading civil rights groups. Similarly, the Democratic
Congress is more responsive to environmentalist interest groups than the Court
has been. The Court's conservatism in jurisdiction and procedure is mainly due
to its institutional policy of interpreting judicial power very conservatively and
to its current concerns about excessive caseloads. Congress is not encumbered
by these policy limitations and has incentives to provide relevant interest groups
greater access to the courts.1 33 In cases involving state-federal relations, the
Court is strongly influenced by its longstanding commitment to federalism,"a
while Congress is more evenly balanced between its concern for state and local
governments and its desire to grant rights and remedies to civil rights, and
other, groups.1 35
132. Generalizations about the preexisting ideology of the Justices are risky. How can we know what
they "really" think, when they only claim to say what Congress thinks? Nonetheless, the conventional
wisdom among the legal community holds that the Court's preferences on civil rights have moved steadily
to the right after 1971. That wisdom receives empirical support from a study of newspaper editorials at the
time of Supreme Court appointments. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). Confirming evidence can be found in
the Court's drift to the right in constitutional civil rights cases.
133. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (expressing institutional reluctance to read
federal jurisdiction broadly). Congress promptly overrode Finley in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14.
134. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395,2400-01 (1991) (creating "clear statement" rule which
creates strong presumption against congressional regulation of core state government functions and officials,
such as state judges).
135. This contrast shows up clearly in federal cases finding no congressional abrogation of state
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and in their prompt overrides by Congress. See infra Appendix I (overrides
for Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); BV
Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989)).
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Perhaps surprisingly, the Court during this period, on the whole, has been
to the left of Congress on issues of substantive criminal law, income tax, and
antitrust law. In criminal law, the rule of lenity often impels the Court to
demand greater precision from elderly criminal statutes, 136 which Congress,
pressured by the Department of Justice, is often willing to provide. Although
criminal defendants are not usually represented by well-organized interest
groups, tax and antitrust defendants frequently are. This helps explain why the
Court is more liberal in those areas: Congress is more immediately responsive
than the Court to well-heeled taxpayers and corporate antitrust defendants. And,
in each of those areas, the Court, guided by canons against exceptions to tax
collection and antitrust policy, has tended to interpret broadly phrased tax and
antitrust statutes expansively.1 37
For the period of this study, other statutory areas did not yield predictable
divisions between the Court and Congress, for a variety of apparent reasons:
There were too few overrides from which to generalize (immigration law,
freedom of information law, banking, and traditional labor law). Interest group
activity in both the Court and Congress was similarly balanced (bankruptcy law;
copyright, trademark, and patent law). The Court's traditions and personal
ideologies did not cut strongly in any one direction (bankruptcy law). Moreover,
the generalizations made above were and are subject to change over time. For
example, in civil rights law, the Court was more liberal than Congress for the
early years of this study (1967-71), then shifted right as Congress shifted left
(1970's), and has moved even further to the right of Congress in the
1980's.138
Notwithstanding these limitations and caveats, what is most striking about
this analysis is that one should expect Congress and the Supreme Court to have
different preferences for statutory interpretation in the large majority of cases.
The Court is responsive to the plain meaning and legislative history of statutes
even when they are quite old, while Congress is more interested in its own
current, rather than historical, preferences. The Court is more concerned about
the interconnections in, and overall coherence of, the United States Code than
is Congress. The Court's traditions (the canons), institutional concerns, and
personal ideological assumptions are significantly different from the interest
group pressures on and ideology of Congress. During the period of divided
136. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350
(1987); United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971) (rule of lenity); see also Appendix I
(override of McNally).
137. See, e.g., National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89
(1981); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979); United States v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422
U.S. 659,682 (1975); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,348 (1963) (disfavored status
of implied antitrust immunities); see also United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351 (1988); Oklaho-
ma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606 (1943) (disfavored status of implied tax exemptions).
138. See infra text accompanying notes 181-209.
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government that this country has had since 1969, the ideological differences
between the Court and Congress are particularly striking.
If it is true that Congress and the Court often differ markedly in their
preferences for the best interpretation of a statute, and if it is further true that
interest groups bring about half of the Court's statutory interpretation decisions
to the attention of committees generally responsive to Congress' current prefer-
ences, then one might have expected many more overrides than have actually
occurred in the last twenty-four years. Rather than overriding about five percent
of the Court's statutory decisions each year in the 1980's, Congress might have
been expected to override several times that number. But that did not happen.
For example, in the 101st Congress (1989-90), the Court's habeas corpus
decisions, its controversial endorsement of the "bubble concept" in environ-
mental law, and its conservative civil rights decisions were all subject to serious
but unsuccessful override attempts. 139
Why does Congress not override more of the Supreme Court's statutory
decisions?'o The most obvious reason suggested by this study141 is the
existence of conflictual demand patterns. Many Supreme Court statutory
decisions involve big stakes and sharply clashing interests. While the losers
often have enough clout to bring decisions to the congressional agenda, the
winners are also likely to have some influence. In such cases, unless the losers
at the Supreme Court level can persuade other groups to be supportive or
neutral, their chances of overturning a Supreme Court decision are not promis-
ing. This explanation squares with the data generated by the current survey. The
Supreme Court's most controversial statutory decisions are usually not overrid-
den because there are strong interest group alignments on both sides of the
issues, leaving the Court's decisions firmly intact. The congressional overrides
listed in Appendix I tend to involve Supreme Court cases in which the winning
interests were not powerful at the time of the override-because the interests
are diffuse or outside the political process (decisions benefiting accused crimi-
nals) or because the substantive position was weak (Gilbert) or had lost force
over time (Boutilier).
2. Statutory Interpretation as a Sequential Political Game
The explanation just posited for the relative dearth of overrides is a trou-
bling one in a representative democracy, for it suggests that the Court is often
139. See supra note 4 (describing these failed override attempts).
140. One traditional reason given for Congress' failure to override Supreme Court decisions is that
it is "unaware" of them. That is rendered most unlikely by this study's finding that a substantial percentage
of the Court's decisions are subjected to committee scrutiny. See Table 3. A more plausible reason is that
the legislative agenda is not infinitely elastic, and Congress simply does not have the time and resources
to override every statutory decision with which it disagrees. This reason, however, fails to account for
Congress' tendency to override the less important Supreme Court decisions.
141. Or, more precisely, by Dan Farber in his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
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able to read its preferences into statutes, against the desires of our nationally
elected officials. There is, however, another (perhaps complementary) explana-
tion for the Court's ability to avoid congressional overrides, at least in the short
term: 42 The Court is attentive to current congressional (and, as will also be
shown, presidential) preferences when it interprets statutes.
To explore this hypothesis, think about statutory interpretation as a sequen-
tial political game. The game is played across a linear space-here, the possible
interpretations of an existing statute-in which a policy position to the right
reflects conservative preferences and one to the left reflects liberal preferences.
The Supreme Court makes the first move in the game by choosing a point on
the policy line (Q) which represents the Court's preferences as to the best way
to interpret the statute. Once the Court has made the first move, the loser(s)
in the case will bring the issue to the attention of the relevant congressional
committees, which have a "raw" (preexisting) preference about where the
policy should be (C). If the committees agree with the Court's position (J =
C), the game ends. 43 If the committees disagree with the Court, they may
continue the game by reporting an override bill to their full chambers. The
chambers make the next move, reflecting the raw preferences of the median
"lember (M). Thus, Congress may amend the override bill as it likes, in order
to bring it into line with its own preferences.'44 The final move is made by
the President (P), who can veto an override bill if he or she prefers the Court's
policy to that of Congress. The presidential veto is, of course, subject to
Congress' ability to override the veto by a two-thirds vote in each chamber.
As thus outlined, each player in the game (Court, committees, Congress,
President) naively follows its own preexisting preferences about good policy.
But the game as actually played is more complicated, as a matter of both
strategy and information. The strategic complication arises because a player
usually wants the ultimate statutory policy to reflect its own preferences as
much as possible in accordance with the rules of the game. Hence, a committee
may disagree with the Court's statutory interpretation but still may fail to report
an override bill if it would dislike the policy adopted by the full Congress even
more. Stated more formally, the committee will have an "indifference point"
(C(M)) where the Court can set policy which the committee likes no more and
no less than the opposite policy that would be chosen by the full chamber. The
Court itself may strategically compromise its original preferences in order to
142. More than 25% of congressional overrides are for Supreme Court decisions over 10 years old (see
Table 1).
143. Here assume that the committee whose jurisdiction covers the Supreme Court's decision has
"gatekeeping" power if it does not report override legislation, Congress has nothing to consider. Also
assume that once the gatekeeping committee introduces override legislation, it cannot prevent its chamber
from amending it to reflect the chamber's preferences. These are traditional positive political assumptions
and are the basis for the works, cited in supra notes 121-22, which have most influenced this game theory.
144. This reflects the assumption that the override bill will be considered on at least a partially open-
rule basis in Congress, which seems to have been the case during the period of this study. Again, political
scientists using such a model, see sources in supra notes 121-22, make this assumption.
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avoid a congressional override, for example, by accommodating the preferences
of the President or committees when those players are in a position to protect
the Court.
The informational complication arises because each player has some
uncertainty about its "raw" (pregame) preferences about statutory policy, and
because one object of the game is to gather information that will help resolve
its uncertainty about appropriate policy under the statute. Hence, a committee's
initial reaction to a Supreme Court statutory interpretation may be skeptical,
but after hearings and further information gathering, the committee may decide
that the interpretation is defensible or not worth overriding. Under this theory,
the Court's ultimate preferences about statutory policy might be influenced by
contemporary congressional deliberation and information gathering on the issue.
The above discussion sets forth the broad contours of the
"Court/Congress/President Game." 145 Now consider the operation of this
sequential game under variations of the players' preferences in concrete policy
settings-criminal, tax, and antitrust law, where congressional preferences tend
to be more conservative than judicial preferences; jurisdiction and procedure
and intergovernmental relations, where congressional preferences have tended
to be more liberal than judicial preferences; and civil rights law, where congres-
sional preferences shifted over time from more conservative to more liberal than
judicial preferences. Although the discussion is organized around the relative
preferences of Congress and the Court, which tend to change fairly slowly and
deliberately over time, the preferences of the President, which change more
dramatically, are often important in the playing of the game.
a. The CourtlCongresslPresident Game in Criminal, Tax & Antitrust Law
Because the Court is influenced by liberal rules of interpretation of crimi-
nal, tax, and antitrust statutes, and Congress is more susceptible to conservative
interest group pressure (from the Department of Justice, state attorneys general,
and private groups), the Court tends to be more liberal than Congress. The
judiciary committees during the period of this study tended to be more liberal
than their chambers, but not necessarily as liberal as the Court on these issues.
Figure 1 maps the relevant preference relationships:
Liberal Conservative
Policy C(M) J C M P Policy
Figure 1. Raw Preferences, C(M) < J < C < M < P
Equilibrium Result, x = J
145. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History: Playing the CourtlCongresslPresident Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) (outlining game in civil rights context).
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Because of the Court's willingness to apply the role of lenity against the
government when it construes criminal statutes, the Court's preferences, J, are
usually more liberal than those of the median legislator, M. The judiciary
committees have raw preferences, C, a little to the left of their chamber medi-
ans on such issues, but do not tend to be complete outliers. 146 As the nation's
chief executive officer, the President, P, tends to be more conservative than
Congress (P > M).
Given the preference configuration in Figure 1, the Court could interpret
the statute to reflect its own raw preferences and not be overridden, even
though its preferences are somewhat to the left of those of the chamber (J <
M). This will be the case so long as the Court's preferences are at or to the
right of the committee's indifference point, (C(M)), that is, the point at which
the committee is perfectly indifferent between that point and the chamber
median, M. In that event, the committee has no incentive to report an override
bill, since such a bill could be amended to reflect the median Member's prefer-
ence, M, which the committee may find more distasteful than the Court's policy
preference, J. So the committee would do nothing, and the Court's preference
would be left in place.
This result-no bill for the chamber to consider-endures so long as the
Court's preferences are at or to the right of the committee's indifference point,
C(M). Thus, so long as C(M) < J, the Court can simply implement its own
preferences and not be overridden. The game changes if the Court's preferences
are to the left of the committee's indifference point (J < C(M)), as diagrammed
in Figure 2:
Liberal Conservative
Policy J C(M) C M P Policy
Figure 2. Raw Preferences, J < C(M) < C < M < P
Equilibrium Result, J < x < C(M)
If the Court implements its preferences, it will trigger an override bill from the
committee and probable enactment of the chamber's preferences, M. The Court
can try to avoid this result by either shifting its own preferences far enough to
the right so that the committee will not want to override its interpretation (x
= C(M), J shifting right), or by trying to persuade the committee to adjust its
own preferences to the left by providing it with useful information about the
statute (x = J, with C(M), C shifting left).
146. See KREHBIEL, supra note 70, at 129 tbl. 4.6.
Note that the figures in the text will simplify Congress into a single chamber, consistent with the
political science literature cited in notes 121-22 supra.
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An example of the phenomenon described in Figure 2 is United States v.
Kozminski, 47 which interpreted the criminal code's prohibition against
"involuntary servitude" to overturn a conviction when much of the evidence
of servitude pointed toward psychological pressure rather than physical threats
or coercion. The Court's opinion, probably very much to the left of (more
protective of criminal defendants than) the probable congressional or committee
preferences, reflected traditional judicial preferences in criminal law cases,
including attention to the statute's plain meaning, probable original expectations
(it was a nineteenth-century statute), and the rule of lenity. But the Court was
quick to observe (in dicta) that on retrial the victims' psychological vulnerabili-
ty would be relevant to the more "overt" coercion allegedly used by the
defendants. The Court's apparent willingness to bend its preferences to reflect
modern evidence may have been strategic or may have been a genuine effort
to accommodate current legislative preferences. In either case, it reflects the
fluidity of the Court's preferences, in response to current legislative preferences,
on issues of substantive criminal law. Although the Court's opinion was very
probably more liberal than were the raw preferences of Congress on this issue,
its open accommodation of such views was enough to discourage an override
effort.
Note that under the conditions of Figures 1 and 2, the President is not an
important player, because he will sign any bill Congress would pass (P > M
> J). This characterizes the Presidency's position on most issues of criminal
and antitrust law for most of this period-but not during the Carter Administra-
tion (1977-81), when presidential preferences shifted to the left. Figure 3
reflects the new alignment on at least some criminal law and antitrust issues:
Liberal Conservative
Policy V J C(M) C M Policy
P
Figure 3. Raw Preferences, V < J, P < C(M) < C < M
Equilibrium Result, x = J = P
When the President is aligned with the Court, as in Figure 3, a new point
becomes relevant-the "veto median" (V), namely, that point in each chamber
for which one-third of the legislators are on one side, and two-thirds on the
other. Under the game mapped by the raw preferences in Figure 3, the Court
could implement its own preferences without fear of an override. Even though
the Court's preferences are more liberal than those of the committee's indiffer-
ence point (J < C(M)), the committee will not introduce override legislation:
The committee knows that the chamber will not act to pass a bill the President
147. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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will veto unless the chamber can override the veto. And the committee knows
that more than a third of the chamber prefers the Court's interpretation to any
interpretation the committee and the chamber prefer (V < J < C < Al). Know-
ing that it cannot obtain a better policy through override legislation, the com-
mittee does nothing.
b. The Court/Congress/President Game in Federal Jurisdiction, Govern-
mental Relations, and Environmental Law
Because the Court's traditions in these areas are restrictive, and Congress
is more responsive to liberal group pressures (to expand jurisdiction, reform
procedure, expand government accountability to citizens, and protect the
environment), the Court tended to be more conservative than Congress in these
areas during the period of this study. The judiciary committees (and subcommit-
tees) were, on the whole, to the left of their chamber medians, and hence
unaligned with the Court on these issues. Figure 4 maps these preference
configurations, under the further assumption that the President is neutral or
favors Congress (as was usually the case before 1981):
Liberal Conservative
Policy C(M) C M J Policy
P
Figure 4. Raw Preferences, C < M, P < J
Equilibrium Result, M < x < J
As in Figures 1-3, Figure 4 shows the relevant committees, C, somewhat to the
left of the chamber median, M. Unlike Figures 1-3, Figure 4 shows the Court's
raw preferences, J, to the right of those of the chamber median. The location
of the Court's preferences vis-il-vis those of the committee and the chamber
significantly affects the game. If the Court simply reads its preferences into the
statute, it can expect a congressional override, because the committees prefer
any policy to the left of the Court's preferred policy, including the policy
Congress would adopt (C < M < J). Hence, the committees would report
override legislation, which Congress would amend to reflect its policy prefer-
ences.
Figure 4 roughly describes the relative preferences of the players in the
current debate over habeas corpus reform. The Court has been cutting back on
Fay v. Noia148 for the last fifteen years, reflecting its institutional concerns
about the large volume of habeas cases handled by federal judges. The House
148. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Judiciary Committee, generally to the left of both the Court and the House on
these issues, sought to override some of the Court's more conservative decisions
in 1990,149 but its override was amended on the House floor to add more
conservative provisions.150 As amended, habeas reform was killed in confer-
ence committee by the House conferees, but new override legislation may be
successful in the 102d Congress.15 The 1990 experience suggests that with
most habeas issues, the Court has been able to avoid an override by persuading
Congress that its increasingly conservative positions are justified, resulting in
a shift to the right by Congress.
The Court can also avoid an override if it shifts its preferences in the
direction of the chamber median. An unusually dramatic example of this
phenomenon was the Court's actions after Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co. 152 Green interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence to permit impeach-
ment of witnesses in civil trials through prior criminal convictions that did not
involve perjury of the witnesses. Although the statutory language was not
helpful and due process values cut against the Court's interpretation, the Court
made a strong case for its interpretation by referring to a traditional common
law rule and Congress' probable intent when it redrafted the Rules in 1974.153
The Court's preferences were certainly more conservative than those held in
the current Congress, however. But the Court immediately accommodated
Congress' preferences by transmitting an amended version of the Rule within
months of Green, pursuant to its authority under the Rules Enabling Act."5
Although a rule change does not put the Court in a position of "interpreting"
a statute, it does suggest that the Court was willing to compromise its prefer-
ences expressed in Green.1 55
For much of the period of this study (especially after 1981), the preferences
of the Presidency are to the right of Congress' preferences on issues ofjurisdic-
149. See H.R. REP. NO. 681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 123-35 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6472, 6528-41.
150. The Judiciary Committee realized that it did not have the votes to obtain House approval for its
habeas corpus provisions and offered its own "diluting" amendments, which were defeated on the floor of
the House. 136 CONG. REC. H8870-76 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990). The House then passed the more conserva-
tive Hyde Amendment, which substituted a habeas corpus title that was on some issues more conservative
than the Supreme Court decisions. Id. at H8876-82.
151. H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. xi (1991), as reported by the House Judiciary Committee
substantially cuts back on Fay v. Noia's availability of habeas corpus, but is more liberal than the Hyde
Amendment adopted by the House in 1990. As an obvious compromise, the new habeas title survived attack
from a similar Hyde Amendment in 1991 that would have overridden Fay v. Noia altogether. 137 CoNG.
REc. H7995-8005 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991) (Hyde Amendment defeated, 208-218).
152. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
153. Id. at 511-24. But cf. id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (relying only on most plausible
meaning of plain text of statute, but drawing only one vote).
154. The Court transmitted to Congress a proposed revision of Rule 609 in January 1990. See I10 S.
Ct. cxxviii-cxxxvi (1990). The Rule change went into effect in December 1990, when Congress refrained
from deferring the Rule's effective date or rewriting the Rule. See 110 S. Ct. e (1990).
155. Note, for example, that the Court arguably lacks the power under the Rules Enabling Act to
"repeal" a rule adopted by Congress. If the Court really adhered to the Green interpretation of congressional
intent'when redrafting Rule 609, it could not have changed Rule 609 in 1990.
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tion and procedure, governmental operation and intergovernmental relations,
and environmental policy. Figures 5 and 6 map two versions of this new
alignment. Figure 5 describes issues, such as national government operations,
where the President is significantly to the right of Congress and somewhat to
the right of the Court:
Liberal Conservative
Policy C M J V P Policy
Figure 5. Raw Preferences, C < M < J < V < P
Equilibrium Result, x = J
Similar to the earlier discussion of Figure 3, when the President's preferences
favor those of the Court more than those of Congress, the Court gains greater
power to impose its preferences onto statutory policy, because it requires
supermajorities in Congress to override both the Court and a presidential veto.
That is, if the Court's interpretation is at or to the left of the veto median (J
< V), the relevant committee would tend not to report an override bill, nor
would Congress bring the bill to a vote, because the committee and Congress
would know that the President's probable veto would be sustained.
An excellent example of this scenario is the ongoing controversy over Feres
v. United States. 56 There, the Court read the Federal Tort Claims Act to
include an immunity from tort suits arising out of military service activities.
Congressional hearings through the 1980's viere harshly critical of the Feres
doctrine, especially for medical malpractice in the military, while represen-
tatives of the President strongly opposed any effort to override Feres.15 7 The
President apparently had the votes to sustain a veto, for no bill ever passed
Congress. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Feres in United States v. Johnson,
reflecting its preference for immunities in military and foreign affairs and for
vertical coherence (following precedent). Although the relevant subcommittee
156. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
157. See Medical Malpractice Suits for Armed Services Personnel: Hearing on S. 2490 and H.R. 1054
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Senate Feres Hearings]; Military Malpractice and Liability for
Injuries Resulting from the Atomic Weapons Testing Program: Hearing on H.R. 1054 and H.R. 1341 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Feres Doctrine and Military Malpractice: Hearing on S. 489 and HR.
3174 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Military Medical Malpractice: Hearings on H.R. 1161 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Hotse Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1985); Medical Malpractice Claims by Armed Forces Personnel: Hearing on H.R. 1942 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); The Feres Doctrine as It Relates to Private Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Agency Administration of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (heated
exchanges between members of Congress and the Departments of State and Justice).
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chairs railed against Johnson,158 and a Feres override limited to medical mal-
practice claims passed the House, the President's opposition killed Senate over-
ride efforts.
Finally, consider Figure 6, which places the raw preferences of both the
Court and the President to the right of the veto median in Congress:
Liberal Conservative
Policy C M V J Policy
P
Figure 6. Raw Preferences, C < M < V < J, P
Equilibrium Result, V < x < J, P
In this preference configuration, the Court would face an override if it read its
raw preferences into the statute. Here, committees have every incentive to
report override bills, and Congress could pass a bill setting policy at the veto
median, V, that would not be vetoed, because the President would lack the votes
to sustain a veto. The Court would then have two options to avoid an override.
It could simply compromise its preferences and adopt an interpretation at or
near the veto median (x = V, with J shifting left), or it could try to persuade
a chamber, or at least the veto median, to shift its preferences to the right in
light of information the Court would provide about the statute (x = J, with V
shifting right). If the Court tries the latter, the President may become a useful
ally, as a center of media attention and head of one of the political parties.
c. The CourtlCongress/President Game in Civil Rights
The discussion above has assumed a relatively constant relation between
congressional and judicial preferences in the subject areas covered; the big
changes in preference configurations for the period of this study have been for
the Presidency (compare Figure 1 with Figure 3, and Figure 4 with Figures 5
and 6). Indeed, the Presidency is a relatively more mercurial institution, since
a single election can alter its preferences dramatically (as occurred in 1952,
1960, 1968, 1976, and 1980). Preference shifts occur more gradually in Con-
gress and the Court, but they do occur.
For most subject areas, the Court/Congress/President game evolves over
time. Not only do the players adjust their raw preferences in the short term to
accommodate new information and political pressures, but as their personnel
and the political landscape change, the players adjust their absolute preferences
and their comparative preferences (relative to one another) over time. This
158. See 1988 Senate Feres Hearings, supra note 157, at 15-17 (testimony of Rep. Frank to override
Johnson and adopt the approach of Justice Scalia's dissent in that case).
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 385 1991-1992
The Yale Law Journal
phenomenon occurs in all subject areas, but has been most dramatic in civil
rights policy during this period. 5 9 During the late Warren Court and early
Burger Court (1967-71), the Court's preferences for interpreting civil rights
statutes were more liberal than those of Congress and its committees. Figure
1 roughly describes the raw preferences of the players and suggests that the
Court then enjoyed relative freedom to read civil rights statutes liberally,
without being overridden. During the 1970's, Congress drifted to the left and
the Court to the right in their preferences for civil rights policy, and the config-
uration changed to that shown in Figure 4. As a consequence, the Court was
subject to more overrides during that period. After the 1980 election, the Presi-
dent aligned strongly with the Court, and Figures 5 and 6 map the new array
of preferences. Protected by the President's veto, the Court more boldly read
its raw preferences into civil rights statutes. This culminated in the series of
1989 decisions that have been the subject of override efforts in 1990 and 1991.
Several recent civil rights cases reveal how the Court plays the game as
mapped in Figures 5 and 6. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,6' the
Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866111 to provide a cause of action
against private employers when they "make or enforce" contracts in ways that
discriminate by reason of race, but not when the contract is discriminatory only
in actual operation. The Court's opinion was an apparent compromise-on the
one hand reaffirming its prior holding that the statute protects African Ameri-
cans against private refusals to enter contracts, while on the other hand declin-
ing to extend its analysis to protect African Americans whose conditions of
employment are discriminatory. Based on an amicus brief filed by Members
of Congress, which took a very strong position on the first issue but ignored
the second, the Court might have believed that such a compromise would
satisfy the median Member. 6 '
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 63 the Court interpreted Title VII
to require that plaintiffs in Griggs "disparate impact" cases carry the burden
of proving that racial imbalances are the result of specific discriminatory
practices. The Court probably realized that its interpretation of Title VII was
contrary to the preferences of a substantial majority of legislators in each cham-
ber, but strongly suggested that legislators revise their preferences, lest employ-
ers be forced to adopt undesirable quotas. 64 This strategy was probably criti-
cal in the defeat of the override effort in the 101st Congress: The President not
159. The analysis in this paragraph is taken from Eskridge, supra note 145, and this point is explored
further in Part lII.A, infra.
160. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
161. Currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
162. The amicus brief argued that Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should not be overruled,
but took no position on the application of Runyon to the facts of Patterson. Brief for 66 Members of the
United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Patterson (No. 87-107).
163. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
164. Id. at 652.
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ofly vetoed the override bill, but invoked the quota issue and used it to rally
enough Republican Senators to sustain his veto. The political landscape has
changed with the 102d Congress and the President abandoned that position,
permitting Congress to override Wards Cove (as well as Patterson and the other
1989 decisions).
3. A Theory of Congressional Overrides
The sequential game developed above explains how the Supreme Court
often can avoid congressional overrides of its statutory decisions, even when
the raw preferences of the Court and Congress might be very different. The
Court/Congress/President game then raises the question: Might the Supreme
Court avoid overrides altogether by adroitly playing the game? Probably not.
The sequential game theory suggests three situations in which the Court's
statutory decisions will be overridden.
First, the Court's interpretations will be overridden when congressional
preferences change over time. 6 This is why some of the Court's older deci-
sions, such as Boutilier, are overridden.'66 These older decisions may have
adequately reflected contemporary congressional preferences, but over time
society changed, and congressional preferences changed too. Usually, Supreme
Court decisions survive such changed circumstances, either because the new
circumstances render the decisions irrelevant or because the decisions work well
enough within new social frameworks to be regarded as "harmless errors."
Changed circumstances, however, may sometimes render a statutory decision
not only obsolete, but counterproductive to current congressional policy or
productive of confusion in the law.167 Often in such cases, especially in con-
nection with comprehensive revision or reform bills, Congress overrides the
obsolete interpretation.161 Such overrides are almost always routine affairs,
165. Of course, the Court's preferences on an issue might also change over time, in which event the
Court might consider "overruling" the statutory precedent. For a suggested connection between the Court's
willingness to overrule a statutory precedent and Congress' interest in overriding it, see infra Part III.A.1.
166. About 25% of the overriden Supreme Court decisions in Appendix I were decisions rendered more
than 10 years before the override.
167. This was the case with Boutijier, which was overridden because its view of homosexuality as a
"disease" was considered obsolete even by relatively conservative legislators. 135 CONG. REC. S5040-42
(daily ed. May 9, 1989) (Sen. Simpson, R.-Wyo.). More importantly, the obsolescence of Boutilier was not
harmless error, because the PHS (which no longer would cooperate) opposed the INS (which believed
Boutilier should be occasionally enforced) on this issue, and the circuits were split as to which agency was
acting properly. Compare Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (PHS is correct), with In re Longstaff,
716 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1983) (INS is correct).
168. Most of Congress' overrides of recent Supreme Court decisions (within 10 years) have been in
legislation either limited to the issue in the overridden decision or close to it. Conversely, most of Congress'
overrides of Supreme Court decisions that are more than 10 years old have been in omnibus reconciliation
bills and in ambitious statutory recodifications. See. e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
598, 92 Stat. 2549 (9 overrides, 7 of them older decisions): Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (2 overrides, I of them an older decision): Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (4 overrides, I an older decision): Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers Compensation
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (4 overrides, 3 of them older decisions). These
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with no intended criticism of the Court's statutory interpretation. For example,
when Congress overrode Boutilier as part of its general revision of the immi-
gration law in 1990, the override was treated as a routine policy adjustment,
not as an attack on the Court for reading an antihomosexual interpretation into
the statute.
Second, the Court may misinterpret congressional preferences or may be
unpersuasive in its efforts to inform Congress of constitutional or other con-
cerns. Overrides prompted by such judicial miscalculation usually come swiftly
(often within a year or two) and are accompanied by some concern that the
Court is not "doing its job." This describes the congressional reaction to
Gilbert, which interpreted Title VII as not prohibiting pregnancy-based discrimi-
nation. The Court rested its decision primarily upon a constitutional precedent
which held that depriving women of pregnancy benefits was not gender-based
discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.'69 The Court's deci-
sion also raised the question of whether including pregnancy benefits in a health
care package might be unfair to male employees, by providing disproportion-
ately greater health care benefits to female employees. Given Congress' com-
plete failure to deliberate about the sex discrimination provision of Title VII
when it enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the Court's opinion raised
pertinent constitutional and policy questions that Congress had never consid-
ered. Through extensive committee hearings in both chambers, Congress
carefully considered the Court's new information to satisfy itself that the
Court's concerns were not justified and, therefore, overrode the Court's deci-
sion.17 A similar congressional process responded to the Court's employment
discrimination decisions of the 1988 Term (Wards Cove, Patterson, and others).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Court, for institutional reasons,
will often invite a congressional override. This point requires elaboration
through several examples. In TVA v. Hill,'7' the Court interpreted the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973 to protect the snail darter at the price of halting the
nearly complete construction of a $110 million dam. The Court's opinion
emphasized the plain meaning of the statute, for which judicial preferences are
quite strong, but it is doubtful that this was the Court's real point. The Court's
message was an institutional one: You (Congress) have not provided us (the
overrides are all collected in Appendix 1.
169. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125. 134-36 (1976) (relying on Geduldig v. Aiello. 417
U.S. 484 (1974)).
170. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4765; H.R. REP. NO. 948,95th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749
(1978); S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the
Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportuni-
ties of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); Discrimination on the Basis
of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. onl Human
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
171. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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Court) with sufficient policy guidance to enable us to administer a system of
exceptions to the facially absolute prohibitions in the Endangered Species Act,
nor do we have sufficient information or expertise to create these exceptions
ourselves (and some of us do not wish to do so). Both the Court and the
dissenters called upon Congress to override the Court's decision by statute.172
Congress did so immediately, establishing an administrative mechanism to
consider exemptions from the Act's prohibitions. 173 The statutory override
created an administrative mechanism responsive to the political process, some-
thing the Court could not have done. The Court in TVA expressed rational, and
probably exemplary, preferences when it combined a literal statutory interpreta-
tion with a call for congressional override.174 As the foregoing example dem-
onstrates, the Court will sometimes refuse to interpret a statute broadly, espe-
cially when such an interpretation would represent a major policy decision that
the Court would be more comfortable allowing Congress to make. 175 At other
times, however, such signals by the Court do not result in congressional action.
Also exemplifying such institutional signaling are the Court's decisions that
apply constitutionally inspired clear statement rules. The most prominent of
these rules is the requirement that any congressional abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity be explicit on the face of the statute. 176 In
the last two years, the Court has invoked this clear statement rule several times
to render federal statutory schemes inapplicable to the states, and Congress in
return has overridden some of these decisions. 77 A majority of the Court is
not unhappy with this sequence of events because the apparent goal of the clear
statement rule is to force Congress to decide the issue of state immunity before
the Court will find abrogation of Eleventh Amendment interests. If Congress
responds by amending the statute to add the requisite language, the Court's goal
has been achieved.
172. Id. at 195 (majority opinion); id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting).
173. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (creating
mechanism); see also Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437,
449 (1979) (reversing result in TVA case).
174. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 338-40 (1989).
But see DWORKIN, supra note 126, at 313-54 (arguing that TVA dissenters had "best" interpretation, but
not considering this institutional dimension).
175. Congress promptly responded to Supreme Court override invitations in Public Employees
Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (plain meaning interpretation of ADEA); Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (refusal to interpret federal jurisdiction statute broadly); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (rule of lenity counsels against expansive judicial interpretation of broad federal
criminal statutes, especially when federalism concerns are prominent); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S.
394 (1974) (Congress, not Court, should update Copyright Act to reflect new technological developments).
176. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). The Court's finding of no abrogation
of the states' immunity against lawsuits brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was itself overridden
by Congress in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003 100 Stat. 1807,
1845.
177. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), overridden by Education of the Handicapped Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 103, 104 Stat. 1103, 1106; BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 858 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1988) (following Atascadero), overridden by Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT/CONGRESS/PRESIDENT GAME FOR
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
The Court/Congress/President game developed in Part II provides a realistic
theory of the legislative process and the interaction between the Court, Con-
gress, and the President. This model can also serve as the basis for some
interesting observations about general theories, as well as specific doctrines,
of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation traditionally has been viewed
as the Court's implementation of the original intent of the enacting Congress.
The theoretical debate of the 1980's, however, debunked this traditional view
and argued that statutory interpretation usually is, and should be, dynamic.17
The description of the Court's preferences in Part II was based upon the
insights of dynamic statutory interpretation theory. This theory argues that when
the Court interprets statutes it considers arguments based upon plain meaning,
horizontal and vertical coherence, and good policy. The Supreme Court cases
surveyed in this Article demonstrate the insights of dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion. Congress' original intent was critical to very few of the Court's decisions
(a rare example is Boutilier). In most cases, the Court emphasized such intrinsi-
cally evolutive concerns as precedent, the common law, and the ever-changing
canons of statutory interpretation (see Tables 6 and 8). The
Court/Congress/President game suggests that the Court is a part of the process
by which statutory policy is created and that its policy preferences affect public
policy, albeit in different ways than Congress' policy preferences.
In at least one respect, however, the game adds a dimension to the interpre-
tive process that dynamic statutory interpretation theory has thus far neglected.
It includes an additional feature for the Court's configuration of preferences-a
preference that its decisions not be immediately overridden by Congress. Thus,
one of the dynamic factors influencing the Court's interpretation of statutes over
time is the signals sent to the Court by subsequent Congresses. That idea turns
traditional thinking about statutory interpretation on its head.17 9 Where they
diverge from the Courts' preferences, the expectations of the current Congress
and the President are more important to the Court than are the expectations of
the enacting Congress.
178. See DWORKIN, supra note 126; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 238 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987); Farber, supra note 123; Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial
Process: The Revisionist Role of Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987); Peter
C. Schanck, The Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and
Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REV. 815 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 123.
179. See, e.g., David Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). They argue that the independent federal judiciary was created
to facilitate interest group behavior and statutory deals, by enforcing those original deals over time. However,
they fail to explain why the courts would want to enforce such deals. It seems more plausible that the
Supreme Court would assign greater weight to the preferences of the current and future Congresses (which
might override the Court's preferences) than to those of the enacting Congress, particularly if, as often
happens, that Congress is long departed.
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This is a radical hypothesis.1t 0 The first section of this part will test this
hypothesis by analyzing Supreme Court decisions from the last three decades
that interpret civil rights legislation. The analysis will demonstrate that this
hypothesis more accurately describes the Court's decisions than does traditional
(original intent) theory. The second section will present further evidence
supporting this theory by examining the Court's practice of selectively overrul-
ing statutory precedents, frequently relying on legislative inaction, and occasion-
ally invoking subsequent legislative history when it interprets statutes. The
hypothesis provides a useful framework for thinking about these much-criticized
doctrines. The final section will defend the Court's deference to current legish,-
tive and presidential preferences against the normative objection that the Court
should only consider original legislative preferences. But the Court's practice
is vulnerable to objections that it is too deferential to normal politics on the
whole and is insufficiently critical of current legislative preferences.
A. The Court/Congress/President Interaction in Civil Rights Cases, 1967-90
Civil rights decisions provide a starting point for testing the robustness of
the hypothesis that the Court is more responsive to current than to original
legislative expectations. The substantial number of such decisions, their political
salience, their generation of a number of congressional overrides (see Table 4)
and failed override efforts (see Appendix I), and the relatively discernible
preferences of the institutional players make these decisions ideal for study. On
the other hand, civil rights decisions may be particularly susceptible to this
hypothesis, because the rapid changes in civil rights thinking and experience
render original legislative expectations less useful in this area than in others,
and because constitutional considerations play an important, but not dominant,
role in these cases. Notwithstanding these limitations, the sequential game
developed in Part II does go far in explaining the interaction between the Court,
Congress, and the President in civil rights cases.t"'
1. Court/CongresslPresident Interaction, 1966-71
During the late Warren Court and early Burger Court eras, the Court's raw
preferences in civil rights cases were significantly to the left of those in Con-
gress, and somewhat to the left of those in the gatekeeping (labor and judiciary)
180. Note that this hypothesis is not that the Court is acting in a dishonest fashion or that it is nothing
more than a scheming political institution. Surely, few if any of the Justices see their role as avoiding
overrides. Rather, the hypothesis is that as a group the Court in the past 24 years has more often-perhaps
unconsciously-reflected current, as opposed to historical, congressional preferences when it interprets
statutes. Also, note that the Court itself may be rethinking this role. See infra Part II.C.
181. See Eskridge, supra note 145 (analyzing Court's civil rights decisions during this period in more
detail).
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committees.182 Thus, the preference configuration sketched in Figure 1 de-
scribes the situation between 1967 and 1971. Under the
Court/Congress/President game developed in Part II, the preferences of the
contemporaneous Congress would not have constrained the Court much, since
the Court was protected from legislative override by supportive gatekeeping
committees and a very supportive Presidency. In fact, this is what occurred
during that period, for the Court not only updated old civil rights statutes to
reflect newer legislative preferences, but also interpreted both old and new
statutes more liberally than Congress probably would have done on its own.183
Again, this was possible under the conditions described in Figure 1, because
the relevant committees had incentives to protect the Court from overrides. To
the extent that the committees' or Congress' raw preferences were subject to
persuasion, the Court was backed up by the very persuasive President Lyndon
Johnson.
The high point of the Warren Court's liberal interpretation of Reconstruc-
tion civil rights laws was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,184 which interpreted
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982, to provide
a remedy for racial discrimination in the sale, leasing, or other conveyance of
real or personal property by private parties. Mayer essentially overruled the
Court's prior understanding that § 1982 only prohibited public laws "providing
for discriminatory property arrangements"' 5 and was probably contrary to
the expectations of the 1866 Congress.8 6 It also went well beyond the expec-
tations of the current Congress, which just weeks before Mayer had enacted
a fair housing statute providing a far less generous remedy to victims of
182. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 445-50 (1983) (preferences of Warren Court); 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 848-49 (1986) (describing Court's solidly liberal preferences after Justice Frankfurter's retirement in
1962); see also GRAHAM, supra note 116; WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 64 (House Judiciary Committee
and congressional preferences); Barbara Sinclair, Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change from Coolidge
to Reagan, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 291, 301-04 (Laurence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds.,
3d ed. 1985) (Congress' preferences).
The House Judiciary Committee was strongly to the left of the House as a whole (and maybe as far
left as the Warren Court) on some issues under the chairmanship of Representative Celler from 1955 to
1973. See WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 64, at 29-67. The Senate Judiciary Committee through the
1960's was chaired by a Southern conservative and was evenly split between pro- and anti-civil rights
Senators. But the Senate Democratic leadership (led by liberal Majority Leader Mansfield) and the Senate
Labor Committee were pro-civil rights. See, e.g., 29 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 44 (1963).
183. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (interpreting Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prohibit employment practices having "disparate impact" on minorities); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969) (interpreting Voting Rights Act of 1965 to invalidate de minimis dilution of minority
voting); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (interpreting Enforcement Act of 1870 to criminalize
some private conspiracies to deprive people of civil rights); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)
(interpreting Enforcement Act of 1870 in accordance with Court's new Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
184. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
185. See id. at 451-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 454-76; see also CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART 1,
at 1258-59 (197 1); Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. CT.
REV. 89 (examining Mayer in light of legislative history of 1866 Civil Rights Act).
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housing discrimination. 187 But the Court's interpretation was acceptable to
the gatekeeping committees in Congress, which protected it from legislative
override."'8
2. Court/CongresslPresident Interaction, 1972-81
The Court's raw preferences in civil rights cases moved sharply to the right
after 1971,189 just as Congress' raw preferences were moving to the left.190
Thus the preference configuration sketched in Figure 4 is applicable, and the
model predicts more tension between the Court and the current Congress. This
is precisely what happened. This period saw several important congressional
overrides of the Supreme Court's statutory civil rights decisions,191 mainly
because a Court to the right of Congress and even more to the right of the
gatekeeping committees had no margin of error in predicting or transforming
congressional preferences. In all but one of the overridden decisions, the Court
had no signals from Congress as to its current preferences, and therefore simply
read its own preferences into the statutes.1 92
More importantly, in several civil rights decisions the Court directly or
indirectly suggested that it was adjusting its raw preferences to reflect those
of the current, rather than the enacting, Congress. The best example is Runyon
v. McCrary,193 which reaffirmed Mayer and applied its interpretation of the
property rights provision of the 1866 Act (now § 1982) to the contract rights
187. Pub. L No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (1968); see Eskridge, supra note 174, at 340-43.
188. In 1971-72, floor amendments in both the Senate and the House sought to override Mayer's
interpretation as itpertained to the contracting provision of the 1866 Act (now codified at42 U.S.C. § 1981).
The Senate defeated the floor amendment upon a tie vote in which the tiebreaking Senator agreed to a highly
unusual "live pair," 118 CONG. REC. 3373, 3965 (1972), but the House adopted a similar one, 117 CONG.
REC. 31973,32111 (1971). The conference committee, dominated by House and Senate committee members
who had opposed the override from the beginning, then quietly dropped the override provision. H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972).
189. When Justices Powell and Rehnquist started casting votes in 1972, the Court's center of gravity
moved sharply to the right. See Segal & Cover, supra note 132, at 560.
190. See Sinclair, supra note 182, at 306-11 (finding big jump in civil liberties support scores for
congressional Democrats from 1969-72 to 1981-82).
191. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), overridden by Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134; United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977),
overridden by Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189; General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), overridden by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975), overridden by Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641.
192. Thus, Gilbert interpreted the gender discrimination provisions of Title VII, for which there was
no useful legislative history or subsequent congressional action, using reasoning from its constitutional
precedent, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Similarly, the Court in Bolden had no reliable legislative
signals for Congress' expectations in the Voting Rights Act and simply applied its Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence to the issues. Alyeska interpreted the old federal costs statute and relied on subsequent congres-
sional signals, namely the enactment of specific fee-shifting statutes, to conclude that the general costs statute
did not authorize fee shifting generally. Only in McMann was there evidence of current congressional
preferences, but it consisted of a committee report issued shortly before the Court's opinion was handed
down, and after the case was argued.
193. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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provision of the Act (now § 1981). The Court's willingness to do so, by a
seven-to-two vote, was expressly premised upon the Court's belief that Con-
gress in 1971-72 had signaled its approval of the application of Mayer to §
1981 .91 Moreover, two of the majority Justices wrote special concurring opin-
ions suggesting that they thought Mayer was in fact wrongly decided but that
stare decisis, reinforced by current expressions of legislative preferences,
impelled them to go along with a liberal interpretation of the 1866 Act.19
A number of other decisions in the late 1970's relied on the Court's
perception of current legislative preferences to reach results that were probably
more liberal than the Court's preferences otherwise would have been.196
Indeed, this hypothesis provides a cogent explanation for United Steelworkers
v. Weber,t 97 which interpreted Title VII to allow voluntary affirmative action.
One of the Justices in the Weber majority had voted the year before against the
constitutionality of state-sponsored affirmative action, 19 and a second Justice
explained his vote as a response to societal developments that had overtaken
the original congressional expectations. 199 Both of these Justices, and probably
others in the majority, conceded the dissent's view that the Court's holding had
little support in the original congressional understanding,2' but were sensitive
'r the pressures for affirmative action created by Griggs and to the approval
of Griggs voiced by the gatekeeping committees in 1971. For this reason, a
Court critical of affirmative action in constitutional cases interpreted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to allow a much broader range of preferential programs than
one would expect.
To generalize this point, the Burger Court produced results in constitutional
cases-where there was little chance of an override-that were discernibly more
194. Id. at 174-75 & n.ll. I consider the evidence of legislative approval cited by the Court to be
unreliable. See Eskridge, supra note 127.
195. 427 U.S. at 186-89 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189-92 (Stevens, J., concurring). A third Justice
in the majority, conservative Chief Justice Burger, probably would have voted with the dissenters if the
Court had split 4-4. It is common knowledge, especially after The Brethren, that Chief Justice Burger often
voted with liberal majorities simply to control the assignment of the opinion. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 64-65 (1979).
196. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 685-87, 694-708 (1979) (Court split
5-1-3; key argumentfor majority was apparent congressional assumption that Title IX included private cause
of action); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (7-2 Court relied upon
recent legislative assumptions to overrule line of § 1983 cases); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435
U.S. 110, 131-35 (1978) (5-1-3 Court endorsed liberal interpretation of Voting Rights Act, based in part
on congressional understanding when Act was renewed in 1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747 (1976) (5-1-2 Court allowed affirmative remedies in Title VII cases and relied on discussions underlying
1972 amendments). Butsee International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
197. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
198. Justice Stewart, the fifth vote in the 5-2 split for Weber, was part of the five-Justice majority
invalidating the affirmative action plan in University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justices
Stevens and Powell, who did not participate in Weber, were also part of the Bakke majority.
199. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 228-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Academics tend to agree with the dissent on this issue.
See GRAHAM, supra note 116; Farber, supra note 123, at 303; Bernard D. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The
Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980).
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conservative than the results it reached in analogous cases of statutory interpre-
tation.201 This fact provides further support for the hypothesis. The Burger
Court's greater liberalism in statutory cases cannot credibly be attributed to
textual plain meaning or to original legislative expectations, which cut very
much against its interpretations, or to any great sympathy for civil rights
legislation. Instead, the Court seems, perhaps unconsciously, to have molded
its preferences in statutory cases (but not so much in constitutional cases) to
accommodate the more liberal preferences of Congress and the President in the
late 1970's.
3. Court/CongresslPresident Interaction, 1981-90
The Court's behavior after 1981 provides strong support for this hypothesis.
There was just one change in the Court's personnel between 1975 and 1986,
the replacement of moderately conservative Justice Stewart with the slightly
more conservative Justice O'Connor. Hence, the Court's raw preferences
remained just about the same throughout that period, and Congress' raw
preferences did not markedly change.2° The significant change was the
election of a conservative President. Hence, after 1981, Figures 5 and 6 repre-
sent the configuration of raw preferences on civil rights issues.
This hypothesis would predict that the Court would shift to the right in its
interpretation of civil rights statutes. The Court would be protected from
congressional overrides by a presidential veto, unless the Court took a position
that not even a third of either chamber could accept. This is apparently what
happened: Within a few years the Court handed down a series of narrowing
constructions for Title VII and other recent civil rights statutes, °3 as well as
for § 1983 and other nineteenth century civil rights statutes." An examina-
201. Contrast Weber with Bakke. The disparity became even stronger in the 1980's. Compare Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (articulating very expansive view of Weber) with Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (articulating stingierview of affirmative action in constitution-
al cases). Also contrast the Burger Court's willingness to look at effects upon racial groups to find actionable
discrimination in statutory cases, such as Griggs, with its focus only upon intentional conduct to find
discrimination in constitutional cases. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
202. The Republicans gained control of the Senate from 1981-87, thereby moving Congress to the right.
The move, however, was only a small one. For example, although chaired by conservative Republicans
Thurmond and Hatch, the Senate Judiciary and Human Resources Committees retained pro-civil rights
majorities.
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (6-3 decision) (construing Education of the
Handicapped Act and Rehabilitation Act narrowly); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
g" 561 (1984) (6-3 decision) (construing Title VII narrowly); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)
(6-3 decision) (construing Title VII narrowly); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (4-1-4 decision) (extending liberal Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
interpretation to insurance companies, but only prospectively); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S.
125 (1983) (6-2-1 decision) (construing Voting Rights Act narrowly); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,
456 U.S. 63 (1982) (5-4 decision) (construing exception to Title VII broadly).
204. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (6-1-2 decision)
(interpreting § 1981 narrowly); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (6-3 decision) (interpreting
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tion of all the civil rights statutory decisions during this period reveals a clear
overall trend toward more conservative voting divisions on the Court after
1980.205 Although the Court still handed down some liberal decisions, they
tended to be on issues where the Court felt constrained by precedent or where
Congress had sent strong signals that conservative results could be overridden
by veto-proof margins.' °
The balance between conservative and liberal interpretations of civil rights
statutes shifted to the right after 1981 due to the Court's perception that a
conservative President gave it more leeway to reach conservative results. 7
The Court's preferences shifted further to the right after 1986 because of
personnel changes,05 which resulted in six decisions in May and June 1989
(including Patterson and Wards Cove) that triggered the override efforts in the
101st and 102d Congresses. The conservative Court might have been testing
§ 1982 narrowly).
In May 198 1, Senator Hatch's Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee
held hearings on bills to override the Burger Court's liberal interpretations of § 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 (1980), and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See Municipal Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1981) [hereinafter Municipal Liability]. By July of that year, the Supreme Court
had narrowed both decisions with fresh, and markedly more conservative, interpretations of § 1983 in
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), and City of
Newport v. Fact Concerns, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). This was noted with enthusiasm in the Municipal
Liability, supra, at 380, 404-06, 444, 450-52, 458.
205. Consider the following data, drawn from the Supreme Court's decisions from the 1977 through
1983 Terms, which were the basis for Table 4:
Interpretations of Modern Supreme Court Decisions Supreme Court Decisions
Civil Rights Statutes 1977 to 1979 Terms 1980 to 1983 Terms
Liberal 10 Decisions 11 Decisions
Conservative 6 Decisions 12 Decisions
No Clear Division 1 Decision 11 Decisions
Interpretations of Reconstruction
Era Statutes
Liberal 7 Decisions 5 Decisions
Conservative 6 Decisions 14 Decisions
No Clear Division 7 Decisions 9 Decisions
This data suggests that after 1980 the balance of power on the Court shifted toward more conservative
interpretations of both modern and nineteenth-century civil rights statutes. The shift is particularly strong
for the older statutes, perhaps because they are so open ended that there is more room for the Justices'
personal political philosophies to play a critical role.
206. The most notably liberal decisions were Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(reaffirming Weber); School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983), all of which relied explicitly upon subsequent congressional signals.
207. The Court did not, of course, always prevail in this period, for it dramatically failed to hit the
veto median in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which was overridden by the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
208. These changes consisted of the replacement of conservative Chief Justice Burger by the more
conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986, of Justice Rehnquist by the more conservative Justice Scalia
in 1986, of moderately conservative Justice Powell by the more conservative Justice Kennedy in 1987, and
of liberal Justice Brennan by the less liberal Justice Souter in 1990.
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Congress to discover the veto median on these issues," 9 which Congress has
now provided. Section C of this part will consider another explanation for what
the Court was doing in these cases.
B. Rethinking Doctrines of Statutory Interpretation: Strong Stare Decisis,
Legislative Inaction, and Subsequent Legislative History
The Court/Congress/President game provides a fresh way of thinking about
several doctrines of statutory interpretation that scholars have scorned, but that
the Court has followed. These are: (1) the super-strong presumption of correct-
ness of statutory precedents; (2) the ratification of an authoritative statutory
interpretation by legislative inaction; and (3) the use of subsequent legislative
history. The Court's selective invocation of these doctrines follows the pattern
suggested by my model. That is, the Court usually will invoke strong stare
decisis when the Court has reason to believe that current legislative majorities
support the precedent and will tend not to invoke it when there are strong
doubts that this is what Congress prefers. The Court will invoke legislative
inaction and subsequent legislative history as evidence of statutory meaning
when it believes that they provide reliable evidence of current congressional
preferences regarding an issue of interpretation.
The hypothesis that the Court is attentive to current congressional and
presidential preferences provides an interesting and useful way of thinking
about these often-criticized doctrines. In turn, these patterns support the hypoth-
esis that the Court is more responsive to current congressional preferences than
to the preferences of the enacting Congress in statutory interpretation cases.
1. Super-Strong Presumption of Correctness for Statutory Precedents
The Supreme Court has long held that statutory precedents are entitled to
a greater stare decisis effect than either constitutional or common law
precedents, in part because Congress and not the Court should have the primary
responsibility for overriding statutory precedents.210 Scholars have been
critical of this "super-strong presumption of correctness" for statutory prece-
dents, in part because it is not realistic to expect Congress to know about and
209. For example, in Patterson, the Court unanimously declined to overrule Runyon, in response to
unequivocal congressional hostility to such a move (signaled in an amicus brief), but gave the decision a
narrow reading that the Court might have believed would survive congressional scrutiny. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
210. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946): Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488-89
(1940); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938): Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 540 (1948).
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respond to the Court's statutory precedents, 21 and in part because the Court
invokes it so selectively.212 The empirical study described in this Article sug-
gests that the first criticism has been too harsh. Congress is aware of the
Court's statutory decisions and actively considers almost half of them in
legislatiie hearings, but does not respond to most of them.
The second criticism may also be too harsh, because the analysis in this
Article suggests an underlying coherence to the Court's invocation of the super-
strong presumption. The Court will not overrule a statutory precedent that
seems to enjoy support in the current Congress, but will consider overruling
a statutory precedent that the Court has reason to believe the current Congress
would not protect with an override. In other words, the Supreme Court does
abandon the super-strong presumption, but only when it thinks the precedent
is no longer politically viable.213
Two recent statutory stare decisis decisions illustrate this point. In
Patterson, a unanimous Court reaffirmed Runyon's and Alfred H. Mayer's
interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even though several Justices
believed those cases were wrongly decided.214 The Court invoked the super-
strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents, but made it clear
that the key reason for its refusal to disturb the precedent was its consistency
with Congress' current commitment to ending racial discrimination.215
The year before Patterson, another unanimous Court overruled a line of
statutory precedents involving appellate jurisdiction in Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.16 The Court did not mention either the super-
strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents or the possibility of
congressional action, even though several override bills introduced in 1987 were
then being given serious congressional consideration.217 While it is hard to
211. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 252-55 (1975);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions. 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 425-29
(1988); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 388-89 (1988).
212. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1427-39 (1988),
lists 26 Supreme Court decisions explicitly overruling statutory precedents between 1961 and 1987, another
24 implicitly overruling statutory precedents, and another 35 significantly curtailing statutory precedents
or overruling their reasoning. See also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989) (arguing that the Court should never
overrule statutory precedents).
213. If this reformulation is correct, the Court's traditional rationale for the super-strong presumption
is backwards. If the Court can undo the damage of a statutory precedent that is no longer politically popular,
it will overrule the precedent. Only if the Court has reason to believe Congress would still support the
precedent will it refuse to reconsider the precedent.
214. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
215. Id. at 174. The Court disclaimed reliance on legislative acquiescence, id. at 175 n.1, but its
invocation of contemporary values is an obvious reference to the values held by Congress as well as the
electorate. Although the Court did not rely on the amicus brief filed by dozens of Members of Congress,
supra note 162, it might have been influenced by the very substantial congressional support for Runyon.
216. 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (overruling Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942), and
Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935)).
217. Override provisions for the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine were included in H.R. 3152, 100th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1987), and S. 1482, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), at the behest of the Judicial Conference. See
generally Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
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tell whether the Court was fully aware of how close Congress was to overriding
the old decisions, the Court's eagerness to overrule them-and to deny them
any special stare decisis-probably represented its (correct) impression that they
enjoyed little or no current legislative support.
The point of this comparison can be generalized. On the one hand, when
the Court has explicitly overruled its statutory precedents in the last thirty years,
it has usually had good reason to believe that the precedents no longer reflected
congressional preferences. Indeed, the Court has often cited inconsistent statuto-
ry developments as a reason to overrule such precedents.218 Even where the
Court has not cited subsequent statutory developments, it can sometimes be
inferred that negative congressional signals contributed to the Court's willing-
ness to overrule precedents.2 9
It is noteworthy that Congress has never during this period overridden any
of the 30 Supreme Court decisions overruling statutory precedents.' The
most likely override is Fay v. Noia, which was an important target of the
1990 habeas revisions deleted in conference committee. Consistent with con-
gressional restiveness over Fay, the Court itself has been trimming it back for
fifteen years,' - and the Court's recent habeas decisions track Congress'
concern with the federalism values undermined in Fay.
On the other hand, when the Court has invoked the super-strong presump-
tion to rebuff a serious challenge to a statutory precedent, there has often been
tangible evidence that the precedent enjoyed substantial support in recent
Congresses.' For example, the Court in United States v. Johnsonp recent-
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 33
(1987-88). After the Supreme Court overruled these decisions in Mayacamas, the general override was
dropped by the House Judiciary Committee, though it retained a specific override for Baltimore Contractors,
Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955), which applied only to arbitration cases. See H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), reporting H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); 133 CONG. REC. E1508 (daily
ed. Apr. 23, 1987).
218. See Eskridge, supra note 212, at 1427-29 app. A (10 of 26 Supreme Court decisions overruling
statutory precedents note subsequent statutory developments as one reason for overruling).
219. For example, the Court's per se invalidation of vertical restraints under the Sherman Act in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), came under increasing fire in Congress during the
1970's and generated a host of proposals to exempt various industries (such as soft drinks and beer) from
the per se rule. Forproposals protecting the soft drink industry, see H.R. 3567, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
S. 1483, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 3421, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); H.R. 6684, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 978, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 16,916, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). This may have
contributed to the Court's willingness to overrule Schwinn in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Notwithstanding GTE Sylvania, Congress still overrode Schwinn in the Soft Drink
Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308, 94 Stat. 939 (1980).
220. See Eskridge, supra note 212, at 1427-29 app. A (collecting cases); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas, 485
U.S. 271 (1988); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
221. 372 U.S. 391, 435-36 (1963), overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 208 (1950).
222. Starting with Wvainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977); see id. at 94-96 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 98-99 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 102-09 (Brennan, J., author of Fay,
dissenting).
223. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (refusing to consider
overruling Weber, because there is no sentiment in Congress to override precedent); Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 & n.3 (1982) (refusing to reconsider § 1983 precedent, in part because of
1991]
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ly refused to overrule Feres over the objections of a strong dissent. An impor-
tant reason cited by the Court was Congress' failure, over a forty-year period,
to derogate from Feres immunity in any way, notwithstanding numerous
proposals to do so. As if to confirm the Court's judgment, legislative efforts
to override Feres through the 1980's have been unsuccessful.
2. Interpreting Legislative Inaction
The Court has long maintained that "legislative inaction" might ratify or
bolster statutory interpretations reached not only by the Supreme Court, but also
by lower courts or agencies. Specifically, the Court often gives special defer-
ence to an interpretation that Congress has left in place notwithstanding legisla-
tive hearings on the issue, reenactment of the underlying statute, and proposals
in committee or on the floor to reject that interpretation.- Like the Court's
special stare decisis rule, its legislative inaction rules have been criticized by
academics on the grounds that the rules are unrealistic and that the Court only
selectively invokes them.226 Again, these criticisms may be overstated, be-
cause the Court's practice has been to invoke the legislative inaction doctrines
mainly when it has found some indication that there is insufficient support in
Congress for overriding the contested interpretation.
Perhaps the most criticized case invoking special stare decisis for statutory
precedents and the legislative inaction doctrines is Flood v. Kuhn.27 A badly
divided Supreme Court was "loath" to overrule its own Sherman Act precedents
giving baseball an exemption from the antitrust laws, "when Congress, by its
positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far
beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to
disapprove them legislatively." 2 Although the Court's opinion left antitrust
law in a state of incoherence (since other professional sports were covered by
the antitrust laws), the Court would not act. The precedents were surely ques-
congressional reliance); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972) (refusing to reconsider Sherman Act
precedent, in part because Congress had extensively considered issue and focused attention on expanding
precedent rather than overriding it).
For most, and perhaps all, of the other leading decisions explicitly invoking the super-strong presump-
tion, a case can be made that the statutory issue was sufficiently controversial that Congress would not itself
have overridden the precedent in dispute. For example, although the Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977), did not mention congressional approval of the challenged precedent, Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), subsequent hearings suggest that Congress
would not have overridden it. See 1979 House Illinois Brick Hearings, supra note 100.
224. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
225. See Eskridge, supra note 127, at 125-37 (appendices collecting cases).
226. DICKERSON, supra note 211, at 181; HART & SACKS, supra note 52, at 1394-1401; Reed
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1133
(1983); John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984); Laurence Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid:
Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982).
227. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
228. Id. at 283-84.
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tionable, but the Court perceived that Congress supported them. That was the
point of the Court's emphasis on "positive inaction." Congress not only deliber-
ated about baseball's antitrust exemption and failed to override it, but the pro-
posals that enjoyed the most support were ones that would have expanded
baseball's exemption to other sports and would not have constricted the exemp-
tion the Court had given baseball. 9 Hence, the Court left the prior interpreta-
tion in place. As in other cases, the Court's political instincts were correct, for
subsequent legislative hearings in Flood revealed little interest in overturning
the decision? 030
A similar point can be made about Supreme Court decisions bolstering
agency interpretations by reference to current congressional preferences.
Responding to court challenges, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1970-71
amended its regulations to disallow income tax exemptions to educational
institutions that discriminate on the basis of race. The new IRS position was
probably not the one that the original enacting Congress would have adopted,
but Congress in the 1970's rejected all efforts to reverse the new rules, though
it did hamper the agency's efforts to devote significant resources to enforcing
the regulation? 13
In Bob Jones University v. United States,2 2 a virtually unanimous Su-
preme Court upheld the agency's antidiscrimination regulation, with heavy
reliance on Congress' supportive stance during the 1970's.233 Like Flood, Bob
Jones drew from the record of Congress' deliberations the inference that
Congress was happy with the agency's regulation on its face. A year later, in
Allen v. Wright,2-4 the Court turned back efforts to challenge the agency's
229. Bills were introduced and hearings held on sports exemptions to the antitrust laws in 1957, 1958,
1959, 1960, 1964, and 1965. Brief for Respondents at 32-36, Flood (No. 71-32). Most of the serious
proposals sought to expand baseball's exemption to other sports. In 1958, the House passed one such bill,
H.R. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (Senate took no action). In 1960 and 1964, a Senate committee
recommended similar legislation, and in 1965, the Senate passed a bill expanding baseball's exemption to
other sports, S. 950, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965) (House took no action).
230. See Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-
82). Although the Department of Justice enthusiastically supported overriding Flood, id. at 29, no other
group backed up the Department's position, and the subcommittee spent most of the hearings exploring
issues in other sports.
231. Specifically, after the IRS issued regulations in 1978-79 placing burdens on schools with low
percentages of black students to "prove" their nondiscrimination, Congress attached the Ashbrook Amend-
ment to a 1980 appropriations statute, barring the IRS from implementing the regulations. Other "back door"
restrictions followed. See IRS Tar Exemptions and Segregated Private Schools: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
49-50 (1982) (hearings preceding but cognizant of Court's forthcoming decision in Bob Jones).
232. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
233. Id. at 599-602 (majority opinion by Burger, C.J., for eight Justices); see also id. at 607 (Poweil,
J., concurring).
234. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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refusal to enforce its regulation very vigorously, again in accord with recent
congressional signals.235
3. Subsequent Legislative History
In its analysis of a statute's legislative history, the Court sometimes con-
sults legislators' post-enactment statements about the statute.236 Even defend-
ers of the use of such "subsequent" legislative history have criticized the
Court's practice.237 They argue that the Court invokes it arbitrarily"8 and
that such materials are unreliable. However, the Court/Congress/President game
developed in this Article suggests an underlying reason for the Court's invoca-
tion of subsequent legislative history: The Court is particularly interested in
such material if it is persuasive evidence of recent congressional preferences
and of the probability of a legislative override.
Thus, while the Court does not rely on subsequent legislative history to
illuminate the enacting Congress' expectations, it does consider subsequent
history when the history illuminates the probable desires of the current Con-
gress. 239 This is particularly important when the Court's preferences are
otherwise substantially to the right of those in Congress (the configuration of
preferences in Figures 4 and 6). For example, in 1987, the Supreme Court in
School Board v. Arline' interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohib-
it discrimination against a person afflicted with contagious tuberculosis. This
was a very liberal interpretation of the statute by a very conservative Court. As
the dissenting opinion suggested,241 the liberal result was hardly compelled
by the vague statutory language, the generalized legislative history, or the
Court's own precedents. Instead, the Court's opinion rested upon subsequent
agency regulations that "were drafted with the oversight and approval of
235. Allen, however, was a case of constitutional standing, not statutory interpretation, in which the
Court made it difficult for citizens to sue the IRS to force it to enforce its regulation.
236. "[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the
enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight and particularly so when the precise intent of
the enacting Congress is obscure." Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)
(citations omitted); see also Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).
237. See Dickerson, supra note 226, at 1146; Patricia M. Vald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 205 (1983).
238. Compare cases cited supra note 236 with Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S.
825, 840 (1988); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980);
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) (leading case, using frequently quoted language that "the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one").
239. See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 148-52 (1987) (interpreting Social Security Act in
light of Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 530-35 (1984) (following HEW regulations considered by Congress and not overruled, notwith-
standing congressional deliberation and proposals to override regulations); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 686 & n.7 (1979) (relying on subsequent legislative signals to find private cause of action
in Title IX).
240. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
241. Id. at 289-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Congress," and hence, considered probative. 2 The subsequent legislative
history was, in the sequential game modeled here, important to the Court as
evidence that Congress (perhaps by veto-proof margins) favored a liberal
approach to the Rehabilitation Act. 3 It is also noteworthy that Arline came
to the Court one year after the Court suffered three reversals of its statutory
decisions failing to protect the rights of the disabled.'
The Court's refusal to credit subsequent legislative history traditionally has
meant that the Court does not consider the legislative history to be a reliable
source of current congressional preferences or (for the reasons developed above)
that it wants to invite an override. Both reasons were implicated in the Court's
refusal to credit subsequent legislative history in TVA v. Hill. In TVA, the
petitioner argued that the Endangered Species Act permitted exceptions for an
almost-completed dam, and that Congress' continuing appropriations for the
dam after the snail darter problem arose were evidence that Congress did not
consider the dam threatened by the Act. 5 The Court ruled that this evidence
was not a reliable indicator of congressional preferences, since legislators do
not scrutinize appropriations measures for substantive statutory developments.
Another probable reason was that the Court believed the best solution of the
snail darter and other similar dilemmas was a statutory override, which the
Court invited in its opinion.
In sum, this Article's game theory analysis suggests that the Court has used
the foregoing doctrines of statutory interpretation in a relatively systematic,
rather than haphazard, way. Specifically, the Court's invocation of special stare
decisis for statutory precedents, legislative inaction, and subsequent legislative
history is a signal that it is readjusting its own preferences to avoid an over-
ride-in light of signals from post-enactment Congresses. Moreover, the Court
has been quite astute in its perceptions about such evidence, for the Court's
decisions relying upon these doctrines are rarely overridden by Congress. The
Court's use of these doctrines supports the hypothesis that the Court tends to
be more attentive to the preferences of the current Congress than to those of
the enacting Congress.
242. Id. at 279 (majority opinion) (relying on Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,634-35
(1984)); see also id. at 285 n.14 (relying on 1978 amendments to Act).
243. In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32,
Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act essentially to codify Arline. See also Fair Housing Amendments
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(a), 102 Stat. 1619, 1620.
244. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (overriding
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)); Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
435, 100 Stat. 1080 (overriding United States Dep't ofTransp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597
(1986)); Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (overriding
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
245. See Brief for TVA at 7-18, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-170) (survey of House and
Senate Appropriations Committees' monitoring of dam situatfon, with full knowledge of snail darter
problem).
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C. Should the Court Be Playing the Court/Congress/President Game?
If the Court is more responsive to the preferences of the current Congress
than to those of the enacting Congress, the question remains: Should the Court
be playing such a game? To lawyers, this game may seem like an "unjudicial,"
if not highly irregular, way for the Court to carry out its statutory interpretation
duties, which have in the legal literature traditionally been characterized as a
search for Congress' "intent" or application of a statute's "plain meaning."
Even modem scholars of dynamic statutory interpretation are sometimes
reluctant to acknowledge the pull of subsequent legislative signals.246
But to political theorists and economists this game is not so remarkable.
According to traditional political theory, the Court's willingness to consider
current legislative preferences and its desire to avoid legislative overrides rests
upon a specific and widely held ideology 7 regarding the Court's role in our
political system.24 Under this ideology, the Court is part of our nation's
pluralist political system, just as Congress and the President are. Like the other
branches, the Court plays a specialized role in the overall lawmaking process,
but a role that facilitates rather than obstructs the operation of the pluralist
system. The Court is, therefore, not normally "countermajoritarian," though
sometimes it may push our pluralism to make adjustments ensuring the partici-
pation of relevant groups (and hence the perpetuation of pluralism and the
stability it brings)."49 This vision sees a limited but important role for the
Court as constitutional interpreter and a most important role for the Court as
statutory interpreter. As statutory interpreter, the Court is a faithful agent of
majoritarian policymaking and carries out statutory policies as Congress desires.
An ambiguity rests in the lessons of this traditional ideology. If the Court
is to be a facilitator of majoritarian policies, it is unclear which majority it
should obey. Should it obey the congressional majority that enacted the statute
or the majority in the current Congress, which may not be willing to enact
246. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 123 (favoring dynamic statutory interpretation, except where it runs
against the clear import of both the plain textual meaning and the original intent of Congress).
247. By "ideology," I do not mean a crude liberal/conservative political strategy, but a holistic cultural
understanding of the power dynamics and institutional roles in our polity.
248. The leading explicit statement is Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making In a Democracy: The Role
of the Supreme Court As a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293-94 (1957), which argues that the
Supreme Court is inevitably part of the national political coalition and cannot be expected to perform the
"countermajoritarian" functions often expected of it. Dahl's thesis is implicit in some of The Federalist
Papers, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), and in much leading scholarship about
the role of federal courts, most notably JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); HART & SACKS,
supra note 52; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
249. Thus, the Court might aggressively intervene to ensure that "discrete and insular minorities" are
not excluded from the political system, lest they abandon the system and work against its stability. See
generally ELY, supra note 248 (purpose of judicial review is "representation reinforcing" rather than
imposing constitutional values). Under this theory, the Court's commitment to desegregation in the 1950's
makes sense as a pluralist strategy to ensure participation in politics by all groups in society. Cf. Derrick
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518,
524-26 (1980) (arguing that Brown was part of elites' strategy of co-opting minorities).
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anything like the original statute? The Court cannot ignore either Congress. It
needs to pay attention to the preferences of the enacting Congress, not just to
assert "rule of law" values, but also to reassure interest groups that, when they
receive legislation from Congress, their legislative deal will not entirely collapse
over time.10 But the Court also needs to pay attention to the preferences of
the current Congress, to facilitate the efficient operation of pluralism. If the
Court completely ignored current legislative preferences and interest group
configurations, Congress would have to revisit statutes constantly to update
them-a job the Court can perform more efficiently for a wide range of issues.
Because most of the statutory issues decided by the Court are those for which
there is no completely verifiable "deal" in the enacting Congress, the preferenc-
es of the current Congress are usually more important for the Court than are
the preferences of the enacting Congress.
The evidence suggests that during the time frame of this Article (1967-90),
the Court has tacitly followed the ideology just described. This may be chang-
ing, however.251 Voices within the Court itself are openly questioning this
traditional ideology, and academics and judges writing about issues of statutory
interpretation are criticizing the Court for its practices in the pluralist system.
A discussion of the normative desirability of the Court's pluralist ideology first
should focus upon the now-ascendant "formalist" ideology. Formalism offers
both a critique of the Court's traditional approach and an affirmative new
approach. The difficulties with formalism suggest a different, "normative"
critique, which argues that the Court ought to challenge the pluralist system
more often to protect values not protected by normal politics.
Formalism argues that constitutional "rule of law" values require the Court
to follow only the statutory language as understood by both Congress and the
President at the time of enactment. Under formalist ideology, the Court's role
in statutory interpretation is not to facilitate the dominant political coalition's
evolving preferences, but to protect the formal structures of our democracy.
This argument places great weight on the Constitution's requirement of bicam-
eralism and presentment before "law" can be changed 52 Traditionally this
critique argued that statutory interpretation is limited to discerning Congress'
original intent, but recent voices on the Court, most notably that of Justice
250. Professors Landes and Posner argue that an independent judiciary might be viewed as protecting
the integrity of interest group deals over time. See Landes & Posner, supra note 179. This is an important
insight but does not tell the whole story.
251. For early soundings, see Richard Pildes, Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982).
252. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (bicameralism and presentment requirements for Congress to enact"laws").
For stringent formalist application of the bicameralism and presentment requirements to the issues in this
Article, see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment); Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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Scalia, have recast this critique by focusing on the statutory text.253 Changes
in the Court's personnel in the last five years have yielded a Court more
sympathetic to such formalist arguments than any other Court since the
1930's. 4
The formalist group on the Court is not interested in the preferences of the
current Congress. Thus, they have vigorously attacked the traditional doctrines
by which the Court has explicitly considered post-enactment congressional
preferences. Specifically, they have been more prone to revise statutory prece-
dents for which current Congresses are sympathetic, 2 5 to reject arguments
relying on current congressional acquiescence, 1 6 and to scorn subsequent
legislative historyas7 Moreover, this formalist group is much more aggressive
in using the canons as critical tools for interpreting statutes, especially those
drawn from structural constitutional principles."8
Not surprisingly, Congress is more likely to override Supreme Court
statutory decisions following such a formalist approach. Appendix III and the
summary in Table 6 present systematic evidence of this phenomenon, which
has also been noted by Justice Stevens, the Court's staunchest exponent of
traditional pluralist ideology.5 9 Justice Stevens strongly objects that the Court
"do[es] the country a disservice when [it] needlessly ignore[s] persuasive
evidence of Congress' actual purpose and require[s] it 'to take the time to
revisit the matter' and to restate its purpose in more precise English."2"
While aware that the Court has often followed the preferences of current
Congresses, formalists believe the Court is doing the country a greater service
253. For analytical descriptions of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of statutory interpretation, see Eskridge,
supra note 127; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice; 74 VA. L. REV.
423 (1988); Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399; Patricia M.
Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of
the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
254. Justice Rehnquist (who generally favors original intent) was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986;
Justice Rehnquist was replaced by Justice Scalia (an ardent textualist); Justice Kennedy (a sometime
textualist) replaced Justice Powell (an accommodationist) in 1987. It is not clear how sympathetic newly
appointed Justices Souter and Thomas will be to the formalist vision, but it is highly likely that they will
be more sympathetic than Justices Brennan and Marshall, whom they replaced. Justices White and O'Connor
are sometimes sympathetic to formalist arguments.
255. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,657, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. See id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Compare Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
200 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Runyon v. McCrary ought to receive
heightened stare decisis treatment because subsequent Congresses had signaled approval after deliberation
and study) with id. at 175 n.1 (Kennedy, J.) (refusing to consider evidence of legislative acquiescence).
257. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989) (Kennedy, J.)
("We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a
committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that
statute." (citations omitted)); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 838-41 (1988)
(White, J.).
258. See Eskridge, supra note 125, at 663-66.
259. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, IIl S. Ct. 1138, 1153-56 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
260. Id. at 1155 (citation omitted).
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when it ignores evidence of subsequent congressional purposes and attitudes.
They argue that the Court should refuse to do Congress' job. If a statute falls
out of date in relation to newer congressional preferences or newer problems,
formalists argue that the Constitution requires any revision of the statute to go
through the processes of bicameralism and presentment. The empirical study
described in Part I of this Article lends some support for this argument because
it shows that Congress is well aware of the Court's statutory decisions and
often will override those it disagrees with. 1 Congress already overrides many
of the plain meaning decisions 2' and could probably override more decisions
if it enlarged the staffs of the judiciary committees and the labor committees
in each chamber.6 3
Moreover, several of the case studies described in this Article suggest that
formalist ideology has some advantages. Consider the example of employment
policies that raise questions of disparate impact and affirmative action. While
these issues were not squarely debated or addressed in the Civil Rights Act of
1964,216 the Court still made the tough policy choices in Griggs and Weber.
Because the gatekeeping committees supported the Court's resolutions, Con-
gress never meaningfully debated these issues. When Wards Cove brought
Griggs and Weber into question, these issues moved to the legislative agenda,
where they have been discussed hotly. Whatever the legislative resolution of
these issues, it may be more satisfying, in a democracy, for the elected legisla-
ture rather than the unelected Justices to make and debate the policy choices.
Formalism raises important questions about the Court's traditional accom-
modationist approach to statutory interpretation and makes an attractive case
for a more confrontational approach. However, there are several problems with
such a strategy of confrontation. One problem arises out of the nature of
formalist reasoning and raises the question of whether the Court's formalists
have really made out a case for rejecting the Court's traditional accommo-
dationist attitude. To make its case, formalism must root its argument in an
authoritative source. The obvious source for the Court's formalism is the
Constitution, but the Constitution offers little if any support for such a vision
of statutory interpretation. 65 Nothing in the text of the Constitution provides
reliable support for formalism. Article III simply defines the duties of the Su-
preme Court as entailing the "judicial Power," which tells us little about proper
considerations in statutory interpretation. Article I's bicameralism and present-
ment requirements, much relied upon by the new formalists, tell us nothing
261. See Tables 1, 2 and 3.
262. See Tables 6 and 8.
263. See Table 4.
264. See GRAHMI, supra note 116, for an excellent discussion of the evolution of debate (almost
entirely outside Congress) from 1961 to 1971.
265. See Eskridge, supra note 125, at 670-78.
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about the Court's proper approach to statutory interpretation, as the Court itself
suggested in INS v. Chadha.66
The discussions surrounding the adoption of the Constitution also fail to
provide persuasive support for formalism. Indeed, there is some indication that
the Framers would have expected the Court to interpret statutes to reflect
contemporary policy and reasonableness. 267 Without authoritative support for
its ideology of confrontation, the formalist critique is not only incoherent, but
presents others with no substantial reason to supplant the Court's traditional
ideology of accommodation.
A second problem with the formalist critique is that it requires the Court
to act in a more countermajoritarian manner than its traditional approach. Both
traditional and formalist ideologies view the Court as Congress' "agent" in
statutory interpretation. Like commercial agents in the real world, the Court's
role is a subordinate one, implementing directives issued by the principal
(Congress) over time. Like principals in the real world, Congress makes the
big choices and expects its agent to implement them. The question then be-
comes one of who is a better agent, the accommodationist who keeps one eye
on the principal's current as well as historical preferences, or the formalist, who
only has eyes for the principal's original intent or for the plain terms of the
written directives? Obviously the principal would rather have the agent who
follows the dynamic purpose of his directives, rather than their strict, literal
meaning.
This principal-agent analysis has some application to institutions like
Congress. When the Court denies civil rights to groups Congress intended to
help, or when the Court obstructs a statutory scheme, the damage, even if short
term (i.e., there is a quick override), is often irreparable. When the principal
is a complex institution like Congress or the President, many mistakes will
266. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha invalidated the legislative veto as an effort by Congress to make
new "laws" without going through bicameral approval and presentment to the President and, therefore, said
nothing about the role of the Court to interpret the "laws." Indeed, the Court explicitly approved of highly
dynamic executive branch "lawmaking" pursuant to a congressional delegation, because executive activity
is regulated under Article II, not Article I. Id. at 953 n.16. Obviously, the same point could be made about
the Supreme Court's "lawmaking" through statutory interpretation.
267. The English Humanist tradition of the eighteenth century, which was influential for many of the
Framers, emphasized the rule of Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584):
the office of all the Judges is always to make such [I construction as shall suppress the mischief
[addressed by the statute], and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief.., and to add force and life to the cure and remedy,
according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
Even much more conservative thinkers such as Blackstone stated that "where some collateral matter arises
out of the general words [of a statute], and happens to be unreasonable, there the judges are in decency to
conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to
expound the statute by equity," as in Heydon's Case. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. The
Federalist Papers echo Blackstone in arguing that courts ought to interpret "unjust and partial" laws by
"mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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never be corrected. 28 Because Congress does not have an infinitely elastic
agenda, the Court's effort to push more items onto the legislative agenda
necessarily pushes other items off of it. It is arguably countermajoritarian for
the Court to make Congress legislate repeatedly on matters that Congress
thought were closed.
This difficulty is compounded by the democratic process' reliance on the
Court's past practice. Since 1937, it appears that the Court has generally been
in sync with the pluralist political process in statutory interpretation. 2 9 During
this period, Congress has enacted thousands of statutes, which were surely
written and implemented with the baseline assumption that the Court (or,
increasingly, an agency) would interpret the statutes over time to carry out
Congress' overall goals in a practical fashion. If, as formalists such as Justice
Scalia suggest, the Court in the 1990's were to replace its accommodationist
philosophy with a more confrontational one, the Court's move would be
tantamount to a game of "bait and switch"-one that lures the mark into enact-
ing a statute by holding out the promise of helpful dynamic interpretation (bait),
but then eviscerates the statute over time by stingy interpretation (switch).
Consider the following example of bait and switch. The Court has long
recognized that Congress can abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity from lawsuits pursuant to a federal statutory scheme. In 1985, the Court
changed the rule to require Congress to make "its intention unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute," in order to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity.27 In the last several Terms, the Court relied on this rule to carve
the states out of several important statutory schemes.271
In Dellmuth v. Muthy the Court held that the Education of the Handi-
capped Act (EHA) of 1975 did not abrogate state immunity. The Court reached
this result even though the law imposed substantive obligations directly on the
states, included the states in its jurisdictional grant, and included legislative
discussion assuming that the states could be sued. After the Supreme Court
changed the clear statement rule in 1985, Congress responded in 1986 with a
broad textual abrogation of state immunity for statutes protecting the dis-
abled.273 Yet in Dellmuth, the Court held not only that the EHA did not meet
the more stringent test for abrogation, but that the 1986 statute made clear
268. For example, recall the preference configuration described in Figure 1. When the gatekeeping
committee of either chamber favors the Court's countermajoritarian interpretation about as much as it favors
the chamber's preferred interpretation, it will have few or no incentives to introduce override legislation.
In those not insubstantial number of cases, strong countermajoritarian statutory interpretations can survive.
269. This ambitious generalization is based upon the present study, which covers the period 1967-90,
and the political science scholarship cited supra note 55, as well as Dahl, supra note 248, which covers
the period before the 1960's. The key date is 1937, the beginning of the end of the Lochner era.
270. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), overridden by Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845.
271. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (Bankruptcy Act);
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (§ 1983).
272. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l) (1988).
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Congress' "intent" not to abrogate state immunity in lawsuits filed before
1986.274 Congress overrode Dellmuth in 1990.275 That Congress had to pass
the same statute three times to achieve its original goal is quite striking.
Although the new formalists proclaim the "obligation" of the Court "to conduct
[its] exegesis [of statutes] in a fashion which fosters the democratic proc-
ess,"276 the formalist ideology may undercut the democratic process in many
cases.
A final, and related, problem with formalism is that it does not appear to
be a "neutral" alternative to the Court's traditional accommodationist ideology.
Rather, formalism appears to be structurally biased in ways that are difficult
to defend. By requiring Congress to revisit statutes that are imperfectly drafted
or that do not precisely address new versions of the problem they were enacted
to solve, formalism substantially raises the costs of passing statutes. If statutes
are more costly to write and rewrite, fewer of them will exist. Formalism in
this way embodies a relatively antigovernmental philosophy. This may reflect
the libertarian bias of some formalists277 or their belief in the distributive
theory of politics,27 both of which are deeply controversial views. In any
event, their ideology systematically works against majoritarian regulation. 79
The present study points to another structural bias in formalism, derived
from its pride in kicking statutory issues back to Congress. Tables 7 and 9
suggest asymmetries in Congress' willingness to override Supreme Court
statutory decisions. The United States, big business, state and local govern-
ments, organized employee groups, women's organizations, and environmental-
ists are best able to obtain override legislation when they lose Supreme Court
statutory cases. More diffuse interests are less able to do this. In other words,
a Court that has adopted formalism would systematically benefit established
interest groups at the expense of diffuse groups and minorities. Thus, an odd
consequence of formalism is that it would considerably strengthen the Court's
already strong pro-government bias.
274. Compare Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 231-32 (majority opinion) (relying solely on plain meaning of
statutory text) with id. at 238 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (looking to structure and implications of entire
statute).
275. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 1103, 104 Stat.
103, 1106.
276. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
277. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (supporting
statutory construction only when statute either plainly addresses problem or requires judges to supply
construction).
278. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) (arguing that judges should attend more to economics of
legislative process).
279. The formalists on the current Court add a further bias in their enthusiastic espousal of the Chevron
doctrine that courts should defer to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with implementing.
This bias suggests their preference for presidential over congressional lawmaking, a preference which is
contrary to the structure of lawmaking contemplated in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution itself. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article 1, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1992).
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This last line of analysis suggests a very different critique of the
Court/Congress/President game-that the Court's traditional ideology is too
accommodationist and too uncritical of the pluralist system."0 There are two
ways of expressing this critique, one that is "representation reinforcing"'"
and one that is 'normativist. '' 2s The representation-reinforcing version would
argue that many interests are left out of our pluralist political system. To
enhance our system's representation of such interests, the Court should act in
a countermajoritarian fashion that provides a voice for those who are not heard.
The normativist version would argue that certain fundamental values are
neglected in the political process, and the Court can protect those values, or
at least force attention to them, through statutory interpretation. Since these two
expressions are interrelated, this section will simply refer to them both as
"normativist."
A normativist analysis would engage in a statutory interpretation much
different from the Court's traditional approach. Recall Boutilier v. INS, 83 in
which the Court interpreted the immigration law's exclusion of people afflicted
with "psychopathic personality" as excluding all lesbians, gay men, and bisexu-
als. The Court's result strained the "plain meaning" of the statute's text, but
accurately read the political situation in 1967 to suggest that the original anti-
homosexual "deal" between the PHS and key players in Congress was still in
force.' If the Court's goal was to avoid overrides and mirror the dominant
political feelings of the day, then Boutilier succeeded.
Yet Boutilier was normatively questionable. By going out of its way to
interpret an ambiguous statute to exclude lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,"5
the Court made it easier for the political process to persecute a vulnerable
minority, which was virtually invisible in the political process. If ever the
interests of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals were going to be heard in 1967,
the Court would have had to supply the forum and a considerable amplifier.
Not least of all, Boutilier added the sanction of Court-determined "rule of law"
to the historical discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals in this
280. The Federalist Papers suggest that the role of the Court is to "mitigat[e] the severity and confin[e]
the operation" of "partial and unjust" laws. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
281. See ELY, supra note 248.
282. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 68, at 743-47; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98
YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT COVER, ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)).
283. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
284. The Court had very good evidence for that supposition. The Ninth Circuit in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), had interpreted
the "plain meaning" of the statute not to cover gay men and lesbians. Congress reacted promptly to the
decision, with a statute adding "sexual deviation" to the list of exclusions in the Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919. Although the 1965 Act did not apply to Boutilier, the recent
political signals surely informed the Court's interpretation.
285. Clive Michael Boutilier was not even a "homosexual," as we now understand the term, but rather
was "bisexual." Unrebutted medical evidence stated that Boutilier had sexual relations with both men and
women equally. See Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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country. In short, Boutilier was normatively unjustifiable, even if politically
expedient. Even at the risk of an override and adverse criticism, the Court
should have interpreted the ambiguous statute to protect the interests of the
dispossessed and to avoid irrational discrimination.
Normativism is an attractive vision for a Court constantly engaged in
statutory interpretation. Like formalism, it confronts the existing political
process with discordant statutory interpretations and challenges the process to
override. Unlike formalism, normativism carries with it powerful justifications
for supplementing or replacing the Court's traditional approach. It succeeds as
an alternative for some of the reasons that formalism fails.
Perhaps surprisingly, normativist-rather than either pluralist or formal-
ist-assumptions make the best sense out of the Constitution. The structure of
the Constitution itself is strikingly inconsistent with the agency metaphor
favored by both pluralist and formalist ideologies. The Court is featured as an
independent branch of government, not as a satrapy of Congress. The metaphor
that is more consistent with the separation of powers resonant in the Constitu-
tion is that of "partnership" rather than "agency." 6 That is, Congress, the
President, and the Court are partners in the creation of public policy, the first
making the laws (Article I), the second enforcing the laws (Article II), and the
third interpreting the laws (Article III). Article III assures the Court of life
tenure and no diminishment of salary, so that the Court has the freedom to
reflect upon and criticize the political process as a coequal partner. Alexander
Hamilton anticipated normativism in The Federalist No. 78, when he argued
that a critical role for the Court in statutory interpretation is to interpret "partial
and unjust" laws by "mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such
laws."17
While normativism may be more consistent with the text, structure, and
traditions of the Constitution, it is subject to the other two objections to formal-
ist ideology, namely, countermajoritarian tendencies and nonneutrality. But
these objections are not as problematic for normativism as they are for formal-
ism, which claims to be more "democracy-enhancing" and "neutral" than the
Court's traditional pluralist ideology. Normativism posits that neutrality is not
possible and that countermajoritarianism is necessary to our political process.
An impressive body of legal literature is in the process of justifying
normativism as an alternative to the traditional pluralist vision."' The empiri-
286. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 189-91 (1984).
287. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
288. See, e.g., DWORmN, supra note 126; CASS R. SUNsTEN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990);
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Harold McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation:
A Clinical Dimension for the New Legal Process, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 83 (1989); Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493 (1988); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
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cal research reported in this Article is relevant to this literature in several ways.
To begin with, the override data compiled here, especially that in Tables 7 and
9 (the ability of "losers" in Supreme Court cases to obtain congressional over-
rides), supports the proposition that our political system is not meaningfully
"pluralist." It lends some support to the views of political scientists who argue
that "[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with
a strong upper-class accent,' ' 9 for the poor, the ordinary, and the diffused
are seldom heard by our Congress when their interests lose in Supreme Court
statutory cases.
But the data suggest a much more complicated political system than one
in which the "haves come out ahead. 290 It is a system in which government
"insiders" (federal employees, state and local governments, federal agencies,
the executive departments) often do a lot better than "outsiders," even wealthy
outsiders. It is a system in which middle class "minority" groups (noncitizens,
women, the disabled) can do better than "established" business interests and
diffuse groups such as consumers.
If Hamilton's words2 91 mean anything today, they should at least mean
that the Court can serve as the "conscience" of the nation's pluralism by
bringing attention to interests that go unrepresented in Washington and values
that are overlooked.292 A further lesson of the present study is that the Court's
stance significantly affects the way public policy develops in this country.293
What this Article suggests is that because of the informational features of the
Court's statutory interpretation, the Court can influence political preferences
by framing statutory issues in a different way, by presenting those issues in a
concrete (and probably unanticipated) factual setting, and by raising arguments
of public policy not considered by the political process.
Interestingly, the Court's traditional practice in statutory interpretation
offers traces of a normativist approach in some of its "clear statement rules,"
long a mainstay of Anglo-American statutory interpretation.294 To take the
best example, the rule of lenity requires that the Court interpret ambiguous
criminal prohibitions in favor of the accused and against the government. This
rule serves the representation-reinforcing goal of protecting a relatively power-
less group (people accused of committing crimes) and the normativist goal of
289. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 58, at 35.
290. For example, organized workers (not a big "have" group) do about as well in obtaining overrides
as organized businesses (the big "have" group). See Tables 7 and 9. Unions and public employees often
obtain overrides, and (perhaps just as important) when such groups intensely oppose an override they have
a better track record than do business groups.
291. The Court should interpret "partial and unjust" laws by "mitigating the severity and confining
the operation of such laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
292. A theme best developed in Minow, supra note 288.
293. Aside from the usually mentioned reasons that the Court's interpretation is accepted as the
presumptive starting point for any discussion of a statute and that the political process usually defers to the
Court's judgment.
294. See Eskridge, supra note 131; Sunstein, supra note 123.
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injecting due process values of notice, fairness, and proportionality into the
political process.295 The rule of lenity also seems to make a difference in the
Court's decisions. For example, the rule appears to trump the Court's tradition-
ally accommodationist attitude toward current congressional preferences.2 6
This is normatively attractive, because the rule embodies worthy values and
because its beneficiaries are too easily brushed aside in the legislative process.
From a normativist perspective, the problem with the Court's practice is
that few of the clear statement rules are as sensible as the rule of lenity. Many
of the rules-against waivers of federal sovereign immunity, against federal
abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity, against federal regulation
of the states-protect values and interests that are already well protected by the
national political process. Other rules-against extraterritorial application of
federal law and in favor of common law baselines-rest upon outdated, often
pre-industrial, assumptions. Still other rules-in favor of groups outside the
political process and in favor of proportionality-are good rules that are not
authoritatively accepted or regularly invoked by the Court.
Return to Boutilier. Boutilier was expelled from the United States because
the Court found his sexuality evidence of "psychopathic personality" exclusion
in the immigration statute. Justice Brennan dissented from that interpretation
and adopted the reasoning of Judge Moore in the lower court.297 Judge
Moore's dissent was a classic normativist move in statutory interpretation, for
it focused attention on the facts of the case, subjected the pluralist values to
substantive critique, and spoke for the victims whose voices had not effectively
been heard in the political process. Had the Supreme Court adopted Judge
Moore's position, a congressional override would have been probable. But it
is possible that the political process would have been enlightened-or
shamed-by a Court opinion precisely analyzing the medical term "psychopath-
ic personality," in light of the developing medical literature. Instead, the Court
added the sanction of law to poor policy.
One lesson of the theory and practice described in this Article is that the
Court can provide leadership to Congress when it can express a perspective that
has not been heard. Sometimes by resisting the political process, the Court can
transform the preferences of the players, or at least initiate z debate that will,
in turn, transform their preferences.
295. see generally ESKRIDGE& FRICKEY, supra note 51, at658-76; J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WrrTH
STATUTES 64-65 (1982); POSNER, supra note 248, at 283-84.
296. Congress frequently overrides the Court's lenient interpretations of federal criminal statutes. See
supra notes 89-90.
297. Boutilier, 387 U.S. 118, 125 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on Boutilier v. INS, 363
F.2d 488,497 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting)). Justices Douglas and Fortas filed a separate dissenting
opinion, id. at 125.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The empirical and theoretical discussion in this Article may contribute to
a more systematic analysis of the interaction between the Court, Congress, and
the President in the creation of public policy in the United States. Although the
data here only pertain to federal statutory interpretation cases, the same analysis
could apply to agency lawmaking, federal common law, and federal constitu-
tional law.298 One point of the analysis is that the Court's role in American
lawmaking is intrinsically political and not neutral and that other institutions
should be aware of that reality. This analysis has a range of implications for
the theory and operation of public policy in this country.
The Court's dynamic statutory interpretation takes on new meaning in light
of this study. The evolution of statutes is influenced not just by changing
circumstances, but also by changing preferences in the political system. Dynam-
ic statutory interpretation theory has established that the Court does not and
cannot tie its interpretive practice meaningfully to original legislative intent.
This study suggests, further and perhaps surprisingly, that current legislative
expectations are usually more important to the Court than original legislative
expectations. Furthermore, these conclusions are defensible against formalist
attack, but subject to the normativist reservation that the Court should be more
critical of the political preferences to which it defers. Consistent with recent
literature, this Article views the canons of statutory interpretation as one mode
for the Court's critical reflection.
The analysis in this Article is more important for Congress, which should
be thinking more systematically about its dynamic interaction with the Court
and the President. To begin with, Congress should be aware that judicial
interpretations of the statutes it enacts are not going to be faithful to its original
expectations 299-- the Court will be more responsive to the expectations of
future Congresses and to values (such as plain meaning and due process) that
it particularly treasures. Given this, Congress has much stronger incentives to
monitor judicial decisionmaking than it has traditionally realized. Congress'
need to monitor judicial decisions is particularly strong in a period of divided
government when the Court is aligned with the President on many policy
matters.
Moreover, Congress can be assured that most controversial Supreme Court
decisions will come to its attention and that the relevant committees do a good
job of monitoring Supreme Court decisions. Congress, however, should be
298. I am currently conducting an empirical tudy, similar to this one, surveying congressional
"responses" (not just overrides) to Supreme Court constitutional decisions.
299. This came as a surprise to some of the Members during former Congressman Kastenmeier's
hearings on statutory interpretation in 1990. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts. Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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concerned that it is aware of relatively few lower court decisions. Just as the
present study shows impressive congressional activity in connection with
Supreme Court decisions, it shows an unimpressive knowledge of and response
to the far more numerous lower federal court statutory interpretation decisions.
Even a Supreme Court per curiam opinion, or a memorandum reflecting an
evenly split Court, is more likely to trigger congressional attention than impor-
tant en banc decisions in the federal circuits. Congress needs to monitor these
lower court decisions more effectively, and a promising beginning is the trial
project by Dr. Robert Katzmann, who is setting up a computer link between
the clerk's office of the District of Columbia Circuit and the staffs of the
relevant congressional committees.3°°
Congress should also be concerned that its monitoring of Supreme Court
statutory decisions yields few overrides. All but one of the six preference
configurations explored in this Article (all but Figure 4) reveal the significant
power of the Court to read its own raw preferences into statutes without
congressional override. This is particularly troubling today, when the raw
preferences of Congress and the Court are very far apart, when the Court is
becoming a preference outlier without significant dissenting voices, and when
the Court's preferences can be backed up by a presidential veto (the divided
government problem). Even if a President with preferences similar to those in
Congress were elected, Congress could still expect provocatively conservative
Supreme Court decisions yielding Court/Congress conflict in the areas of civil
rights, environmental law, immigration, government liability for constitutional
and ordinary torts, and federal jurisdiction and procedure.
Congress ought to be particularly alert to any movement within the Court
toward Justice Scalia's formalist critique of the Court's traditional practice.
Given the Court's institutional history, I am not sure that Justice Scalia's
formalist vision will make much headway in the Court. But to the extent that
it does, there will be much more conflict between the Court and Congress in
the 1990's-with more overrides and more acrimony. Congress will search for
ways to deal with a Court no longer willing to "play the game." In that event,
Congress should consider setting up "councils of revision" specializing in
override legislation within the legislature, and should consider transferring
primary decisionmaking power to agencies over which Congress has more
leverage.
A final conclusion to be drawn from the present analysis is the critical role
of the Presidency in statutory interpretation. The President is now truly imperial
in issues of statutory interpretation, through two powers given the office by the
Constitution-the power to appoint Supreme Court Justices 0 1 and to veto
300. This is described in Robert A. Katzmann, Congress, the Courts and Statutory Cases: A Challenge
For Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.I (forthcoming Feb. 1992).
301. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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legislation30 -- and one power given the office by the Court-the power of
executive agencies to issue presumptively valid interpretations of statutes.303
Thus, a Presidency that has grown increasingly conservative since 1968 has
appointed a Court that is increasingly conservative, has used the veto power
to protect at least some of the Court's conservative statutory interpretations (and
thereby raise the cost of successful overrides), and has used agency rulemaking
as a means for trimming back statutory policy. At this point in our history of
divided government, the big winner is the Court/Congress/President game is
the President.
302. Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
303. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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A METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THREE APPENDICES
The following three appendices report the raw data upon which Tables 1
through 9 and much of the discussion in this Article are based. This introduc-
tion describes the methodology used in compiling these appendices, the limits
of the methodology, and some of the choices made.
A. Appendix I: Overrides, 1967-90
Appendix I collects statutes in the 89th through 101st Congresses in which
Congress knowingly overrode federal court interpretations of federal statutes.
This Appendix does not report statutory overrides of, or responses to, the
Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Constitution3s° or its common law
decisions.35 The Appendix does report overrides of Supreme Court decisions
resting upon both statutory and constitutional grounds.
The United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
(U.S.C.C.A.N.) collects the main committee reports (and sometimes floor
explanations) for most of the public laws enacted by Congress in any given
year. Committee reports, including conference committee reports, routinely
discuss judicial decisions affected by proposed statutory provisions, usually in
their section-by-section analyses. My research assistants and I searched the
reports printed in U.S.C.C.A.N. for the period 1967-90, noting every reference
to a Supreme Court or other judicial interpretation of federal statutes that the
reports described as being "overruled," "modified," or "clarified" by a provi-
sion in the proposed statute. I then correlated these references to provisions in
the enacted public law, weeding out references to provisions that did not
override a decision in any substantial way or that were not ultimately enacted.
This method has a number of gaps. Not all public laws generate committee
reports. Not all of the overrides are reflected in committee reports. Not all
committee reports are reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. To fill in at least some of these
gaps, I did an extensive (but not comprehensive) search of committee reports
reproduced on microfiche by the Congressional Information Service, examined
the hearings conducted by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees in the
period 1979-88, and consulted secondary sources. °6
304. See, e.g., Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108-09
(1988) (overriding Waiters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)); Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (overriding Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547 (1978)).
305. Federal Employees Liability Reform & Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-691,
102 Stat. 1568 (overriding Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988)); Amendments to Federal Rules of
Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 2215, 2236 (1974) (new Rule 803(3)) (overriding Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892)).
306. Particularly helpful was Solimine & Walker, supra note 5.
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I have made a number of choices that should be explicitly noted. First, I
have included as "overrides" statutes that "modified" the holding or reasoning
of a federal statutory decision. The statute does not have to have entirely
nullified the court's statutory decision for me to have counted it as an over-
ride. 7 So long as key players in Congress were clearly reacting to a statutory
decision, I have counted the statute as an override. Generally, I have counted
as overrides only those statutes whose legislative history mentions overridden
cases by name. I deviated from this policy for a few overrides of Supreme
Court cases because the overrides are clearly linked to the Supreme Court cases
in the relevant communities of interpretation. 0
Second, I have not included as overrides statutes that contain legislative
history rejecting a federal statutory decision but that did not proceed to change
the text of the United States Code to override the decision.30 9 Nor do I
include as overrides statutes only requiring agency reports or agency follow up
on the implications of statutory precedents, rather than changing the text of the
statutes.3
10
Third, I have not included as overrides statutes that "codified" or "en-
dorsed" federal statutory decisions. There must have been disapproval of the
decision or its consequences for the statute to count as an override.31" A
307. See, e.g., Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308,94 Stat. 939 (1980) (over-
riding United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), but only for soft drink industry);
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-617,88 Stat. 2126 (overriding procedural rules of Zahn v. Int'l
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (overriding Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), but only
for Port Act cases).
308. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (overriding
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), with legislative history only focusing on lower court decision
following Boutilier); Child Sexual Abuse & Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b)(1), 100
Stat 3511 (overriding Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1971), but not mentioning decision);
Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 105, 100 Stat. 449,459 (1986) (overriding Dickerson
v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 109 (1984), but not mentioning decision).
309. For example, the House report for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, rejects the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1989), reprinted in
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1947-49. But there is no change in the statute to reflect this rejection. Hence, I have
not included this as a statutory override.
310. See Housing & Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 102(b), 101 Stat.
1815, 1820 (calling for Comptroller General report, in response to congressional doubts about Wright v.
Roanoke Dev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) see also 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3461 (Conf. Rep.)); Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (House Report directs SEC to
monitor impact of Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 636 (1983), and report back to committee H.R. REP. No. 98-355,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2288).
311. For example, Congress essentially built upon and expanded upon the Court's decision to protect
victims of contagious diseases in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), when it enacted the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32. Although Walker &
Solimine, supra note 5, count this as a congressional response to Arline because the statute expanded
Arline's holding, I do not count it as an override because there was no congressional disapproval of the
decision; Congress was only using it as a "building block" for public policy.
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harder choice was whether a statute indirectly "responding" to a decision
Congress does not like counts as an override. Generally not.
312
B. Appendix II: Judiciary Committee Hearings, 1979-88
Appendix II collects the Supreme Court cases that were subject to scrutiny
in hearings before the House or Senate Judiciary Committees for the 96th
through 100th Congresses (1979-88). The appendix lists Supreme Court deci-
sions (often clustered, if they all relate to the same statutory issue), any override
bills aimed at those decisions, and the ultimate disposition of the override bills.
The methodology here was quite simple. I read through the Library of
Congress' collection of House and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for the
96th through 100th Congresses. The Library of Congress keeps the hearings
all together and arranges them in sequential numerical order, so that any gaps
in coverage can be readily noted. Obviously, I did not read hearings that were
clearly unrelated to statutory interpretation issues (which was about half of
them), nor did I read the hearings carefully for substance. I just looked for
scrutiny of Supreme Court decisions and studied the more important hearings.
The hearings note and usually reprint the bills on which they are focused,
and this was my main source for the override bills. Hence, my study does not
report override bills that were not the focus of hearings. On the other hand, I
have listed a few cases that were scrutinized in hearings, but for which there
were no override bills reported in the hearings. What was important was the
House or Senate Judiciary Committees' scrutiny of Supreme Court statutory
decisions.
I determined the ultimate fate of the override bills primarily through the
LEGISLATE computer service at the Library of Congress. Unhappily, this
service leaves much to be desired. Sometimes, for example, an override bill is
left to die in committee, while an equivalent provision is inserted into another
bill, through amendment or so forth; LEGISLATE does not catch these develop-
ments. I have caught as many of these anomalies as possible (often through
reference in subsequent hearings), but gaps no doubt remain.
C. Appendix III: Characteristics of Overridden Supreme Court Decisions
312. For example, the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964),
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), ruled that federal patentlaw preempted
most state regulation of sound recordings, even though federal law did not itself provide protection. Congress
responded by amending federal patent law to protect sound recordings. Although Congress amended the
statute specifically in response to the Supreme Court decisions and did not like the policy resulting from
those decisions, see H.R. REP. NO. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566,
1577-78, I have not included this action as an override of the Supreme Court decisions because the statutory
amendment left their rulings completely in place (state law remained preempted). I consider this a very close
call.
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Appendix III lists the 121 overridden Supreme Court decisions collected
in Appendix I, indicates in parentheses the dates of the decisions, and indicates
in brackets the dates of the congressional overrides. In the three remaining
columns, Appendix III makes some crude characterizations of those decisions.
Most of the characterizations are self-explanatory, but a few words are in order.
1. Voting Split
The "voting split" column reports how the Court divided, with the Court
majority being first, followed by the number of dissenters, followed by the
number of Justices concurring only in the judgment (if applicable). Hence, "7-
2" means there were seven Justices in the majority and two in dissent; "6-2-1"
means there were six Justices in the majority, two in dissent, and one concur-
ring in the judgment. I have characterized the ideology of the voting split in
brackets. Ideology is measured in conventional terms, with Justices Brennan
and Marshall as "liberals" and Justice Rehnquist as a "conservative." If the
Court divided ideologically and the conservatives won (Rehnquist in the
majority, Brennan and Marshall in dissent), I have reported "Con./Lib." If the
Court issues no opinion, was unanimous, or did not split along ideological lines
(e.g., Brennan and Rehnquist vote together), I have signified that as "No Split."
2. Primary Reasoning
The "primary reasoning" column reports the most important justification
invoked by the Court to support its interpretation of the statute. The choices
are:
* Plain Meaning, when the Court relies on the most natural meaning
of the statutory text, in light of standard rules of syntax and grammar,
accepted dictionaries, and the structure and other provisions of the
statute (the whole act).
-Legislative History, when the Court relies on the discussion (usually
within Congress) surrounding the enactment of the statute.
- ?recedents, when the Court relies on its own precedents interpreting
the statute or related statutes.
- Canons, when the Court relies on the canons of statutory construc-
tion, traditional presumptions, and clear statement rules of statutory
interpretation.
- Purpose, when the Court relies on the policy or purpose of the
statute.
- Common Law, when the Court relies on common law baselines.
1991]
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Sometimes, it was hard to determine the Court's "primary" basis for decision.
In such instances, I usually list the two most important justifications
3. Winners/Losers
The "winners/losers" column reports my characterization of the groups that
essentially won and lost each case, measured in terms of the decision's effect
upon their interests. Often this corresponds to the parties in the case (for
example, the United States), but sometimes I have extrapolated from the parties
to the groups that are more generally helped or hurt by the decision. I have
tried to be conservative in these extrapolations.
I have identified the raw "groups" whose "interests" are harmed by each
Supreme Court decision. The raw groups identified are:
- United States, when the government or one of its agencies or officers
lost the case against a criminal defendant, government contractor, tort
victim, regulated industry, taxpayer, etc. (I have not counted the U.S.
as the losing interest when it intervened to support a private interest's
interpretation.) Interests represented by the Solicitor General (at the
Court) and executive agencies or departments (in Congress) fall within
this category.
- Diffuse Citizenry, when the case harmed the interests of most or all
Americans in a similar or random way, including decisions against the
interests of government tort victims, antitrust plaintiffs, FOIA appli-
cants, consumers, and general litigants. Interests represented by the
Consumer's Union, Common Cause, or the ACLU fall within this
category.
- Organized Business, when the case harms the interests of a well
organized industry or trade group. Interests represented by the Chamber
of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, or a more specialized industry
group fall within this category.
* State & Local Government, when state and local governments directly
lost cases against criminal defendants, constitutional tort victims,
antitrust plaintiffs or defendants, etc. Interests represented by the
Association of State and Local Governments, or Association of State
Attorney Generals fall within this category.
- Organized Workers, when a decision injured the interests of unions,
retired workers, or government employees. Interests represented by
AFL-CIO and specific unions, American Association of Retired Per-
sons, or government employee unions fall within this category.
• Women, when a decision injured the interests of women as a group.
Interests represented by the National Organization for Women, various
ad hoc groups, or Planned Parenthood fall within this category.
[Vol. 101: 331
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• Disabled, when a decision injured the interests of Americans who
have physical or mental disabilities. Interests represented by the ACLU
or various special groups fall within this category.
• Environmentalists, when a decision failed to protect the environment.
Interests represented by the Sierra Club, Environmental Defense Fund,
Natural Resources Defense Council, etc. fall within this category.
• Veterans, when a decision failed to protect Americans who served
in the armed forces. Interests represented by Veterans of Foreign Wars
or various special issue groups fall within this category.
• Noncitizens, when a decision made it harder for noncitizens to enter
into or remain in this country. Interests represented by the Immigration
Bar fall within this category.
-Minorities, when a decision failed to recognize or enforce a statutory
right or remedy sought by a group traditionally discriminated against
because of its race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Interests represented
by the Lawyers' Committee on Civil Rights and the ACLU (generally),
the NAACP and Urban League (African Americans), MALDEF (Mexi-
can Americans), Human Rights Campaign Fund (lesbians and gay men)
fall within this category.
• The Poor, when a decision upheld or created a role disproportionately
affecting people below the poverty line. Interests represented by the
ACLU and specialized issue groups fall within this category.
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APPENDIX I
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
FEDERAL STATUTES (1967-1990)
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES SUPREME CoURr DECISION PRIMARY REASONING
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Pub.L.No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat.
5089, 5113-14 (1990)
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L.No.
101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5067
(1990)
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L.No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990)
§ 3102, 104 Stat, at 4916
§ 3103, 104 Stat. at 4916
Independent Safety Board Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub.L.No. 101-
641, § 3, 104 Stat. 4654 (1990)
Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990,
Pub.L.No.101-588, § 2, 104 Stat. 2879
(1990)
Inventions in Outer Space, Pub.L.No.
101-580, 104 Stat. 2863 (1990)
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,
P.L.No. 101-553,104 Stat. 2749 (1990)
Clean Air Act, Amendments,




§ 228(b), 104 Stat.
at 2507-08
§ 228(d), 104 Stat.
at 2510-11
§ 701, 104 Stat. at
2679 (new § 113(e))
§ 706, 104 Stat. at
2682
§ 707(g). 104 Stat. at
2683
§ 707(h), 104 Stat.
at 2683-84
National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 1991, Pub.L.No. 101-510.
§ 555, 104 Stat. 1485. 1569-70 (1990)
101sT CONGRESS
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545
(1989)
Matter of Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439
(5th Cir. 1983); also Boutilier v. INS.
387 U.S. 118 (1967)
In re Cain, 96 B.R. 115 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1988), et al.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)
Woulfe v. United States, No. 89-7822
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 1989)
TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942, 948
(9th Cir. 1981). et al.
Decca Ltd. v. United States, 191
U.S.P.Q. 439 (Ct.Cl. 1976); see
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram, 406
U.S. 518, 531 (1972)
BV Engineering v. UCLA, 858 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1988), et al.; see
Atascadero St. Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234 (1985)
Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071
(9th Cir. 1987)
Ced's Inc. v. EPA, 745 F.2d 1092 (7th
Cir. 1984)
United States v. Hill Petroleum, No.
85-0184C (W.D. La. July 29, 1986)
United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F.
Supp. 1110 (D.Md. 1987); United
States v. Kaiser Steel. No.82-2623-IH
(C.D.Cal. Jan. 17, 1984)
West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860
F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1988)
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation. 484 U.S. 49 (1984)
New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp.
1472 (D.D.C. 1985). rev'd on other
grounds, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir.
1986)
Unnamed judicial decisions interpreting
Uniformed Servs.
Former Spouses Protection Act
Gap in federal jurisdiction rules.
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873-76 (H.R.
Rep.)
Outdated health-based rules. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4069-
70 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6570-
71 (H.R. Rep.); id. at 4071 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6380 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4060-
61 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation based upon bad
Supreme Court cases. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950-55 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3408
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3509
(S. RepJ
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3512
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3749
(S. Rep
Bad interpretation. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3755 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 136 CoNo. REC. S18040
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (explanation
of conference agreement)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3758
(S.Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3166 (Conf. Rep)
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Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub.L.No. 101-503. 104 Stat.
1388 (1990)
§ 6208, 104 Slat.
at 1388-307 to -308
§ 11323(a), 104
Stat. at 1388-464
Education of the Handicapped Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-
476. § 103, 104 Stat. 1103, 1106
(1990)
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,
Pub.L. No. 101433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990)
Radiation E'xposure Compensation Act,
Pub.L.No. 101426, 104 Stat. 920
(1990)
Civil Service Due Process
Amendments, Pub.L.No. 101-376, 104
Stat. 461 (1990)
Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub.L.No. 101-73,103 Stat. 183
(1989)
§ 212(a), 103 Stat.
at 225-30 (new
§ 11(d)(3)-(7))
§ 212(a), 103 Stat.
at 240
§ 902, 103 StaL
at 450-53
§ 903, 103 Stat.
at 453-57
Marine Mammal Protection Act
Amendments of 1988, Pub.L.No. 100-
711, § 2, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988)
Insider Trading & Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub.L.No.
100-704. 102 Stat. 4677 (1988)
§ 3(b)(2), 102 Stat.
at 4680
§ 5, 102 Stat. at
4680-81
Patent & Trademark Office
Authorization, Pub.L.No. 100-703,
§ 201, 102 StaLt. 4674, 4676 (1988)
Judicial Improvements & Access to
Justice Act, Pub.L.No. 100-702, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988)
§ 501. 102 Stat. at
4652
Secretary of the Interior v. California,
464 U.S. 312 (1984)
Commissioner v. Danileson, 378 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1967), et al.
Dellmuth v. Muth,491 U.S. 223 (1989)
Public Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)
United States v. Allen, 816 F.2d 1417
(10th Cir. 1987); Begay v. United
States, 591 F. Supp. 991 (D.Ariz.
1984), aff'd, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1985)
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439
(1988)
Colt Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC,
489 U.S. 561 (1989)
Continental Cas. v. Allen. 710 F.Supp.
1088 (N.D. Tex. 1989)
Larimore v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir.
1986)
Stoddard v. Board of Gov'rs, 868 F.2d
1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
100TH CONGRESS
Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v.
Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d
795 (D.C.Cir. 1988)
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S.
19 (1987)
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 E2d 5
(2d Cir. 1983)
United States v. Morton Salt, 338
U.S. 632 (1950)
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879 (1988); Hohri v. United States,
482 U.S. 64 (1987)
Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 2675-
77 (Conf. Rep.)
Confusing caselaw. 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2351-53 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1734 (HR. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1990




Bad policy. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 698
(H.R.Rep.)
Address concerns raised by Supreme
Court. 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 214-15
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 212-
13 (HR. Rep.)
Confusion in law. 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
264 (HR. Rep.)
Confusion in law. 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
264-65 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162,
6178-79 (H.R. Rep.)
Issue unresolved by equally divided
Court. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6047
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6075-
76 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. Patent Licensing Reform
Act of 1988: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
& the Admin. of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary. 100th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 67 (1988)
Confused/unclear law. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6012-14 (H.R. Rep.)
1991]
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§ 801, 102 Stat. at
4657
§ 1007, 102 Stat. at
4667
§ 1019, 102 Stat. at
46
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub.L.No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat.
4181, 4508 (1988)
Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,
Pub.L.No. 100-688, 102 Stat. 4139
(1988)
Veterans' Judicial Review Act-
Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act of
1988, Pub.L.No. 100-687, Tit. II & 1I,
102 Stat. 4105, 4109-22 (1988)
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988,
Pub.L.No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988)
§§ 128-130, 102 Stat.
at 3944-45
§ 132, 102 Stat. at
3946
Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988,
Pub.L.No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988)
Technical & Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub.L.No. 100-647,
§ 3041,102 Stat. 3342, 3640-41 (1988)
McKinney Homeless Assistance
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.L.No.
100-628. § 1006, 102 Stat. 3224, 3265
(1988)
Review of Tribal Constitutions &
Bylaws, Pub.L.No. 100-581, 102 Stat.
2938 (1988)
Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy. Pub.L.No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (1988)
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
Pub.L.No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467
(1988)
Indian Self-Determination & Education
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub.L.No. 100472, § 206, 102 Stat.
2285, 2294-95 (1988)
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987,
Pub.L.No. 100-298, 102 Stat. 432
(1988)
Prescription Drug Marketing Act of
1987. Pub.L.No. 100-293, § 4. 102
Stat. 95, 96 (1988)
The Yale Law Journal
United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hill,
480 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Fa. 1979)
In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust
Litigation, 515 F. Supp. 1076
(D.Ariz. 1981)
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v.
Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987)
City of New York v. EPA, 543 F.
Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
Traynor v. Turnage. 485 U.S. 535
(1988)
Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-it,
Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1986);
Standard Terry Mills Inc. v. Shen
Mfg. Co, 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.
1986)
Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co.,
415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969)
Eastern Microwave, Inc. v.
Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1982); Pacific & Southern
Co. v. SBN, 694 F. Supp. 1565 (N.D.
Ga. 1988)
Peterson Est. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.
#18 (1988), et at.
Drake v. Pierce, 698 E Supp. 1523
(W.D. Wash. 1988)
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians
v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 165
(E.D. Cal. 1986)
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 765
F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)
California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians. 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
Busby Sch. of the N. Cheyenne Tribe
v. United States, 8 Ct.CI. 596 (1985);
Appeals of Papago Indian Tribe of
Ariz., IBCA-1962 & 1966 (1986)
Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978),
et al.
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658
(1975)
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6024
(H.R. Rep.)
Excessively technical policy. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6029 (H.R. Rep.)
Clarification of outdated rule. 133
CONG. REC. E1509 (daily ed. Apr.
23, 1987)
Bad policy. 134 CONG. REc. S17376
(daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5869-
70 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5801-
04 (H.R. Rep.)
Resolve split in circuits and update
statute. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5601-02
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5603
(S. Rep.)
Unanticipated policy problem. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5616 & 5642 (two
H.R. Reps.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4977
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4477-
78 (Conf. Rep.)
More flexible policy. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3909 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201-
02 (S. Rep.)
Rationalizing federal law. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3072-76 (S. Rep.)
Unequal application of federal law.
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2653-55 (S. Rep.)
Split in courts, bad policy. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 371 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 59-
60 (S. Rep.)
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Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub.L.No. 100-259,102 Stat. 28 (1938)
Computer Security Act, Pub.L.No. 100-
235. § 8, 101 Stat. 1724. 1730 (1987).
Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
FY 1988-89, Pub.L.No. 100-204, 101
Slat. 1331, 1399 (1987).
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, Pub.L.No. ,00-203, 101 Stat.
1330 (1987)
§ 9307(d), 101 Stat. 1330-357
§ 9343(c), 101 Stat. at 1330-372
§ 10103. 101 Slat. 1330-86
§ 10222, 101 Stat. 1330-410 to
411
§ 10225. 101 Stat. 1330-413
§ 10402. 101 Stat. 1330-431 to
-432
Criminal Fine Improvements Act,
Pub.L.No. 100-185, § 3, 101 Stat. 1279
(1987)
Competitive Equality Banking Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(1987)
§ 101(a), 101 Stat. at 554
§ 108, 101 Stat. at 579
Water Quality Act, Pub.L.No. 100-4.
101 Stat. 7 (1987)
§ 306, 101 Slat. at 35-36
§ 406(e), 101 Stat. at 73
Nat'l Defense Auth. Act for FY 1987.
Pub.L.No. 99-661, § 952, 100 Stat.
3816. 394549 (1986)
Health Programs. Pub.L.No. 99-660. §
2122. 100 Stat. 3743 (1986)
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986. Pub.L.No.
99-654, § 2, 100 Stat. 3660. 3660-63
(1986)
Criminal Law & Procedure Technical
Amendments Act of 1986. Pab.L.No.
99-646. 100 Stat. 3592 (1986)
Grove City College v. Bell. 465 U.S.
555 (1984); Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Darrone. 465 U.S. 624, 635-36
(1984) (leaving issue open)
SDC v. Mathews. 542 F.2d 1116 (9th
Cir. 1976).
Reagan v. Abourezk, 85 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
AMP, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d
612 (3d Cir. 1987)
Calfee, Halter & Griswold v.
Comm'r, 88 T.Ct. No. 35 (1987).
Porter v. Comm'r. 88 T.Ct. No. 28
(1987)
Woods Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 85 T.Ct.
274 (1985).
Textron, Inc. v. United States, 561
E2d 1023 (lst Cir. 1977)
Estate of John G. Boykin. 53 T.C.M.
345 (1987)
United States v. King, 824 F.2d 313
(4th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Mayberry. 774 F.2d 1018 (10th Cir.
1985)
Unnamed l1th Circuit case
M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First
Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1977)
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC. 470
U.S. 116 (1985)
NRDC v. EPA. 790 F.2d 289 (3d
Cir. 1986)
99111 CONGRESS
Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States.
416 F.2d 1306 (1969); United States
v. Rogerson. 785 F.2d 296 (Fed. Cir.
1986)
Givens v. Lederle. 556 F.2d 1341
(5th Cir. 1977). et a].
Williams v. United States. 327 U.S.
711 (1946)
Bad interpretation. 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3-6 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation, bad policy. 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3157, 3183 & nn.44-
45.
Constitutional concerns. 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2357 (S. Rep.) & 2423
(Conf. Rep.).
Policy coherence. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-614 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1636 (H.R. Conf.
Rep.).
Unfair policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-654 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-703-705 (H.R. Rep.), 2313-
1706-1709 (Conf. Rep.)
Unfair tax policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-711 (H.R. Rep.) & 2313-1717
(Conf.Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2313-658 to -660 (H.R. Rep.) &
2313-1740 to -1743 (Conf.Rep.)
Policy coherence. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2140 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 497
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 533
(S.Rep.). 612 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 22-25
(floor remarks)
Policy fairness. 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40 (floor remarks)
Policy unfairness, bad interpretation.
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6462-63 (S. Rep.)
& 6568-69 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6368
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6188
& nn.15-16. 6194-6200 (H.R. Rep.)
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§ 61, 100 Stat. at 3614
§ 63, 100 Stat. at 3614-15
§ 68. 100 Stat. at 3616
Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of
1986, Pub.L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100
Stat. 3582, 3590 (1986)
Futures Trading Act of 1986.
Pub.L.No. 99-641, § 103, 100 Stat.
3556, 3557 (1986)
Child Sexual Abuse & Pornography
Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-628,
§ 5(b)(1), 100 Stat. 3510-11 (1986)
Immigration Reform & Control Act of
1986, Pub.L.No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1986)
§ 112, 100 Stat. at 3381-83
§ 315(b), 100 Stat. at 3439-40
Quiet Title Actions, Pub.L.No. 99-598,
100 Stat. 3351 (1986)
Age Discrimination in Employment
Amendments of 1986, Pub.LNo. 99-
592, 100 Stat. 3342 (1986)
Freedom of Information Reform Act of
1986, §§ 1801-1804 of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L.No. 99-570,
100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 (1986)
False Claims Amendments Act of
1986, Pub.L.No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153 (1986)
§ 2(7), 100 Stat. at 3153-54
§ 5, 100 Stat. at 3158
§ 6, 100 Stat, at 3159-68
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L.No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)
The Yale Law Journal
United States v. Dawlett, 787 F2d
771 (lst Cir. 1986)
United States v. Lopez-Flores, 592
ESupp. 1302 (,V.D.Tex.1934)
United States v. Carpenter. 611 F.2d
113 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Culbert, 548 F.2d 1355 (9th
Cir.1977)
United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d
1121 (6th Cir. 1985)
CFC v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1984)
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917), aff'd, Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
United States v. Anaya, 509 F.Supp.
2289 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd. 685 F.2d
1272 (1lth Cir. 1982)
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183
(1984)
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273
(1983)
Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore. 472 U.S. 353 (1985)
Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899
(5th Cir. 1979), et al.
Jordan v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 591 R2d 753 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en bane), et al.
Olson v. Mellon, 4 ESupp. 947
(,V.D.Pa.1933), aff'd, 71 F.2d (3d
Cir. 1934)
United States v. Aerodex, Inc, 469
F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972)
United States v. Azzarelli Constr.
Co., 647 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1981), et
al.
United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310
(6th Cir. 1962), et al.
United States v. Sells Eng'g Co.. 463
U.S. 418 (1983); United States v.
Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983)
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6153
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6153
(H.R. Rep.)
Split in circuits. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6155-56 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6128
(S.Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6010
(H.R. Rep.)
Outdated policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5958 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad and ambiguous policy. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669-70 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5728
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5643-
44 (H.R. Rep.)
Clarify policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5632, 5639 (H.R. Rep.); also 131
CONG. REc. S14044 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1983)
Bad policy. Freedom of Information
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Technology & the Law of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary.
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 & n.38
Bad policy. Freedom of Information
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Technology & the Law of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 62
Split in circuits. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5283-84 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5284
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5286-
87 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5295-
96 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5298-
99 (S. Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
§ 631, 100 Stat. at 2269-75
§ 821, 100 Slat. at 2372
§ 1004, 100 SaLt. at 2388
§ 1501, 100 Slat. at 2732-43
§ 1535. 100 Stat. at 2750
Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, Pub.L.No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986)
§ 101(b)(2), 100 Slat at 1850
§ 301(a), 100 Stat. at 1868-72
Rehabiliation Act Amendments,
Pub.L.No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807
(1986)
Superfund Amendments &
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub.L.No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
§ 114, 100 Slat. at 1652-53
§ 127(d), 100 StaL at 1693
Air Carrier Access Act of 1986,
Pub.L.No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080
(1986)
Handicapped Children's Protection Act
of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat.
796 (1986)
Judicial Improvements Act of 1985.
Pub.L.No. 99-336, § 3, 100 Stat.633.
637 (1986)
Firearm Owners' Protection Act.
Pub.L.No. 99-308, § 105, 100 Stat.
449, 459 (1986)
Comprehensive Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub.LNo.
99-272, § 11007(a), 100 Slat. 82, 244
(1986)
California-Nevada Boundary,
Pub.L.No. 99-200,99 Slat. 1663 (1985)
Dep't of Defense Auth. Act, 1986,
Pub.L.No. 99-145, § 512,99 Stat. 583.
623-27 (1985)
Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension
& Amendment. Pub.LNo. 99-80. 99
Slat. 183 (1985)
§ 1(a), (c), 99 Slat. at 183-84
General Utilities & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935)
Orange & Rockland Utils. v.
Comm'r, 86 T.Ct. No. 14 (1986), et
al.
Miller v. Comm'r. 733 F.2d 399 (6th
Cir. 1984), et al.
Asphalt Prods. Co. v. Comm'r, 796
F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1986)
DeMartino v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1986-263, et al.
Boddie v. ABC, 731 F.2d 333 (6th
Cir. 1984), et al.
United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977), et al.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985)
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355
(1986)
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981)
United States Dep't Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477
U.S. 597 (1986)
Smith v. Robinson. 468 U.S. 992
(1984); also Marek v. Chesney, 473
U.S. 1 (1985) (overidden in part)
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. B&O R.
Co., 258 U.S. 377 (1922), aff'd in
Franchise Tax Bd v. Construction
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
Dickerson V. New Banner Inst., Inc.,
260 U.S. 103 (1983)
In re Bastian Co., 45 Bankr.L.Rep.
717 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
California v. Nevada. 447 U.S. 125
(1980)
Doughtery v. Lehman. 688 F.2d 158
(3d Cir. 1982)
Bad policy. See 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4286-87, 4292-93 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410-
12 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4430-
31 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4870 n.3 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4884 (Conf.
Rep.)
Constitutional problems. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3571 (S. Rep.)
Constitutional problems and bad
policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3556,
3567-68 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. S. REP. No. 388,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1986)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3318
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3352-
53 (Conf. Rep.)
Policy fairness. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2329-30 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1799 (Conf. Rep.)
Obsolescent rule. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1553 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1354-
55 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699 (H.R. Rep.)
Litigation inappropriate. § 1, 99 Stat.
1663
Bad policy. 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 484-
85 (H.R. Rep.)
Spencer v. NLRB. 712 F.2d 539(D.C. Cir. 1983). et al. Bad interpret3tion. 1985U.S.C.C.A.N. 13941 (H.R. Rep.)
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 429 1991-1992
§ 1(c)(2), 99 Stat. at 184
§ 2, 99 Stat. at 184-85
§ 2(c)(2)(G), 99 Stat. at 185
§ 2(c)(2)(H), 99 Stat. at 185
Export Administration Amendments
Act of 1985, Pub.L.No. 99-64,
§ 113(5), 99 Stat. 120, 148-50 (1985)
The Yale Law Journal
Fidelity Constr. Co. v. United States.
700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
Tulalip Tribes of Washington v.
FERC, 749 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984)
Auke Bay Concerned Citizens'
Advisory Council v. Marsh, 755 F.2d
717 (9th Cir. 1985)
Cases holding EAJA inapplicable to
condemnation proceedings (no list)
United States v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d
40 (2d Cir. 1977)
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 144
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145
(H.R. Rep.)
Overly technical approach. 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 146 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 147
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 126
(Conf. Rep.)
98TH CONGRESS
Patent Law Amendments of 1984,
Pub.L.No. 98-622,98 Stat. 3383 (1984)
§ 101, 98 Stat. at 3383
§ 103. 98 Stat. at 3384
Trademark Clarification Act, Pub.L.No.
98-620, § 102, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984)
Trade & Tariff Act of 1984, Pub.L.No.
98-573, § 210(a), 98 Stat. 2948, 2977
(1984)
Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub.L.No. 98-549, § 5, 98 Stat.
2779, 2802-03 (1984)
Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984, Pub.L.No.98-544, 98 Stat. 2750
(1984)
Central Intelligence Information Act,
Pub.,. No. 98-477, § 2(c), 98 Stat.
2209, 2211-12 (1984)
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub.L.No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984)
§ 212(a), 98 Stat. at 2000
§ 1005, 98 Stat. at 2138-39
§ 1103, 98 Stat. at 2143
§ 1104, 98 Stat. at 2143-44
§ 1106, 98 Stat. at 2145
§ 1107, 98 Stat. at 2145-46
§ 1109(a). 98 Stat. at 2147-48
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972)
In re Clemens. 622 F.2d 1029
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Bass, 474
F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills
Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th
Cir. 1982)
United States v. I-eraeus-Amersil.
Inc., 671 F.2d 1356 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
Chartwell Communications Group v.
Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.
1980)
Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982);
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light, 435 U.S. 389 (1978)
Terkel v. Kelly, 599 F.2d 214 (7th
Cir. 1979); Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d
689 (6th Cir. 1980)
United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d
1293. 1301 (9th Cir. 1977)
Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228
(9th Cir. 1944)
Busic v. United States. 446 U.S. 398
(1980); Simpson v. United States,
435 U.S. 6. 10 (1978)
United States v. Brown. 688 F.2d
596 (9th Cir. 1982)
United States v. Losehiavo. 531 F.2d
659 (2d Cir. 1976), et at.
United States v. Kaplan, 586 F2d
980 (2d Cir. 1978). et al.
Williams v. United States. 458 U.S.
279 (1982); United Slates v. Maze.
414 U.S. 395 (1974)
United States v. Bedwell. 456 F.2d
448 (8th Cir. 1972)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5828
(section-by-section floor analysis)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5833-
34 (section-by-section floor analysis)
Bad interpretation, and bad policy.
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5720-27 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5027
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4745-
52 (floor colloquy)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4603-08 (H.R.
Rep.)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3786-88 & 3791
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad reasoning. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3309-10, 3312 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3320
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490,
3493 n.3 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3509
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3510-
11 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3514
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3517-
19 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3521
(S. Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
§ 1204(a), 98 Stat. at 2152
§ 1206. 98 StaL at 2153
§ 1503(2), 98 Stat. at 2182
Longshore & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of
1984, Pub.L.No. 98-426, § 4, 98 Stat.
1639, 1641 (1984)
Drug Price Competition & Patent Term
Restoration Act, Pub.L.No. 98-417, §
202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984)
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,
Pub.L.No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984)
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub.L.No. 98-369,98 Stat. 494 (1984)
§ 65, 98 Stat. at 584
§ 77. 98 Stat. at 595-97
§ 79, 98 Stat. at 597
§ 82. 98 Stat. at 598
§ 91, 98 Stat. at 598-601
§ 95, 98 Stat. at 616
§ 131, 98 Stat. at 662-64
§ 159, 98 Stat. at 696
§ 172(a), 98 Stat. at 699-703
§ 211(a), 98 Stat. at 740-41
§ 421, 98 Stat. at 793-95
§ 1026, 98 Slat. at 1031
§ 1051, 98 Stat. at 1044-45
Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333, 390-91 (1984)
Shipping Act of 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-
237, § 7, 98 Slat. 67,73-74 (1984)
United States v. Lember, 319 F.Supp.
249 (E.D. Va. 1970)
United States v. Sam Goody, Inc.,
675 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.1982), et al.
Playboy Enterprises v. Baccarat
Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982)
Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 925 (1984)
Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
SEC v. MacDonald. 699 F.2d 47 (1st
Cir. 1983)
Comm'r v. Kelly, 293 F.2d 904 (5th
Cir. 1961)
Starker v. United States. 602 F.2d
1341 (9th Cir. 1979)
Raphan v. United States, 3 Ct.CI. 457
(1983)
Edward L. Stephenson Trust v.
Comm'r, 81 T.C. 22 (1983)
Harold v. Comi'r, 192 F.2d 1002
(4th Cir. 1951); Crescent Wharf v.
Comm'r 518 F.2d 772 (9th Cir.
1975)
Insilco Corp. v. Comm'r. 73 T.C.
589 (1980)
Dittler Bros. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.
896, 915 (1979)
United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d
696 (8th Cir. 1981)
Beaton v. Comm'r 664 F.2d 315 (Ist
Cir. 1981); J. Simpson Dean v.
Comm'r, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), et al.
Greenspun v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 931,
aft'd, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982)
Comm'r v. Standard Life & Accid.
Ins. Co.. 433 U.S. 148 (1977)
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962)
Diedrich v. Comm'r, 457 U.S. 191
(1982)
Kamanski v. Comm'r. 477 F.2d 452
(9th Cir. 1973)
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco. 465
U.S. 513 (1984)
FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska
Amerika Linien, 309 U.S. 238
(1968): Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conf., 383 U.S 213
(1966)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3538
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3541-
44 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3631-
32 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2774 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2678-
79 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2284-
85 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1536
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy.1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 895-
98 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 899-
900 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 902-
03 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 915
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1585-
86 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 969,
971 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1689
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1019-
21 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1699-
1712 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1072-
73 (H.R. Rep.) & 1748-53
(Conf.Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1134-
35 (HR. Rep.) & 1804 (Conf. Rep.)
Fairness adjustment. 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1328-29 (HR. Rep.) &
1929-30 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1329-
32 (HR. Rep.) & 1952 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 130 CONG. REC. 14851-
52 & 17151-59 (1984)
Bad policy. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 174,
222-23 (Conf. Rep.)
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FCC Authorization Act of 1983.
Pub.L.No. 98-214, § 4, 97 Stat. 1467-
68 (1983)
Supplemental Approps. Act of 1983,
Pub.L.No. 98-63, ch. VII, 97 Stat. 301,
323-24 (1983)
Social Security Amendments of 1983,
Pub.L.No. 98-21, § 327, 97 Stat. 65,
126-27 (1983)
Misc. Tax & ERISA Provisions,
Pub.L.No. 97-473, § 301, 96 Stat.
2605, 2611-12 (1982)
Futures Trading Act of 1982,
Pub.L.No. 97-444,96 Stat. 2294 (1982)
§ 101, 96 Stat. at 2294-96
§ 225, 96 Stat. at 2315-16
NRC Authorization Act, Pub.L.No. 97-
415, § 12, 96 Stat. 2067,
2073-74 (1982)
Antitrust Reciprocity Act, Pub.L.No.
97-393, 96 Stat. 1964 (1982)
Endangered Species Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub.L.No. 97-304, § 5, 96
Stat. 1411, 1421-22 (1982)
Communications Amendments of 1982-
-National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, Pub.L. No.
97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1099 (1982)
Dep't of Defense Authorization Act of
1983, Pub.L.No. 97-252. § 1002, 96
Stat. 718, 730-35 (1982)
Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub.L.No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (1982)
§ 224, 96 Stat. at 485-90
§ 228, 96 Stat. at 493
Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub.L.No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat.
131, 134 (1982)
Federal Tort Claims-National Guard,
Pub.L.No. 97-124,95 Stat. 1666 (1981)
Immigration & Nationality Act
Amendments of 1981, Pub.L.No. 97-
116, § 8, 95 Stat. 1611. 1616 (1981)
Dep't of Defense Authorization Act of
1982, Pub.L.No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat.
1099, 1114-16 (1981)
The Yale Law Journal
Western Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.
674 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
Meade Township v. Andrus. 695
F2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1982)
Rowan Companies. Inc. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981)
97TH CONGRESS
Agsalud v. Standard Oil of Calif.,
454 U.S. 801 (1981), aff'g mem.,
633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980)
Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th
Cir. 1982)
Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016
(7th Cir. 1979)
Sholly v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 651 F.2d 780
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curium)
Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434
U.S. 308 (1978)
Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v.
Endangered Species Scientific Auth.,
659 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
Reston v. FCC, 492 F.Supp. 697
(D.D.C. 1980)
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981)
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v.
Comm'r, 14 T.C. 74, aff'd, 187 E2d
718 (5th Cir. 1951)
Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. 1979)
City of Mobile v. Bolden. 446 U.S.
55 (1980)
Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S.
41 (1965)
Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975):
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966)
United States v. Banks, 383 F.Supp.
368 (D.S.D. 1974); United States v.
Jaramillo, 380 F.Supp. 1375 (D.
Neb.), appeal dismissed, 510 F.2d
808 (8th Cir. 1975)
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2232
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1309
(S. Rep.)
Bad reasoning. 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N.
183 (S. Rep.). 299-300 (H.R. Rep.),
438 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4595
(S. Rep.) & 4603 (Conf. Rep.)
Interpretation violates agency
agreement. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3889.
3929 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3906-
09 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3598
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3495,
3500-01 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829
(H.R. Rep.) & 2869 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2304
(Conf. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1570 (Conf.Rep.)
Bad policy. 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1309-
14 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1319
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179. 193-204 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. Federal Tort Claims Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Agency Admin. of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary. 97th Cong., Ist &
2d Sess. 34, 86-88 (1981-82).
Confusing Court precedents. 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2593-94 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy and update old statute.
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1788. 1790 (H.R.
Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
Military Justice Amendments of 1981,
Pub.L.No. 97-81, 95 Stat. 1085 (1981)
§ 4. 95 Stat. at 1088
§ 5, 95 Stat. at 1088-89
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981,
Pub.L.No. 97-79,95 Stat. 1073 (1981)
§ 2(a), 95 Stat. at 1073
§ 2(d), 95 Stat. at 1073
Marine Mammal Protection Act,
Pub.L.No. 97-58, § 2(2), 95 Stat.
979, 981 (1981)
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981. Pub.L.No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357
(1981)
§§ 1118(e)(3) & 1119(d), 95 Stat.
at 631-32, 633
§ 2312, 95 Stat. at 853
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Pub.L.No.97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981)
§ 266, 95 Slat. at 265-66
§ 507, 95 Stat. at 333
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980,
Pub.L.No. 96-605, § 107, 94 Stat.
3521, 3524 (1980)
Pub.L.No. 96-598, § 1, 94 Stat. 3485,
3485-86 (1980)
Pub.L.No. 96-596, § 2, 94 Stat. 3469,
3469-74 (1980)
Banruptcy Tax Act of 1980,
Pub.L.No. 96-589, § 5(0, 94 Stat.
3389. 3406 (1980)
Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act, Pub.L.No. 96-487, §
1323, 94 Stat. 2371, 2488 (1980)
Federal Question Jurisdictional
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.
96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980)
Equal Access to Justice Act, Title II of
the Small Business Export Expansion
Act of 1980, Pub.L.No. 96-481, 94
Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980)
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,
Pub.L.No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980)
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. at 2247-51
United States v. Furgason, 6 MJ.
844 (CMR 1979), et. al.
United States v. Larneard, 3 MJ. 76
(CMA 1977)
United States v. Wingate, No. 76-
20M (M.D. Fla. June 18, 1976)
United States v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217
(3d Cir. 1979)
People of Toglak v. United States,
470 F.Supp. 423 (D.D.C 1979)
Gebbie v. United States R.R.
Retirement Bd., 631 F.2d 512 (7th
Cir. 1980)
Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975)
Consolidated Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 37 BTA 576 (1938), aff'd.
101 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1938)
Teh v. Comm'r, 260 F.2d 489 (9th
Cir. 1952); Comm'r v. Pittston Co.,
252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958)
96"r CONGRESS
Comm'r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77
(1977)
Great Olympic Tire Co. v. U.S., 597
P.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1979)
Adams v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 81
(1979)
Meyer v. Comm'r, 383 F.2d 883 (8th
Cir. 1967)
Utah v. Andrus, Civ. 79-0037 (D. Ut.
Oct. 1. 1979)
Snyder v. Harris, 294 U.S. 332
(1969)
Peolo v. Farmers Homes Admin., 562
F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1977), et al.; also
Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness
Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)
Unfair policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1521 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1517-
18 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1753
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1470
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1224-
26 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 780-
81 (S. Rep.)
Special relief. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N.
206 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 266-
67 (S. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7311 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7201-
02 & n.2 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7191-
92 & n.4 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7058
& n.9 (S. Rep.)
Legal uncertainty. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5254 (S. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5064 & n.2 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4996,
also 4985 (H.R. Rep.)
Kirschenmann v. United States. 488 Confusion in law. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1973), et al. 4702-04 & n.4 (S. Rep.)
1991]
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§ 2(a), 94 Stat. at 2247-48
§ 2(a), 94 Stat at 2248-50
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. at 2250
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. at 2253
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.
96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (1980)
§ 226, 94 Stat. at 1930-31
§ 506, 94 Stat. at 1956
Customs Courts Act of 1980,
Pub.L.No. 96-417. § 201, 94 Stat.
1727, 1728-30 (1980)
Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act
of 1980, Pub.L.No. 96-349, 94 Stat.
1154 (1980)
§ 2, 94 Stat. at 1154-56
§ 3, 94 Stat. at 1156
§ 4. 94 Stat. at 1156-57
§ 5, 94 Stat. at 1157
§ 6, 94 Stat. at 1157-58
Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act,
Pub.L.No. 96-308,94 Stat. 939 (1980)
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, Pub.L.No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980)
Pub.L.No. 96-170,93 Stat. 1284 (1979)
Pub.L.No. 96-135, 93 Stat. 1056 (1979)
Dep't of Justice Appropriation Act, FY
1980, Pub.L.No. 96-132, § 14, 93 Stat.
1040, 1048 (1979)
Dep't of Defense Authorization Act,
1980, Pub.L.No. 96-107, § 801(a), 93
Stat. 803, 810-11 (1979)
The Yale Law Journal
Baltimore Baseball Co. v. United
States, 481 F.2d 1283 (Ct.CI. 1973)
Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch. 304 U.S.
191 (1938)
Rushing v. Comm'r, 441 F.2d 593
(5th Cir. 1971), et al.
J.K. Griffith, 73 T.C. No. 76 (Feb.
28, 1980)
Miller v. Usry, 160 FSupp. 368
(W.D. La. 1958)
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v.
ICC, 617 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1980)
Maloof v. United Tmnsp. Union, No.
78-3797 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 27, 1980)
Sneaker Circus v. Carter, 566 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1977); Consumers
Union v. Comm. for Implementation
of Textile Agreements, 561 F.2d 872
(D.C. Cir. 1977), et al.
United States v. GAF Corp., 596
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979)
Kiefer v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc.,
404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968), et at.
'T1VA v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
409 U.S. 363 (1973)
Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590
F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1979)
United States v. American Building
Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271
(1975)
United States v. Amold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); see
Continental TV. Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)
United States v. Mattson, 600 F2d
1295 (9th Cir. 1979): United States v.
Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.
1977)
District of Columbia v. Carter. 409
U.S. 418 (1972)
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel,
432F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1970)
Clay Simmons v. United States, No.
77-75-5 (D.N.Mex.)
United States v. Russo, 1 MJ. 134
(CMA 1975): also United States v.
Harrison. 5 MJ. 476, 481 (CMA
1978). et al,
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Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4704-
05 & n.8 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4705-
06 & n.10 (S. Rep.)
Confusion in law. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4707-09 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4712-
13 & n.22 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4721
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4151
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4166 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741
(H.R. Rep.)
Need for legislative elaboration. 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2716 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. Antitrust Procedural
Improvements & Jurisdictional
Amendments: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies &
Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 23 & n.60 (1979)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2769
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2754
(H.R. Rep.)
Remove anomaly in law. 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2732 (H.R. Rep.)
Need clarification for one industry.
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2373-74 (H.R.
Rep.)
Bad policy. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 789
(S. Rep.)
Update statutory poticy. 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2609-10 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2077
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039-40 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1827-
28 (S. Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
Panama Canal Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.
96-70, § 1411, 93 Stat. 452,485 (1979)
Energy and Water Development
Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub.L.No.
96-69, lit. IV, 93 Stat. 437,449 (1979)
Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub.L.No. 96-39, § 101. 93 Stat. 144,
181-82 (1979)
Endangered Species Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-632, § 7, 92
Stat. 3751, 3752-60 (1978)
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-
600, § 365. 92 Stat. 2763, 2854-55
(1978)
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub.L.No. 95-598, 92Stal 2549(1978)
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2449-50
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2555
§ 101, 92 Stat, at 255
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2564
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2564
§ 101. 92 Stat. at 2579-80
§ 101. 92 Stat, at 2584
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2590-91
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2591
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2591
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2594
§ 101. 92 Stat. at 2595-96 & 1601-
02
§ 101. 92 Stat. at 2596
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2598-99
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2599-2600
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2619
United Fruit Co. v. Panama Canal
Co., 243 F.Supp. 410 (D.Canal Zone
1965)
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
Voss Int'l v. United States, C.D.
4801 (May 7, 1979)
95TH CoNGREss
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
Bongiovanni v. Comm'r, 470 F.2d
921 (2d Cir 1972); Thatcher v.
Comm'r, 533 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.
1976)
In re Freight Drivers Local 600, 3
Bankr.Ct. Dec. 528 (E.D.Mo.1977)
Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 1 (1941)
In re Bank of Crowell, 53 F.Supp.
682 (N.D. Tex. 1931)
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Brock, 405 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1968)
In re Beverly Crest Convalescent
Hosp, Inc., 548 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1976)
In re Illinois Art Indus., Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 334 (W.D.Mich. 1939)
United States v. Embassy Restaurant,
359 U.S. 29 (1958)
Birkelt v. Columbia Bank, 195 U.S.
345 (1904)
In re Walter, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.
1974), et al.
Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473
(1902)
Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18
(1970); Lockwood v. Exchange Bank,
190 U.S. 294 (1908)
Fort Pitt Coal & Coke Co. v. Diser,
239 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1917)
In re Federals, Inc., 553 F2d 509
(6th Cir. 1977)
In re King Porter Co., 446 E2d 722
(5th Cir. 1971)
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1966); Grain Merchants v.
Union Bank & Says.. 408 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1969)
In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp.. 112
F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1940)
Bad policy. 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1067
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 388,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
Bad policy. 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 480
(S. Rep.)
Need for more flexible policy. 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9460-63 (H.R.
Rep.)
Split in the circuits. 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6946-48 (S.Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6266
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5815
(S. Rep.) & 6274 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6157-
58 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6442,
6511 (floor debate)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6286
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6153
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5855
(S. Rep.) & 6313 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6453
(S. Rep.) & 6522 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5865
(S. Rep.) & 6320 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5865
(S. Rep.) & 6320-21 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5868
(S. Rep.) & 6324 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6456
(H.R. Rep.) & 6525 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5875
(S. Rep.) & 6330 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5874-
75 (S. Rep.) & 6330 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5892
(S. Rep.)
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§ 101, 92 Slat. at 2624
§ 101, 92 Stat, at 2632
§ 101, 92 Stat. at 2635
§ 213, 92 Stat, at 2661
Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
Pub.L.No. 95-563.92 Stat. 2383 (1978)
§ 10(a), 92 Stat. at 2388
§§ 8(g) & 14(h), 92 Stat. at 2387
& 2390
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
Pub.L.No. 95-555, 92 StaL 2076 (1978)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978. Pub.L.No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (1978)
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
Pub.L.No. 95-504, § 30,92 Stat. 1705,
1731 (1978)
Pub.L.No. 95-502, Title III, 92 Stat.
1693, 1702-03 (1978)
Income Taxes, Fringe Benefits,
Regulations, Pub.L.No. 95-427, § 3,92
Stat. 996, 996-97 (1978)
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973 Amendments. Pub.L.No. 95-597,
92 Stat. 2547 (1978)
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-
256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978)
§ 2, 92 Stat. at 189
§ 4(b), 92 Stat. at 190-91
§ 4(c), 92 Stat. at 191
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub.L.No.
95-217, §§ 61 & 67(b), 91 Stat. 1566.
1598, 1606 (1977)
Food & Agriculture Act of 1977.
Pub.L.No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977)




Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub.L.No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)
§ 116, 91 Stat. at 711
The Yale Law Journal
American United Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. City of Aron Park, 311 U.S. 138
(1940)
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 347 U.S. 298 (1954)
Aladdin Hotel Corp. v. Bloom, 200
F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953)
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973)
United States v. Bianchi & Co., 373
U.S. 709 (1963)
S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United
States, 406 U.S. 1 (1972)
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976)
United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
Hughes Tool Co. v. TWA, 409 U.S.
363 (1973)
Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217 v.
United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1978), et a].
Comm'r v. Kowalski. 434 U.S. 77
(1977)
In Re Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co., 548
R2d 621 (6th Cir. 1977)
McMann v. United Airlines, 434 U.S.
192 (1977)
Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d
1367 (6th Cir. 1975). et al.
Usery v. Sun Oil Co., 423 ESupp.
125 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
Minnesota v. Hoffman. 543 F.2d
1198 (9th Cir. 1976)
Hein v. Burns, 402 ESupp. 398
(S.D.Iowa 1975). rev'd, 429 U.S. 288
(1977), et al.
Compton v. Tennessee Dep't of Pub.
Welf.. 532 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1976)
Thomas v. Butz, No. 73-336 (D.Ariz.
Jan. 20. 1976)
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167
(1976)
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6465
(H.R. Rep.) & 6534 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5905
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6367
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 6404
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5239-
40 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5237-
38 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4750-52 (H.R.
Rep.)
Fill in statutory gap. 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3910-16 (S.Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3754
(H.R. Rep.) & 3792 (Cong. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3716-
17 (H.R. Rep.)
Fairness. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2512-13
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5781-
82 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 529 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 515
(S. Rep.) & 533-34 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 516
(S. Rep.) & 534-35 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4393 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation and bad policy.
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2003-05 (H.R.
Rep.)
Bad policy. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2003
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2012
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1277-78 (H.R. Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
§ 120. 91 Slat. at 720
§ 127. 91 Stat. at 731 ft.
§ 305, 91 Stat, at 772-77
§ 305(c)(3), 91 Slat. at 776
Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, Pub.LNo. 94-579. §
704(a). 90 Slat. 2743, 2792 (1976)
Pub.L.No. 94-577,90 Slat. 2729 (1976)
Pub.L.No. 94-574,90 Slat. 2721 (1976)
§ 1, 90 Slat. at 2721
§ 3. 90 Slat. at 2721-22
Pub.L.No. 94-568.90 Slat, 2697 (1976)
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-
559, 90 Slat. 2641 (1976)
Copyrights Act, Pub.L.No. 94-553,90
Slat. 2541 (1976)
§ 101, 90 Slat, at 2541-44
§ 110. 90 Slat. at 2549-50
5 108. 90 Slat. at 2546-48
111. 90 Slat. at 2550-58
§ 411, 90 Slat. at 2583
Pub.L.No. 94-489.90 Stat. 2358 (1976)
Pub.L.No. 94-464.90 Slat. 1985 (1976)
Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub.L.No.
94455. 90 Slat. 1520 (1976)
§ 208. 90 Slat. at 1541-42
§ 601(a). 90 Slat. at 1569-72
Northern States Power Co. v. State of
Minn., 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972)
Fri v. Sierra Club. 412 U.S. 541
(1973). aff'g by equally divided
Court, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.
1972)
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462
F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of
Gov'rs, 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (dicta)
94TH CONGRESS
United States v. Midwest Oil Co..
236 U.S. 459 (1915)
Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461
(1974)
Litell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207 (4th
Cir. 1971). et a].
Town of East Haven v. Eastern
Airlines. 28 F. Supp. 507 (D. Conn.
1968)
McGtotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp.
448 (D.D.C. 1972)
Alyeska Pipeline Serv.Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975)
While-Smith Publ. Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1 (1908)
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken. 422 U.S. 151 (1975)
(reasoning)
Williams & \Vilkins Co. v. United
Slates. 420 U.S. 376 (1975). aff'g by
an equally divided Court. 487 F.2d
1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc.. 415
U.S. 394 (1974): Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television. Inc.. 39
U.S. 390 (1968)
Vacheron & Consiantin-Le Coultre
Watches. Inc. v. Benrns Watch
Co.. 260 1.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958)
Descomp v. Sampson. 377 F.Supp.
254 (D. Del. 1974). et al.
Henderson v. Bluemink. 511 F.2d
399 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
Various unnamed Tax Court
decisions
George H. Newi. T.C. Memo. 1969-
131. aff'd. 432 F.2d 998
(2d Cir. 1970)
Bad policy. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1524
(Conf. Rep.)
Preserve decision against possible
Supreme Court reconsideration. 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1183 (H.R. Rep.), also
1479 (views Reps. Devine et al.)
Address concerns implicit in these
decisions. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1397-
98 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1401
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6203
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6164-66 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6131
n33 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6139
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6057-
58 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy, fill "anomalous gaps" in
civil rights. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5909-
12 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5700-
01 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5688-
92 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5703
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5773
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5212 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4445-
46 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2992-
96 (H.R. Rep.)
Split authority. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3050-56 (H.R. Rep.) & 3576-82 (S.
Rep.)
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§ 1051, 90 Stat. at 1643-47
§ 1201(a), 90 Stat. at 1660-67
§ 1204(b), 90 Stat. at 1696-97
§ 1306(a), 90 Stat. at 1717-20
§ 2009(a), 90 Stat. at 1893
§ 2009(d), 90 Stat. at 1896
§ 2101(b), 90 Stat. at 1899
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.L.No.
94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976)
§ 102, 90 Stat. at 1384-87
§ 301, 90 Stat. at 1394-96
§ 302(3), 90 Stat. at 1396
Pub.L.No. 94-416,90 Stat. 1275 (1976)
Government in the Sunshine Act,
Pub.L.No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241
(1976)
§ 5(b), 90 Stat. at 1247-48
§ 5(c), 90 Stat. at 1247.48
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub.L.No.
94-407, 90 Stat. 1238 (1976)
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of
1975, Pub.L.No. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142
(1975)
Pub.L.No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (1975)
Voting Rights Act of 1965 -
Extension, Pub.L.No. 94-73. § 402, 89
Stat. 400, 404 (1975)
Securities Acts Amendment of 1975.
Pub.L.No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
§ 17(3), 89 Stat. at 155
§ 28(1), 89 Stat. at 164-65
Magnuson-Moss Warranty - FTC
Improvement Act, Pub.L.No. 93-637.
88 Stat. 2183 (1974)
The Yale Law Journal
Burke Concrete Accessorias, Inc., 56
T.C. 588 (1971)
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS.
505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1974)
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S.
725 (1974); Alexander v. "Americans
United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974)
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S.
125 (1972)
Estate of Bray v. Comm'r. 396 F.2d
452 (6th Cir. 1968). et al.
Park Place, Inc., 57 T.Ct. 767 (1972)
United States v. Union Oil Co. of
Calif., 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965)
California v. Frito-Lay, 474 F.2d 774
(9th Cir. 1973)
Decorative Stone Co. v. Building
Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426
(2d Cir. 1928)
New Mexico v. United States, 148
ESupp. 508 (D.N.M. 1957)
Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S.
255 (1972)
Aviation Consumer Action Project v.
Washburn, 535 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir.
1976)
North Carolina v. FPC, No. 74-1941
(D.C.Cir. 1976)
Hardy v. Lomenzo. 349 ESupp. 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)
Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary, 508
E2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974)
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y. 471 U.S. 240
(1975)
In re Nat'l Student Marketing Corp.,
368 F.Supp. 1311 (J.P.M.L. 1973)




Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3151-
52 & n.42 (H.R. Rep.) & 3710 n.36
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. 3209-
12 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3197-
99 (HR. Rep.) & 3793 (S. Rep.)
Harsh policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3179-80 & n.4 (H.R. Rep.) & 4009-
12 (S. Rep.)
Bad interpretation and incoherence
with tax policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3418-19 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3425-26 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3826 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2615
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2574-
78 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2588-
90 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2369-
71 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2204.05 (H.R. Rep.) &
2250 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2262
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2174
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2361
(H.R. Rep.)
Practical problems. 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 869-70 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 807-
10 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 251-
55 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 249
(S. Rep.)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
§ 201, 88 Stat. at 2545
§ 202, 88 Stat. at 2193-98
1974,Pub.L.No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126
(1974)
Pub.L.No. 93-600,88 Stat. 1955 (1974)
Pub.L.No. 93-512,88 Stat. 1609 (1974)
Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub.LNo. 93-
502, §§ l(b)(2) & 2(a), 88 Stat. 1561,
1561-62, 1563 (1974)
Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub.L.No.
93-366, § 104(b), 88 Stat. 409. 411
(1974)
Energy Supply & Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974, Pub.INo.
93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1984)
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of
1974, Pub.L.No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1)-(2),
88 Stat. 55, 58-59 (1974)
Pub.L.No, 93-201, 87 Stat. 838 (1973)
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act, PubX..No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576
(1973)
Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers
Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, Pub.I.No. 92-576, § 18, 86 Stat.
1251, 1263 (1972)
Pub.L.No. 92-415, 86 Stat. 652 (1972)
Pub.L.No. 92-140.85 Stat. 391 (1971)
Equal Employment Opportunity
Amendment of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-
261, § 217, 86 Slat. 103, 104 (1972)
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub.L.No. 92-
178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971)
Bunte Bros. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 349
(1941)
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v.
FTC, 340 ESupp. 134 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.Cir.
1973)
Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973) (overridden for Port Act
claims only); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)
(similar)
Fleishmann Distiller Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967)
Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d
360 (5th Cir. 1964)
EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973)
United States v. Pliskow, 354
F.Supp. 369 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 480
F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1973)
United States v. Clark, 19 C.M.A. 62
(1969)
Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, No. 72-
1628 (6th Cir. 1973)
Employees of the Dep't of Pub.
Health v. Missouri, 411 U.S 279
(1973)
Gulf Canal Lines v. United States,
386 U.S. 348 (1967) (per curiam).
aff'g, 258 ESupp. 864 (S.D. Tex.
1966)
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479
F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
92D CONGRESS
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 25 (1946)
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic
S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956)
Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386
U.S. 371 (1967); Reed v. S.S. Yaka,
373 U.S. 410 (1963)
Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 345 F.2d 808 (Ct.CI.
1965). rev'd, 384 U.S. 424 (1966)
Capitol Records, Inc v. Mercury
Records Corp., 221 E2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955)
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.. 402
U.S. 689 (1971), aff'g by an equally
divided Court, 429 R2d 325 (6th Cir.
1970)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7712-
13 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7715
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7556-
57 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7133-
36 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 62
(H-.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6272 (H.R. Rep.) &
6290 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3979-
80 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N:3980
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3286
(HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2853
(HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2925
(S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2417-
19 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4702-05 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4702-
04 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4705 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3118
(S. Rep.)
Regulatory gap. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1577 (H.R.Rep., DOJ Letter)
Bad policy. 118 CONG. REC. 1861-62
(1972) (House); id. at 228 (Senate)
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§ 307, 85 Stat. at 524
§ 312, 85 Stat, at 526
Amendments to the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, Pub.L.No. 92-
129, 85 Stat. 348 (1971)
Pub.L.No. 92-79, 85 Stat. 285 (1971)
Pub.L.No. 91-679,84 Stat. 2063 (1970)
Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1970, Pub.L.No. 91-547, 84 Stat.
1413-36 (1970)
Pub.L.No. 91-467, § 7, 84 Stat. 990,
992-93 (1970)
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
Pub.L.No. 91-452,84 Stat. 922 (1970)
§ 201(a), 84 Stat. at 926-28
§ 702(a), 84 Stat. at 935-36
Pub.L.No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 787,
790 (1970)
Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970,
Pub.L.No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466 (1970)
Pub.L.No. 91-350,84 Stat. 449 (1970)
Pub.L.No. 91-376, § 8(a), 84 Stat. 787,
790 (1970)
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub.L.No.
91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969)
§ 121, 83 Stat. at 536-49
§ 121(b), 83 Stat. at 537-44
§ 414. 83 Stat. at 612
§ 504, 83 Stat. at 632-33
§ 516(b), 83 Stat. at 646
§ 516(c). 83 Stat. at 647
The Yale Law Journal
"A recent court case" (unnamed)
"Recent court decisions" (unnamed)
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S.
112 (1970)
United States v. Carver, 260 U.S.
482 (1923); Dampskibsselskabet
Dannebrog v. Signal Oil & Gas Co.,
310 U.S. 268 (1940)
91ST CONGRESS
Louise M. Scudder. 48 T.C. 36,41
(1967)
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, No.
1083-66 (D.D.C. Sept 27, 1967)
Unnamed lower court decisions
In re McErath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C.
Cir. 1957)
Alderman v. United States. 394 U.S.
165 (1968)
Wellman v. Whittier, 259 E2d 163
(D.C. Cir. 1958). et al.
Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, 394 US. 131 (1969)
Kyer v. United States, 369 F.2d 714
(Ct. Cf. 1966), et al.
Tracy v. Gleason, 379 F.2d 469
(D.C.Cir. 1967), et al.
University Hill Found.. 51 T. Ct. 548
(1969)
Various unnamed court decisions
Various unnamed court decisions
Santa Fe R. v. United States, 378
F.2d 72 (7th Cir. 1967)
Maurer v. United States. 284 F.2d
122 (10th Cir. 1960)
Moberg v. Comm'r 305 F.2d 800
(5th Cir. 1962). et al.
[Vol. 101: 331
Bad policy. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1863
(H.R. Rep.), 1976 (S. Rep.), 1065
(Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1981
(S. Rep.), 1066 (Conf. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1455-
56 (S. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1367-
68 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 60
90-91 (S. Rep.)
Legal uncertainty. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4907 (S. Rep.)
Split in circuits. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4161-62 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4018
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729-31 (H.R. Rep.)
Unfair, bad policy 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3547 (H.R. Rep.)
Regulatory gap. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3477-79 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad interpretation. 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729-31 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1690-
91 (H.R. Rep.) & 2092-93 (S. Rep.)
Split in courts. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2103 (S. Rep.), 2405 (Conf. Rep.)
Split in courts. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2181 (S. Rep.), 2423 (Conf. Rep.)
Unfair policy. 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2221 (S. Rep.), 2430 (Conf. Rep.)
Confusion in law. 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1810-12 (H.R. Rep.) & 2240-41 (S.
Rep.)
Split in circuits. 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1813-17 (H.R. Rep.) & 2241-46 (S.
Rep.)
90TH CONGRESS
Military Justice Act of 1968. Pub.L.No.
90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968)
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
§ 2(17), 82 Stat. at 1339
§ 2(24), 82 Sat. at 1341
False Representations by Mail Act,
Pub.L.No. 90-590,82 Stat. 1153 (1968)
Pub.L.No. 90-537,82 Stat. 885 (1968)
Pub. L.No. 90-535, 82 Stat. 885 (1968)
Pub.L.No. 90-514, 82 Stat. 867 (1968)
Pub.L.No. 90-446, 82 Stat. 474-75
(1968)
Pub.LNo. 90-433. 82 Stat. 448-49
(1968)
Pub.L.No. 90-369,82 Stat. 279 (1968)
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub.L.No.
90-284, § 101, 82 Slat. 73-77 (1968)
Pub.L.No. 90-237, 81 Stat. 765 (1967)
§ 2(a), 81 Stat. at 765
§ 10(b), 81 Stat. at 768-71
Pub.L.No. 90-158, 81 Stat. 516 (1967)
Pub.L.No. 90-123, 81 Stat. 362 (1967)
Pub.L.No. 90-108, 81 Stat. 275-78
(1967)
Military Selective Service Act of 1967.
Pub.L.No. 90-40, § 1(7), 81 Stat. 100,
104 (1967)
United States v. Cleveland, 15
C.M.A. 213 (1965), et a].
United States v. May, 10 C.M.A. 358
(1959)
Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269
(1959)
Arizona v. Calif., 373 U.S. 546
(1963)
Streett v. United States, 331 F.2d 151
(8th Cir. 1964)
World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 391 U.S. 461
(1968), aff'g by an equally divided
Court, 380 F.2d 1770 (2d Cir. 1967)
Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v.
Prod'rs Livestock Marketing Ass'n,
356 U.S. 282, 289 (1958)(reasoning
not result)
Northwest Agric. Coop Ass'n, Inc. v.
ICC. 350 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1966)
In re Noland, 185 F.Supp. 948
(D.Neb. 1960)
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
754-55 (1966) (dicta)
National Coun. of Am.-Sov.
Friendship, Inc. v. SACB, 322 F.2d
375 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322
F.2d 364 (D.C.Cir. 1963)
Lane v. Haytian Corp. of Am., 117
F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1941)
United States v. Scoratow. 137
RSupp. 620 (W.D. Pa. 1956)
Feeley v. District of Columbia, 387
F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Smith v.
District of Columbia, 387 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1967)
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1964)
Unfair practice. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4511 (S. Rep.)
Unjust policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4513-14 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4295
(H.R. Rep.). 4298 (Postm. Gen'l),
4299 (Att'y Gen'l)
Elaborate on Supreme Court decree.
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668-69 (MR.
Rep.); see id. at 3735 (dissenting
view, that law all but negates
Supreme Court decree)
Bad policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3654-
55 (HR. Rep.)
Split circuits, confused law. 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3595 (HR. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2866-
67 (S. Rep.) & 2868 (Dep't Agric.)
Bad policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2768-
69 (H.R. Rep.), 2777 (Sec'y Army)
& 2774-75 (Dep't Ag.)
Unfair policy. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2446 (S. Rep.)
Clarify law. 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1840-41 (S. Rep.)
Clarify legislative intent. 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2669-70 (H.R. Rep.)
Solve mootness problem. 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2673-75 (H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2009-
10 (S. Rep., quoting H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1761
(H.R. Rep.)
Gap in law. 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1742
(H.R. Rep.)
Bad policy. 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333-
34 (H.R. Rep.) & 1359-60 (Conf.
Rep.)
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APPENDIX II
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SCRUTINIZED IN HOUSE & SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS
(1979 - 1988)
This Appendix lists Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions
subject to hearings in the House or Senate Judiciary Committees and
Subcommittees, which considered overruling or modifying the decisions.
No effort was made to find every bill that responded to a Supreme Court
decision; only those bills that were the subject of hearings are listed.
The Appendix covers the ten-year
Congresses.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS






Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988);
United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987)
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988);
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)
United States v Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987);
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987)
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs..
483 U.S. 143 (1987)
ShearsorAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon. 482
U.S. 220 (1987)
Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S.
104 (1986)
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 104 (1986)
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986)
Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau,
Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986); Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)













































All 100(2 House bills
die Subcomm.
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Overriding Statutory Decisions
United States v. Shearer. 473 U.S. 52 (1985);
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983);
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797
(1984)
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984);
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
446 U.S. 719 (1980)
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984);
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);
lMaher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980)
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752 (1984)
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984);
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624
(1984); North Haven Bd. of Edue. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982)
NLRB v. Bildiseo & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)
INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2 (1984); United States v. Loaw's. Inc., 371
U.S. 38 (1962); International Salt Co. v. United
States. 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983)
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S.




























































































Pub. L. No. 99-562
(1986)
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First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio
Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)
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APPENDIX III
SUPREME COURT STATUTORY DECISIONS OVERRIDDEN BY CONGRESS
(1967 -1990)
This Appendix lists Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions that were
overridden by the 96th through 100th Congresses. The full citations to these
decisions, and to their override statutes, can be found in Appendix I. This
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